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obilizing State by State
Executive Summary
Public health threats are inevitable. Being 
prepared for these threats can save lives and 
protect the health and safety of the public 
and emergency responders. The Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) works 
to support public health preparedness for all 
hazards, including natural, biological, chemical, 
radiological, and nuclear events. This work falls 
under one of the agency’s overarching health 
protection goals: “People prepared for emerging 
health threats - people in all communities will 
be protected from infectious, occupational, 
environmental, and terrorist threats.” CDC 
has established nine preparedness goals to 
strategically direct resources towards achieving 
this overarching goal.
The events of September 11, 2001, and the 
subsequent anthrax attacks both highlighted the 
importance of public health during emergencies 
and showed weaknesses in public health’s ability 
to respond during a potential crisis. In 2002, 
Congress authorized funding for the Public 
Health Emergency Preparedness cooperative 
agreement (hereafter referred to as the 
cooperative agreement) to support preparedness 
nationwide in state, local, tribal, and territorial 
public health departments. As of 2007, the 
cooperative agreement has provided more than 
$5 billion to these public health departments. 
CDC administers the cooperative agreement 
and provides technical assistance to public health 
departments. This report outlines progress and 
challenges. It also describes how CDC and its 
partners are working to address these challenges.
Progress continues. With support from 
the cooperative agreement, public health 
departments have improved their ability to 
respond to emergencies.
Public health departments can better detect and 
investigate diseases because of improvements 
in the public health workforce and in data 
collection and reporting systems. 
• The number of epidemiologists in public 
health departments working in emergency 
response has doubled from 115 in 2001 
to 232 in 2006.* Epidemiologists detect 
and investigate health threats and disease 
patterns and work to minimize the negative 
effects of a health threat in a community.
• The number of users for the Epidemic 
Information Exchange (Epi-X), a secure 
CDC-based communications system that 
helps track disease outbreaks, has increased 
to 4,646 in 2006, up from 890 in 2001. 
Users are primarily from state and local 
health departments (75%). 
• All state public health departments now can 
receive and evaluate reports of urgent health 
threats 24/7/365, whereas in 1999 only 12 
could do so. Previously, it was often difficult 
for clinicians to reach a public health 
professional after normal work hours.
* For 8 states and the District of Columbia (DC) responding to Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists (CSTE)          





























Public health laboratories have increased 
capability to test for biological and chemical 
threats and to communicate information. 
• The number of state and local public health 
laboratories able to detect biological agents 
has increased to 110 in 2007, from 83 in 
2002.
• The number of state and local public health 
laboratories able to detect chemical agents 
has increased to 47, from 0 in 2001. 
• All states now have public health 
laboratories that can quickly communicate 
with clinical laboratories. In 2001, only 
20 states reported having public health 
laboratories with this capability. Once a 
threat is confirmed in one laboratory, other 
laboratories need to be quickly alerted since 
they might receive related case samples 
(indicating that the threat is spreading). 
• More than twice the number of state public 
health laboratories are conducting exercises 
to test their ability to handle, confirm, and 
report results for chemical agents (from 16 
in 2003 to 38 in 2006).
Public health departments have developed 
response plans, implemented a formalized 
command structure, and conducted exercises.  
Such activities were rare prior to 2001.
• All states now have plans to receive, store, 
and distribute the Strategic National 
Stockpile (SNS), a national repository of 
antibiotics, other life-saving medications, 
and medical supplies. 
• Seventy-three percent of states reviewed 
have satisfactorily documented their SNS 
planning efforts.
• In 2005, public health departments in 
50 states and DC trained public health 
professionals about their roles and 
responsibilities during an emergency as 
outlined by the Incident Command System, 
while in 1999 only 14 did so.
• All states now participate in the Health 
Alert Network, which allows for the 
rapid exchange of critical public health 
information. 
Challenges remain. Building on progress in 
public health preparedness will require ongoing 
commitment. 
• Public health departments report difficulties 
in recruiting and retaining qualified 
epidemiologists, according to a 2006 CSTE 
survey. 
• Disease surveillance systems need to be 
strengthened. In 2007, 16 states did not 
report any plans to electronically exchange 
health data with regional health information 
organizations (networks of healthcare 
provider organizations that allow the 
electronic sharing of health information 
among members). 
• To facilitate surveillance, public health 
departments need to ensure an appropriate 
legal framework before a disaster occurs; 
otherwise, states may be unable to share 
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• The public health laboratory workforce 
needs improvement. Thirty-one state public 
health laboratories reported difficulty 
recruiting qualified laboratory scientists, 
and 39 state public health laboratories 
reported needing additional staff to perform 
polymerase chain reaction, a rapid DNA 
testing technique to quickly identify 
bioterrorism agents, according to a 2007 
Association of Public Health Laboratories 
survey. 
• Public health laboratories need to increase 
the use of advanced technology and broaden 
testing abilities, including radiological 
testing. Currently, no state public health 
laboratory can rapidly identify priority 
radioactive materials in clinical samples.
• Public health departments need to sustain 
a system of all-hazards planning, training, 
exercising, and improving. This system 
should be ready to help at-risk populations, 
such as the elderly and others who may need 
help controlling chronic diseases. 
• Public health and other response 
agencies need interoperable emergency 
communication systems. In 2007, the 
Department of Homeland Security reported 
that many cities and metropolitan areas have 
established multi-agency communications, 
but more progress is needed to expand 
interoperable communication across 
jurisdictions and levels of government.
Moving forward. CDC is working with state 
and local public health departments on initiatives 
that include:
• Increasing the use of electronic health 
data for preparedness and response by 
networking surveillance systems and using 
real-time data;
• Expanding laboratory testing; 
•  Establishing commercial partnerships 
to supply needed medicines to at-risk 
populations during an emergency; 
•  Developing and evaluating a core 
curriculum for preparedness through the 
Centers for Public Health Preparedness, a 
national network of academic institutions 
with a common focus on public health 
preparedness;
• Improving legal preparedness by helping 
states and other jurisdictions implement 
public health mutual aid agreements, which 
enable sharing of supplies, equipment, 
personnel, and information during 
emergencies;
•  Exercising public health systems to 
continuously improve capability and 
demonstrate readiness; and
• Collaborating with partners to develop 
accreditation programs for state and local 
public health preparedness. 
Achieving the overarching goal, “people prepared 
for emerging health threats,” is critical to the 
health and safety of our communities. This 
report represents CDC’s commitment to sharing 































Public health threats are inevitable. Being 
prepared can save lives and protect the health 
and safety of the public and emergency 
responders during disasters. A prepared public 
health system involves continual improvement 
of the system’s ability to prevent, protect against, 
respond to, and recover from the consequences 
of emergencies. 
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC) works to support public health 
preparedness for all hazards, including natural, 
biological, chemical, radiological, and nuclear 
events. This work falls under one of the agency’s 
overarching health protection goals: “People 
prepared for emerging health threats -  
people in all communities will be protected 
from infectious, occupational, environmental, 
and terrorist threats.” CDC has established 
nine preparedness goals to strategically direct 
resources towards achieving this overarching 
goal. These goals are associated with six public 
health preparedness activities: prevent, detect and 
report, investigate, control, recover, and improve 
(Table 1). 
The events of September 11, 2001, and the 
subsequent anthrax attacks both highlighted the 
importance of public health during emergencies 
and showed weaknesses in public health’s ability 
to respond during a potential crisis. According 
to a 2002 Institute of Medicine report, the 
public health infrastructure suffered from 
“vulnerable and outdated health information 
systems and technologies, an insufficient and 
inadequately trained public health workforce, 
antiquated laboratory capacity, a lack of real-
time surveillance and epidemiological systems, 
ineffective and fragmented communications 
networks, incomplete domestic preparedness 
and emergency response capabilities, and 
communities without access to essential public 
health services.”1
1 Institute of Medicine, The Future of the Public’s Health in the 21st Century; 2002
““
When people ask me what’s the biggest challenge in public health, I 
have an easy answer. For large-scale disasters and more routine threats 
to health, the major problem we face in public health is complacency. 
We’ve made a lot of progress in our preparedness efforts, but we’re 
not done yet. We need long-term investment to really get us where we 
want to be.  
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In 2002, Congress authorized funding for 
the Public Health Emergency Preparedness 
cooperative agreement (hereafter referred 
to as the cooperative agreement) to support 
preparedness nationwide in public health 
departments.2,3 Within each funded jurisdiction, 
public health departments at the state, local, 
tribal, and/or territorial levels work together to 
improve preparedness. 
CDC administers the cooperative agreement 
and provides technical assistance to state, 
territorial, and major metropolitan public 
health departments. This technical assistance 
leverages CDC expertise in disease detection 
and investigation, public health laboratories, 
and response, including crisis communication. 
CDC’s longstanding working relationships with 
public health departments are critical to the 
success of this program.  
2  The cooperative agreement funds 0 states, four metropolitan areas (Chicago, Los Angeles County, New York City, and 
Washington, DC), five territories (Puerto Rico, the Northern Mariana Islands, American Samoa, Guam, and the U.S. Virgin 
Islands), and three freely associated states (the Federated States of Micronesia, Palau, and the Marshall Islands).
 CDC began funding selected public health departments in 1999, but the cooperative agreement’s support of 2  
jurisdictions did not begin until 2002. 




Increase the use and development of interventions known to 
prevent human illness from chemical, biological, radiological 




Decrease the time needed to classify health events as 
terrorism or naturally occurring in partnership with other 
agencies. 
Goal 3
Decrease the time needed to detect and report 
chemical, biological, radiological agents in tissue, food or 
environmental samples that cause threats to the public’s 
health. 
Goal 4 Improve the timeliness and accuracy of communications regarding threats to the public’s health.
Investigate
Goal 5
Decrease the time to identify causes, risk factors, and 




Decrease the time needed to provide countermeasures and 




Goal 7 Decrease the time needed to restore health services and environmental safety to pre-event levels.
Goal 8 Improve the long-term follow-up provided to those affected by threats to the public’s health.
Improve
Goal 9
Decrease the time needed to implement recommendations 






























As of 2007, the cooperative agreement has 
provided more than $5 billion to public health 
departments (Figure 1). Appendix 1 presents 
historical cooperative agreement funding levels 
for each funded public health department. 
The cooperative agreement supports:
• Collaboration among state, local, tribal, 
and territorial public health departments, 
research universities, and other responder 
agencies;
• Rapid identification of biological and 
chemical agents by public health laboratories 
across the country;
• Quick and accurate communication across 
local, state, and federal levels;
• Ongoing enhancement of state and local 
public health programs through a cycle of 
planning, exercising, and improvement 
plans;
• Protecting the health of the community and 
first responders during an emergency; and
• Helping communities recover from 
emergencies.
Collaborating for preparedness. Local response 
agencies, including public health departments, 
are usually the first to respond during an 
Quick and Effective Collaboration – Minnesota Bridge Collapse
When the Interstate 35W bridge collapsed in Minneapolis in 2007, public health professionals 
were ready. According to the Minnesota Department of Health, cooperative agreement funding 
allowed public health to expand, strengthen, and exercise systems that contributed to a fast and 
effective response.
Within 10 minutes of the incident, state public health staff, hospitals, and emergency medical 
services began monitoring real-time information on the number of patients, their condition, 
and available hospital space. Local, state, and federal agencies worked together to determine if 
harmful substances were released into the environment and initiated measures to protect public 
health during the cleanup. State and local public health staff coordinated behavioral health and 
grief support services using a network of registered and credentialed volunteers.
Figure 1: Cooperative Agreement Allocated Funding, Fiscal Year 2002-2007 
(in millions)
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emergency. For multi-state or severe emergencies, 
CDC may be asked to provide additional public 
health resources and coordinate response efforts 
across multiple jurisdictions. CDC monitors and 
often responds to major events that are potential 
nationwide health threats (Figure 2). 
The National Preparedness Guidelines, published 
by the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS), establish a vision, capabilities, and 
priorities for national preparedness. CDC 
preparedness goals support the target capabilities 
outlined in the National Preparedness Guidelines 
in areas such as detecting threats, public health 
laboratory testing, and communications. See 
Appendix 2 for more information on the 
National Preparedness Guidelines and DHS 
preparedness priorities.
CDC works under the strategic leadership of 
the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and 
Response (ASPR) in the Department of Health 
and Human Services (HHS). Under the National 
Response Framework, HHS is responsible for 
coordinating federal assistance to supplement 
state, local, and tribal resources in response 
to public health and medical care needs for 
potential or actual emergencies. To achieve this, 
HHS works with other federal departments, 
including DHS, the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture (USDA), the Department of 
Defense, the Department of Veterans Affairs, 
the Department of Justice, and the Department 
of State. Appendices 3 and 4 detail how CDC 
and ASPR offices are currently working towards 
improving preparedness.
CDC and pubic health department partners 
include the American Public Health Association, 
the Association of Public Health Laboratories 
(APHL), the Association of Schools of Public 
Health, the Association of State and Territorial 
Health Officials, the Council of State and 
Territorial Epidemiologists (CSTE), and the 
National Association of County and City Health 
Officials (NACCHO). These organizations 
share best practices and lessons learned, conduct 
research, and provide training to public health 
professionals. 
CDC Field Deployments
From October 2006 through September 
2007, CDC deployed more than 170 
staff to 31 states to assist public health 
department investigations. The health 
problems included an unexplained 
cluster of patients with neurologic 
disease, tuberculosis, and hurricane-
related health threats.4





























Source: CDC, DEO data; 2001-200 




Hurricanes Rita and Wilma (September)





Ricin, tularemia, and anthrax 
     (October)
California wildfires (October)
Domestic influenza (December)
Mad cow disease (December)
Ongoing monitoring of potential 
nationwide health threats
World Trade Center attack (September)
Anthrax attack (October)
Hurricanes Charley, Frances, Ivan, 
     and Jean (August)
Summer Olympics (August)
Republican National Convention 
     (August)
Influenza vaccine shortage (October)
Asian tsunami (December)
Mumps (April)
Tropical storm Ernesto (August)




         Avian influenza (January)
         BioWatch (February)
         Guam typhoon (February)
         Ricin domestic response (February)
         Cities Readiness Initiative (March)
         G8 Summit (June)
         Democratic National Convention (July)
         West Nile virus (August)
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This report presents existing information 
on selected state and local public health 
preparedness activities and describes how the 
cooperative agreement and other CDC programs 
support these preparedness efforts. Data 
presented in this report come from CDC (i.e., 
data reported by states as part of the cooperative 
agreement and data from other CDC programs), 
APHL, CSTE, and others. More detailed 
information on each data source and methods is 
presented in Appendix 5. 
This report is specific to the Public Health 
Emergency Preparedness cooperative agreement 
and does not directly address other preparedness 
grant programs, including those administered by 
ASPR, which assists hospitals in preparing for 
emergencies, and by DHS, which focuses more 
broadly on supporting all emergency responders, 
including law enforcement and firefighters. 
Public health departments may have used a 
combination of federal and state funding to 
improve public health preparedness.
The report addresses areas of public health that 
are critical to preparedness, including disease 
detection and investigation, public health 
laboratories, and response. Disease detection and 
investigation and public health laboratories help 
confirm the presence of health threats.  During 
a response, public health professionals and other 
first responders use this information to lessen the 
public health effects of an emergency. 
Section 1 of this report contains aggregate 
national information on progress and challenges 
in public health preparedness and how CDC 
is working to address these challenges. Section 
1 focuses on the 50 states and DC. These data 
reflect collaborative efforts of federal, state, local, 
tribal, and territorial public health. 
Section 2 presents snapshots with response or 
exercise examples and data for the 50 states, DC, 
Chicago, Los Angeles County, and New York 
City. Information on funded territories and freely 
associated states is not presented because most of 
the existing data sources did not include them.
This report is a first step in presenting a more 
complete picture of public health preparedness. 
It does not represent all progress and challenges 
or comprehensively assess federal, state, and local 
preparedness. 
CDC, ASPR, and their partners continue 
working to define public health preparedness and 
collect data to better characterize preparedness. 































Section 1: Public Health 
Preparedness in the States and DC 
Section 1 presents data on disease detection and investigation, public health laboratories, and response. 
These essential activities support all nine CDC preparedness goals. Table 2 describes some of the key 
improvements compared to 2001. 
Table 2:  Progress in Public Health Preparedness, 2001-2007




Some state public health 
departments did not have 
enough epidemiologists to 
investigate the suspected 
disease cases and had to 
borrow untrained staff from 
other programs.
The cooperative agreement supports 
additional staff in every state to 
monitor and investigate diseases 
and respond to emergencies. 
Other public health professionals 
have also been trained to provide 




Some state public health 
laboratories could not 
perform rapid tests for 
anthrax because they lacked 
equipment, supplies, or 
trained staff.  
Every state has at least one public 
health laboratory that can perform 
rapid tests for anthrax and other 
bioterrorism agents, and 47 public 
health laboratories can test for a 





State and local public health 
departments had not fully 
anticipated the extent of 
coordination needed among 
first responders.
Public health departments in every 
state have established relationships 
and conducted exercises with 




An ad-hoc center at CDC 
helped coordinate state and 
local response efforts.
Emergency operations centers 
are in place at CDC and almost all 
state public health departments to 
coordinate response activities, and 
roles and responsibilities are defined 




Public health professionals 
did not have a system 
in place to communicate 
effectively with physicians 
during a crisis.
All state public health departments 
have systems to communicate 




Major metropolitan areas did 
not have the ability to provide 
medicine to large portions of 
their population in the case of 
a bioterrorist event.
Major metropolitan areas are 
working to provide medicines to 
100% of their population within 48 
hours.
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Disease Detection 
and Investigation:
Improving the Public Health Workforce 
and Disease Surveillance
The sooner public health professionals can 
detect the source and spread of diseases or 
other health threats and investigate their effects 
in the community, the more quickly they can 
protect the public. Progress in disease detection 
and investigation supports CDC preparedness 
goals in the areas of prevention, detection and 
reporting, investigation, and recovery.
Using cooperative agreement funds, public health 
departments have improved their abilities to 
detect and investigate diseases by enhancing the 
public health workforce and disease surveillance 
systems.
A skilled public health workforce. 
Epidemiologists, or “disease detectives,” detect 
and investigate health threats and disease 
patterns. They might identify contaminated 
food causing illness, assess the number of people 
injured and types of injuries resulting from a 
disaster, or determine causes of a sudden onset 
of fever in a community. They also work to 
minimize the negative effects of a health threat in 
a community. 
According to a 2006 CSTE survey, the total 
number of epidemiologists in state public health 
departments working in emergency response has 
doubled since 2001 (Table 3). 
A connected public health workforce. 
The increase in the users of the Epidemic 
Information Exchange (Epi-X), a secure CDC-
based communications system that helps track 
disease outbreaks, suggests that public health 
professionals are more connected (Table 3). 
Epi-X users represent state health departments 
(38%), local health departments (37%), CDC 
and other federal agencies (22%), and other 
organizations, such as poison control centers 
(3%).6 
Through Epi-X, these users report outbreaks and 
other public health events to CDC and receive 
notifications about developing health threats 
through daily electronic summaries. When a 
report is of special importance, users receive 
immediate e-mails or emergency notification 
(i.e., pager, “land line” phone, or cell phone).
 
Enhancing disease surveillance systems. 
Epidemiologists need health-related data to 
detect disease patterns, estimate effects, and 
determine the spread of illness. Surveillance-the 
ongoing and systematic collection, analysis, and 
interpretation of data-is critical to detect disease 
 CSTE, Epidemiological Capacity Assessment (ECA); 200 – data for 0 states, DC, and  territories
 CDC, Epi-X data; 200
Increased Workforce Capacity
In 2006, the cooperative agreement funded 
531 epidemiologists.  The majority of 
these epidemiologists specialized either in 
emergency response (291) or infectious 
diseases (199).5
Table 3: Public Health Workforce for Disease Detection and Investigation,  
2001-2006
Indicator Then (2001) Now (2006) Percent Increase
Epidemiologists in public health departments 
working in emergency response1 115 232 102%
Epi-X users2 890 4,646 422%





























outbreaks as early as possible and to ensure that 
public health professionals are aware of the 
number and geographic distribution of illness. 
 
To help detect disease patterns, all state public 
health departments now can receive urgent 
disease reports 24/7/365 (Table 4). Previously, it 
was often difficult for clinicians to reach a public 
health professional after regular work hours.
In addition, CDC, state and local public health 
departments, and other partners are developing 
flexible and innovative surveillance systems for 
a wide range of emergencies, including disease 
outbreaks, bioterrorism, and natural disasters. In 
2007, 44 states reported evaluating health data to 
detect unusual patterns that could be associated 
with health threats.7 
The CDC Early Aberration Reporting System 
(EARS) is one surveillance system state and local 
health departments use to monitor notifiable 
diseases and detect unusual spikes indicating 
disease outbreaks. EARS tracks data from sources 
such as hospital emergency departments, 911 
emergency calls, and school absenteeism. In 
2007, EARS was used in approximately 100 
state and local public health departments and 
international sites. It has been used during 
hurricane seasons and at several national events.8
Another surveillance system that CDC 
administers is BioSense, which provides local, 
state, and federal public health and healthcare 
organizations with access to the same data, at 
the same time. In other words, if an emergency 
occurs, every level of public health will be able to 
see healthcare data from their community in near 
real-time. This can decrease delays in recognition 
of a problem and enhance emergency response. 
As of November 2007, BioSense had 423 
hospitals transmitting real-time data, covering 
38 states and 71 major metropolitan areas. Over 
1,500 federal military and veterans’ outpatient 
facilities also transmitted data.9 
In preparation for a possible influenza pandemic, 
states are also improving systems to monitor 
seasonal influenza. In 2006, 28 states reported 
conducting surveillance for seasonal influenza 
throughout the year, while in 2007, all states and 
DC reported doing so.10, 11 Routine surveillance 
of influenza viruses can characterize circulating 
strains to help experts develop annual vaccines 
and identify strains with pandemic potential.
Challenges for Disease Detection and 
Investigation
Several challenges continue to hinder public health 
departments’ ability to collect and effectively use 
information.
Shortages in the epidemiology workforce. 
Public health departments still face barriers in 
recruiting and retaining qualified epidemiologists. 
According to the 2006 CSTE survey, most state 
and local public health departments reported 
difficulty in hiring epidemiologists. Although the 
number of epidemiologists has increased since 
2001, in 2006, state public health departments 
reported needing 34% more epidemiologists than 
they had to provide full capacity nationwide.12 
Other public health professionals, such as 
information technology specialists, are also 
needed to support emerging data sharing and 
communication initiatives. The aging public 
health workforce, high retirement rates, barriers 
to recruitment and retention, and the need to 
train the existing workforce in new methods 
and technology are all issues needing continuous 
attention. 
 CDC, DSLR Mid-Year Report Review data; 200
8 CDC, Division of Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response (DBPR) EARS data; 200
9 CDC, Division of Integrated Surveillance Systems and Services BioSense data; 200
10 CDC, Pandemic Influenza State Self-Assessments data; 200 - data presented for 9 states
11 HHS OIG, Memorandum Report—Laboratory Preparedness for Pandemic Influenza; published October 200
12 CSTE, ECA; 200
Table 4: Public Health Disease Reporting Systems, 50 States and DC, 1999-2005
Indicator Then (1999) Now (2005) Percent Increase
Public health departments that can receive 
urgent disease reports 24/7/365 12
1 512 325%
1 HHS, Office of the Inspector General (OIG), Status of State 24/7 Urgent Disease and Public Health Emergency Reporting 
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Networking disease surveillance systems. 
During emergencies, public health professionals 
need to alert both clinicians and the public 
quickly. A unified network of surveillance systems 
from hospital organizations, physician practices, 
public health departments, and other data sources 
can provide public health professionals with the 
best available information to protect community 
health. 
 
Although public health departments have made 
progress in disease surveillance, more work needs 
to be done to integrate these systems. In 2007, 16 
states did not report any plans to electronically 
exchange health data with regional health 
information organizations (networks of healthcare 
provider organizations that allow the electronic 
sharing of health information among members).13 
In addition, quickly sharing public health 
information across jurisdictions is important 
during emergencies, such as when displaced 
individuals need care out-of-state. Without 
ensuring an appropriate legal framework before 
a disaster occurs, states may be unable to provide 








after a chlorine 
spill.
In January 2005, a freight train transporting 
chlorine and other chemicals collided with a 
parked train in downtown Graniteville, South 
Carolina. The rupture of one car released about 
63 tons of liquid chlorine near residential and 
commercial districts. This accident caused nine 
deaths and forced at least 529 people to seek 
medical treatment. Local public health and 
emergency management officials investigated 
the damage. Since chlorine exposure was a 
serious public health threat, area residents were 
evacuated. Schools and businesses were closed.
Public health professionals coordinated 
emergency medical services, monitored 
hospital care, assessed the number of casualties, 
and supported disaster mortuary services. 
Through interviews and medical chart reviews, 
epidemiologists collected data on symptoms, 
exposures, and demographics. With this 
information, public health professionals could 
track and alleviate the long-term effects.
This accident was the worst chemical train 
wreck in the United States since 1978. 
Established response plans and partnerships 
helped South Carolina public health 
professionals respond quickly and effectively. 
The cooperative agreement helped fund 
activities that improved response. Because 
many nuclear and industrial facilities and rail 
lines were in the area, local public health and 
emergency management departments had taken 
an all-hazards approach to emergency response 
planning, with a focus on hazardous materials 
training. Coordination among agencies was also 
a priority.
Please refer to Section 2 for response examples for each state and 
directly funded locality. 
South Carolina Public Health Effectively 
Responds to a Chlorine Spill






























Improving Laboratory Testing for 
Biological and Chemical Threats, 
Communication, and Training
Public health laboratories are critical in 
identifying disease agents, toxins, and other 
health threats found in tissue, food, or other 
substances. They also play a large role in alerting 
others about emerging health threats, and 
training and supporting clinical laboratories. The 
cooperative agreement has funded public health 
laboratories to hire and train staff, and acquire 
equipment. This supports CDC preparedness 
goals in the areas of prevention, and detection 
and reporting. 
Expanding testing. Public health laboratories 
have expanded their ability to perform rapid tests 
for biological and chemical agents. Previously, 
many state and local public health laboratories 
had to ship samples to CDC in Atlanta, Georgia, 
for testing.
Now, as shown in Table 5, identification of 
biological agents (e.g., anthrax or plague) 
and chemical agents is possible through the 
Laboratory Response Network (LRN). The LRN 
is a national network of local, state, and federal 
public health laboratories; military, international, 
agricultural, and veterinary diagnostic 
laboratories; and food and environmental testing 
laboratories. 
Table 5: Laboratory Testing Capabilities, 2001-2007  
Indicator Then Now (2007) Percent Increase
State and local public health 
laboratories that can detect 
biological agents
83 (2002) 110 33%
Public health laboratories that can 
test for and/or handle toxic chemical 
agents:
Level 1 laboratories* 0 (2001) 10 -
Level 2 laboratories 0 (2001) 37 -
Level 3 laboratories 0 (2001) 15 -
Source: CDC, DBPR LRN data; 2001-200
* Level 1 laboratories serve as surge capacity laboratories for CDC and can test for an expanded number of chemical 
agents, including nerve agents, mustard agents, and toxic industrial chemicals. Level 2 laboratories are also surge 
capacity laboratories but can test for a more limited panel of agents. Level  laboratories work with hospitals and 
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This network supports the laboratory facilities and 
trained staff to respond to biological and chemical 
terrorism and other public health emergencies. 
In 2007, the LRN had 163 member laboratories 
capable of detecting biological agents (of which 
110 are state and local public health laboratories). 
In addition, 62 LRN laboratories can test for and/
or handle chemical agents. As shown in Figure 3, 
90% of the U.S. population lived within 100 
miles of a LRN laboratory in 2007.14
Improving communication among 
laboratories. Once a threat is confirmed in one 
laboratory, other laboratories need to be quickly 
alerted since they might receive related case 
samples (indicating that the threat is spreading).  
To enable this communication, CDC manages 
a secure communication system among LRN 
member laboratories. In addition, public health 
laboratories need to communicate with the 
thousands of clinical and commercial laboratories 
Figure 3: U.S. Population within 100 Miles of a LRN Laboratory, 50 States and DC, 2007
Source: CDC, DBPR LRN data; 200
Laboratory Response Network
Some of the ways CDC supports LRN member laboratories include:
• Sharing tests used to confirm biological and chemical agents;
• Enabling secure communications on emerging and emergency issues;
• Developing training curricula;
• Implementing a quality assurance program; and
• Providing vaccines to protect laboratory workers from dangerous agents.




























e monitoring health through routine testing. These 
laboratories serve as early alert systems and can 
be the first to confirm a potential health threat. 
All states now have public health laboratories 
that can communicate rapidly with these 
laboratories (Table 6).
Training laboratory staff. Expanding training 
for clinical laboratory workers is key because they 
are often the first to confirm diseases leading 
to public health threats. In 2002, state public 
health laboratories offered 65 classes to fewer than 
3,000 clinical laboratory scientists on testing for 
biological agents; while in 2006, states offered 500 
classes to more than 8,000 laboratory scientists.15 
Public health laboratories also need to conduct 
exercises to practice emergency response protocols. 
Figure 4 shows the increasing number of state 
public health laboratories conducting exercises to 
handle Category A biological agents (high-priority 
agents that pose a risk to national security) and 
chemical agents (toxic substances such as cyanide-
based compounds, heavy metals, and nerve 
agents). Refer to Appendix 6 for a list of Category 
A and B biological agents.
Table 6: Laboratory Communications, 2001-2006
Indicator Then (2001) Now (2006) Percent Increase
States with public health 
laboratories that could 
communicate with clinical and 
commercial laboratories (through 
email or fax to multiple recipients)
201 512 155%
1 APHL, Public Health Laboratory Issues in Brief: Bioterrorism Capacity; published October 2002 - data for  states
  and DC
2 APHL, Public Health Laboratory Issues in Brief: Bioterrorism Capacity; published May 200 - data for 0 states
  and DC
Figure 4: Public Health Laboratories Conducting at Least One Exercise for 
Biological and Chemical Agents, 2003-2006
Source: CDC, DSLR data; 200-200
Note: Data for chemical terrorism agent exercises were collected for Level 1 and Level 2 laboratories. 






key, as outbreaks 
identified in one 
location can also 






obilizing State by State
The public health response to a 2006 outbreak 
of E. coli infections showed how cooperative 
agreement funding has improved states’ ability 
to respond. The response to the outbreak 
highlighted the importance of collaboration 
and communication among public health 
professionals in the 26 affected states.
In September 2006, state public health 
departments began investigating an outbreak 
of infections caused by E. coli O157:H7, a 
dangerous foodborne bacterium, to determine 
who the outbreak was affecting and how patients 
had contracted the infection. Public health 
professionals interviewed both ill and unaffected 
individuals to identify the source of the outbreak 
and determined that pre-packaged fresh spinach 
was the likely cause. 
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
advised consumers not to eat fresh spinach, and 
CDC sent messages out to the public health 
community via the Health Alert Network 
(HAN) and Epi-X to alert them of a nationwide 
outbreak. Federal and affected state health public 
information officers quickly disseminated and 
updated critical health information about the 
outbreak to public health partners, clinicians, and 
the news media. 
Meanwhile, state public health laboratories 
performed DNA “fingerprinting” tests, or pulsed-
field gel electrophoresis (PFGE), to distinguish 
strains of E. coli. Laboratories submitted 
information about these strains to PulseNet, a 
national network of laboratories coordinated by 
CDC that consists of state and local public health 
departments and federal agencies (CDC, FDA, 
and USDA). Through PulseNet, public health 
professionals across the country could compare 
the DNA fingerprints to determine if their 
state had cases of E. coli related to the outbreak. 
PulseNet confirmed the outbreak in multiple 
states.
Public health departments and laboratories in 10 
states isolated E. coli strains from bags of spinach 
retrieved from patient households and performed 
tests to match these to E. coli strains isolated 
from patients. Local, state, and federal health 
officials collaborated to identify and report cases, 
communicate with consumers, and identify the 
source of the outbreak. A joint team of CDC, 
FDA, USDA, and California public health 
professionals visited selected farms, tracing the 
bacteria to the source.
Rapid identification of the bacterium causing the 
outbreak and tracking to the food source resulted 
in a nationwide recall of fresh spinach products. 
Joint laboratory and epidemiology investigations 
were critical for this rapid response.
Please refer to Section 2 for response examples for each 
state and directly funded locality.
Coordinated Public Health Response Rapidly 





































1 APHL, Public Health Laboratory Issues in Brief: Bioterrorism Capacity; published in May 200 - data for 0 states and DC
1 APHL, Public Health Laboratory Issues in Brief: Bioterrorism Capacity; published in May 200 - data for 0 states and DC
18 CDC, DBPR LRN data; 200
19 CDC, National Center for Environmental Health (NCEH) data; 200
20 CDC, NCEH data; 200 
Challenges for Public Health Laboratories
Boosting the laboratory scientist workforce to 
ensure rapid and accurate testing. In a 2007 
APHL survey, 31 state public health laboratories 
reported difficulties recruiting qualified 
laboratory scientists. Moreover, 39 reported 
needing additional staff to perform polymerase 
chain reaction, a rapid DNA testing technique 
to quickly identify bioterrorism agents.16  This 
reflects a nationwide shortage of highly skilled 
laboratory workers to confirm potential health 
threats. 
Ensuring secure electronic communication. 
Although 44 state public health laboratories 
have Laboratory Information Management 
Systems supporting laboratory functions, 19 
of those laboratories cannot send or receive 
electronic messages that meet CDC standards 
for exchanging, communicating, and protecting 
data.17  Without such electronic communication, 
it is impossible to rapidly monitor and integrate 
laboratory test results at the national level during 
an emergency. 
Broadening the range of laboratory testing. 
States vary in the extent to which they can test 
for biological and chemical agents. For instance, 
all states have at least one laboratory that can 
test for the biological agents that cause anthrax, 
bubonic plague, tularemia, and brucellosis, but 
eight are not able to test for the highly infectious 
agent that causes Q fever.18 For chemical agents, 
9 states can test for blistering agents (such as 
mustard gas); 13 states for volatile organic 
compounds (chemicals such as benzenes, which 
can have short- and long-term health effects); 
28 states for nerve agents (including manmade 
chemical warfare agents such as sarin or VX 
nerve agent); and 30 states for blood metals 
(such as mercury and lead).19 
Although state public health laboratories can 
test for biological and chemical agents in blood 
or urine, they cannot test for chemical agents 
outside of these human clinical samples, such as 
in an unknown white powder. Laboratories are 
also limited in their ability to rapidly test large 
quantities of samples for chemical agents. 
Another challenge is that no state public 
health laboratory can rapidly identify priority 
radioactive materials in clinical samples.20 This 
could delay medical treatment decisions when a 
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Response:
Improving Communication Systems and 
Increasing Planning, Training, and Exercising
Public health professionals are on the front 
lines during an emergency. Establishing 
emergency response plans was an initial focus 
of the cooperative agreement. Now, CDC is 
emphasizing exercises that test systems and 
validate training to ensure that plans will work 
during a real event. These activities support CDC 
preparedness goals in the areas of prevention, 
detection and reporting, investigation, control, 
recovery, and improvement. 
   
Quickly communicating up-to-date 
information. During an emergency, 
communication from public health professionals 
must be fast and accurate. In 2007, all states 
had plans for crisis communication with first 
responders and healthcare providers during an 
emergency.21 
In addition, CDC’s Health Alert Network 
(HAN) and state-level HANs provide a 
mechanism for users, including state and local 
public health departments, hospitals, and 
physicians, to rapidly exchange critical public 
health information. The number of states 
responding to a test HAN message from CDC 
in 30 minutes or less has increased by 48% since 
2003 (Figure 5).22  
Figure 5: Public Health Departments Responding to Test HAN Messages in 30 
Minutes or Less, 50 States and DC, 2003-2007
Source: CDC, HAN data; 200-200 
 21 CDC, DSLR Mid-Year Progress Report Review data; 200
22 CDC, HAN data; 200-200
Public Health 
Information Network
As part of the Public Health Information 
Network (PHIN), CDC has 
established standards for exchanging, 
communicating, and protecting 
electronic information both among 
public health departments and with 
healthcare, environmental, homeland 
defense, and other partners. To assist with 
implementing PHIN standards, CDC 
works with each state or local public 
health department funded through the 
cooperative agreement. CDC provides 
assistance with gap analyses, self-






























Developing emergency response plans. As 
of 2006, all state public health departments 
reported having public health emergency 
response plans. A key element of these plans is 
detailing roles, responsibilities, and responses 
to an emergency using the Incident Command 
System (ICS).23
Distributing the Strategic National Stockpile 
(SNS). CDC manages the SNS, a national 
repository of antibiotics, other life-saving 
medications, and medical supplies, to help public 
health departments respond to emergencies. The 
SNS is positioned across the country. In 2001, 
few states had up-to-date, written plans for 
receiving, staging, and distributing SNS assets. 
In contrast, today all states have such plans. 
Nevertheless, states vary in the sophistication and 
maturity of the coordination and exercising of 
those plans. 
CDC works closely with state, local, and tribal 
agencies to help identify and fix SNS planning 
gaps. CDC reviews the plans annually on a scale 
from a low of 0 to a high of 100. The  
reviews include the public health department’s 
coordination with traditional and nontraditional 
community partners; receiving, staging, and 
distributing medical materiel; state legal statutes 
to aid in the rapid dispensing of medications; 
and the type and frequency of training, 
exercising, and evaluation of response plans. 
In 2006-2007, 73% of the states reviewed 
satisfactorily documented their planning efforts, 
which is reflected in a review score of 69 or 
higher (Table 7). 
Planning for pandemic influenza. Since 
2006, the cooperative agreement has provided 
specific funding to public health departments 
to prepare for pandemic influenza. As part of 
this effort, every state developed a pandemic 
influenza response plan. Previously, most states 
did not have completed plans addressing areas 
such as enhancing surveillance and laboratory 
capacity, managing vaccines and antivirals, and 
implementing community containment measures 
to reduce influenza transmission.24 In addition, 
states held summits bringing together partners 
from state and local public health departments, 
businesses, schools, hospitals, and other 
organizations to plan for a potential pandemic.
Training to enhance public health 
preparedness. An increasing number of 
staff is now trained to support preparedness 
and response activities (Figure 6). Subjects 
covered in the training courses included 
ICS, risk communication, quarantine and 
isolation, mental health services during and 
after emergencies, and working with at-risk 
populations.25 
In addition, following the anthrax attacks 
of 2001, CDC developed the “Forensic 
2 The Incident Command System (ICS) is the organizational structure for managing incidents that require response from 
different jurisdictions and disciplines. ICS lays out standard roles and responsibilities for the incident commander and 
staff.
2 CDC, Pandemic Influenza State Self-Assessments data; 200
Table 7: CDC Reviews of State Strategic National Stockpile Plans, 50 States, 2006-
2007
Review Score Number of States
69-100 36
0-68 13
Review in progress* 1
Source: CDC Division of Strategic National Stockpile (DSNS) data; 200-200
*CDC has not completed reviewing all states using a new numerical technical assistance review tool. 
CHEMPACK
CDC’s CHEMPACK program has placed 
over 1,600 containers of nerve agent 
antidotes. Locations are determined by 
state and local agencies to help ensure a 
rapid response to emergencies involving 
chemical releases. Thirty-nine states 
already have containers, and seven 














obilizing State by State
Figure 6: States Offering Training Courses to State and Local Public Health 
Professionals, 50 States and DC, 1999-2005
Source: CDC, DSLR data; 1999-200 
2 At-risk or vulnerable population groups may have additional needs before, during, and after an incident in one or  
more of the following functional areas:  maintaining independence, communication, transportation, supervision, and 
medical care.  Individuals in need of additional response assistance may include those who have disabilities; who live 
in institutionalized settings; who are elderly; who are children; who are from diverse cultures, who have limited English 
proficiency, or who are non-English speaking; or who are transportation disadvantaged.
Exercises Test Public Health Systems and 
Foster Partnerships
In November 2006, a mass vaccine dispensing exercise was coordinated by the Navajo Area Indian Health 
Services and the Navajo Division of Health. The exercise provided almost 24,000 seasonal influenza 
vaccines at 15 different sites around the Navajo Nation (about 25,000 square miles). The exercise simulated 
a response to a pandemic influenza outbreak. The exercise also tested risk communication and the SNS 
delivery systems. Several dispensing sites vaccinated as many as 1,000 people per hour during peak times.
The Navajo public health system is large and complex, consisting of tribal and federal health agencies as well 
as agencies from three states and multiple counties. During the exercise, these health agencies worked with 
the Navajo Police, the National Guard, the National Park Service, and others using ICS. The cooperation 
demonstrated by these different agencies during the exercise will contribute to future successful emergency 
responses. 





























Epidemiology” course as a tool for state and local 
public health departments and law enforcement 
agencies to improve joint investigations of 
terrorism. As of 2004, over 14,000 public 
health and law enforcement professionals 
had participated in this course, and staff are 
continuing to be trained. 
Exercising emergency response plans and 
validating training. Exercises test emergency 
response plans with personnel from across 
agencies and organizations.26 Exercises can 
provide valuable experience and knowledge 
because people, technology, and equipment are 
put into action to test their ability to respond. 
Figure 7 illustrates a steadily increasing 
number of exercises conducted by public 
health departments in the 50 states and DC. In 
addition, public health departments routinely 
evaluate exercises or real events and identify 
needed improvements. 
CDC specifically coordinates exercises with state 
and local public health departments to test plans 
for the receipt and distribution of the contents of 
the SNS. The number of CDC-coordinated SNS 
exercises has increased from 0 in 2001 to 18 in 
2006 (Figure 8).
Cities Readiness Initiative
The cooperative agreement funds cities 
to distribute medications to their entire 
population within 48 hours. The Cities 
Readiness Initiative began with 21 cities 
in 2004 and has expanded to 72 cities. 
This includes more than 500 counties, 
covering 56% of the U.S. population.27 
Because of the complexity of providing 
medicine to so many people, the program 
involves ongoing planning and exercises. 
For instance, in a June 2007 exercise, 
Philadelphia postal workers delivered 
more than 50,000 mock packages of 
emergency medication to people in 
their homes, exercising a novel delivery 
method. Similar exercises occurred in 
Boston and Seattle.
2 Exercises provide opportunities to test capabilities and improve performance in a risk-free environment. The three           
types of exercises include tabletop exercises, which involve discussing responses to emergency scenarios and focus on  
training and problem solving; functional exercises, which test and evaluate capabilities and functions in responding    
to a simulated emergency, such as a disease outbreak; and full-scale exercises, which test and evaluate multi-agency, 
multi-jurisdictional coordinated response to an actual deployment of resources under crisis conditions as if a real 
incident had occurred.











Figure 7: Public Health Preparedness Exercises, 50 States and DC, 1999-2005
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Challenges for Response
Ensuring public health uses an “all-hazards” 
approach to preparedness. Because of the 
many competing priorities for public health 
departments’ resources, being prepared to 
respond to a wide variety of emergencies remains 
a challenge. In 2006, all states and DC reported 
having plans covering biological agents, but 
fewer reported having plans covering radiation 
(43) or nerve agents (27).28
Retaining experienced public health response 
personnel. Ensuring that public health 
departments retain qualified response personnel 
is an ongoing challenge. A number of state and 
local agencies have difficulties retaining SNS 
coordinators. 
Building and maintaining relationships. 
To build and maintain relationships with 
response partners, public health professionals 
need to continue planning and exercising with 
other government agencies and the community. 
Building these relationships requires other 
responders to recognize the importance of public 
health in emergency response. In 2006, most 
states and DC reported having developed ICS 
roles and responsibilities with hospitals (90%) 
and local/regional emergency management 
agencies (92%), but fewer (73%) had developed 
them with federal emergency management 
agencies.29
Developing interoperable communication 
systems. Multiple agencies can work together 
more effectively during an emergency if all 
communication systems can “talk” to each 
other. In 2007, DHS reported that many cities 
and metropolitan areas have established multi-
agency communications, but more progress is 
needed to expand interoperable communication 
across jurisdictions and levels of government.30 
Figure 8: Annual Number of Joint SNS Exercises to Test Response Plans, 50 States 
and DC, 2001-2006
Source: CDC, DSNS data; 2001-200
Note: Figure 8 only includes joint state/CDC exercises. States also conduct exercises independently that are not 
included in these numbers.  
28 CDC, DSLR data; 200
29 CDC, DSLR data; 200





























Moreover, the report noted that some of the 
communications planning and exercises among 
response agencies did not include public health 
departments. 
Monitoring environmental health. 
Environmental effects from an emergency, such 
as a chemical spill, need to be monitored over 
extended periods to track potential long-term 
health outcomes. In 2007, 11 states did not 
report any activities related to having systems  
that can track environmental exposures and 
adverse events over the long term.31
Helping at-risk populations during 
emergencies. CDC’s experience responding to 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita showed that CDC 
and state public health departments must address 
the needs of at-risk populations in an emergency. 
For example, the elderly and others with chronic 
diseases need help to control diseases such as 
diabetes and heart conditions when health 
systems are not available.
Exercises Prepared Public Health Response 
to a Meningitis Outbreak
When a meningococcal meningitis outbreak 
occurred at a local high school in Los Angeles, 
California, in 2006, the local public health 
department responded. 
The public health department was ready 
because vaccination exercises had been 
conducted before the outbreak. The exercises 
provided public health department staff 
experience in working directly with the local 
and county law enforcement agencies, fire 
departments, and emergency medical services.  
This was valuable during the meningitis 
outbreak because collaboration resulted in 
effective site security, traffic control, and 
emergency medical technician response at the 
high school. 
The County of Los Angeles Department of 
Public Health reported that “before, the setup 
and response to a disease outbreak took far 
longer, sometimes an entire day or more; 
site organization and management was often 
overwhelming, and at times chaotic.”  A timely 
response reassured students and their parents 
that they were being well taken care of by 
the Department of Public Health during this 
outbreak.
Please refer to Section 2 for response examples for each state and 
directly funded locality.
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Moving Forward: 
CDC and Public Health Departments Are 
Working to Address Challenges 
Public health professionals need to continually 
train and exercise to improve performance. 
Laboratory and other equipment must be 
maintained to work well during an emergency. 
Response plans must be updated to address 
emerging health threats. Accordingly, an 
ongoing national commitment to public health 
preparedness will allow state, local, tribal, and 
territorial public health departments to maintain 
their current abilities and take the next steps 
necessary to improve emergency response. 
Public health departments still face many 
challenges in improving preparedness. Appendices 
3 and 4 present information on CDC and ASPR 
activities to strengthen preparedness. Examples of 
CDC initiatives are presented below.
• Electronic data for preparedness. CDC 
is establishing standards and providing 
technical assistance to allow the exchange of 
electronic health data across organizational 
and jurisdictional boundaries. 
• Laboratory testing. CDC is working with 
state public health laboratories to expand 
their biological and chemical testing abilities. 
For radiological testing, CDC is developing 
rapid laboratory methods to analyze 
radioactive materials in clinical samples and 
build capacity in state or federal laboratories 
to measure radioactive contaminants in these 
samples. 
• At-risk populations. CDC has established 
commercial partnerships to supply needed 
medicines to at-risk populations during an 
emergency. With these partnerships, CDC 
can quickly supply childhood vaccines, 
medications for a variety of chronic diseases, 
or other medicines. 
• Public health workforce and training. 
CDC and its partners developed the Meta-
Leadership Summit for Preparedness, a 
nationwide program that trains business, 
government, and non-profit leaders to act 
effectively during times of crisis. In addition, 
the Centers for Public Health Preparedness, 
a national network of academic institutions 
with a common focus on public health 
preparedness, are developing a national 
preparedness core curriculum. 
• Legal preparedness. CDC’s initiatives 
include enhancing training courses on legal 
preparedness for public health professionals 
and other first responders. In addition, CDC 
is helping states and other jurisdictions 
implement public health mutual aid 
agreements, which enable sharing of supplies, 
equipment, personnel, and information 
during emergencies.
• Technical assistance to public health 
departments. CDC provides ongoing 
technical assistance to public health 
departments to help address preparedness 
challenges. The technical assistance includes 
sharing CDC public health expertise, 
identifying promising practices, providing 
guidance for exercises, and developing 
performance goals.
• Exercising public health systems. CDC 
joins other federal agencies in requiring 
that public health departments and other 
response agencies receiving federal funds 
exercise capabilities using Homeland 
Security Exercise and Evaluation Program 
principles. Exercises range from discussion-
based tabletop exercises used to discern 
gaps in emergency response plans to full-
scale operations-based exercises that test 
communication and coordination within the 





























• Standards for preparedness. CDC and 
NACCHO are collaborating on Project 
Public Health Ready to develop standards for 
local public health preparedness. CDC is also 
working with partners to develop a voluntary 
accreditation program for state and local 
public health departments. 
• Measuring public health preparedness. 
CDC is expanding and improving 
preparedness data to present a clearer picture 
of the status of public health preparedness 
in the United States and to promote 
accountability, as reinforced by the Pandemic 
and All-Hazards Preparedness Act, signed in 
December 2006. These data will assist CDC 
and public health departments in identifying 
specific areas for improvement. CDC is 
committed to developing appropriate, 
specific, measurable, and validated 
performance measures to foster improvement 
in public health preparedness.
Achieving the overarching goal, “people prepared 
for emerging health threats,” is critical to the 
health and safety of our communities. This 
report represents CDC’s commitment to sharing 
information on a program that contributes to this 
goal. Future reports will show the extent to which 
CDC and public health departments are making 
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The purpose of these snapshots is to provide 
information on public health preparedness 
activities in the 50 states, DC, and the directly 
funded localities of Chicago, New York City, and 
Los Angeles County. 
The snapshots present data from CDC and 
partner publications that were available at 
the time of reporting and do not cover all 
preparedness activities that state and local public 
health departments have conducted. However, 
this effort represents a first step in presenting 
a more comprehensive picture of public health 
preparedness. For more information on current 
state preparedness activities, please contact the 
state public information officer (see directory at 
http://www.nphic.org/regions.asp). 
Each snapshot provides an example of a real-
life response or exercise that was enhanced by 
the cooperative agreement, narrative from the 
state or locality describing how the cooperative 
agreement has improved public health 
preparedness, and data on specific preparedness 
activities. The data are organized under one 
of three key public health preparedness areas: 
disease detection and investigation, public health 
laboratories, and response. The preparedness 
activities support CDC preparedness goals in the 
areas of detection and reporting, control, and 
improvement; crosscutting activities help prepare 
for all stages of an event.
The following table summarizes the snapshots 
on select public health preparedness activities 
conducted by the 50 states and 4 directly funded 
localities. For data points that do not cover all 
states and localities, the number responding 
is noted (some data sources did not collect 
information on the localities or did not have a 
100% response rate).
Section 2: Snapshots of Public 
Health Preparedness in States 






























Public health laboratories test and confirm agents that can threaten health. For example, advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques 
and subsequent reporting to the CDC database (PulseNet) are critical to recognize nationwide outbreaks from bacteria that can cause 
severe illness, such as E. coli O1:H and Listeria monocytogenes. 
Detect & Report
Number of laboratories in the Laboratory Response Network*1 1
Number receiving E. coli O1:H samples (partial year, 9/0 – 2/0)2 [0 states] 
- Mean percentage of test results submitted to CDC database within  days 9%
Number receiving Listeria monocytogenes samples (partial year, 9/0 – 2/0)2 [0 states] 2
- Mean percentage of test results submitted to CDC database within  days %
Had a laboratory information management system that could create, send, and receive messages 
(8/0 – 8/0) [0 states and DC] 8%
- System complied with CDC information technology standards (PHIN) (8/0 – 8/0) %
Had a rapid method to send urgent messages to frontline laboratories that perform initial 
screening of clinical specimens (8/0 – 8/0) [0 states and DC] 100%
Crosscutting
Conducted bioterrorism exercise that met CDC criteria (8/0 – 8/0) %
Conducted exercise to test chemical readiness that met CDC criteria† (8/0 – 8/0) [ states] 8%
* This number only includes LRN laboratories in the 0 states. There are a total of 1 LRN laboratories.
† Data for chemical terorism agent exercises were collected for Level 1 and 2 laboratories
1 CDC, DBPR; 200; 2 CDC, DSLR; 200;  APHL, Public Health Laboratory Issues in Brief: Bioterrorism Capacity; May 200;  CDC, DSLR; 200
The Big Picture for All States and Directly Funded Localities
Disease Detection and Investigation
The sooner public health professionals can detect diseases or other health threats and investigate their causes and effects in the 
community, the more quickly they can minimize population exposure. 
Detect &
Report
Could receive and investigate urgent disease reports 2//1 100%
Primary method for receiving urgent disease reports*2
- Telephone 81%
- Electronic reporting 1%
- Fax %
Linked state and local health personnel to share information about disease outbreaks across 
state lines (through the CDC Epi-X system) 100%
Conducted year-round surveillance for seasonal influenza [0 states and DC] 100%
* Telephone, fax, and electronic reporting are all viable options for urgent disease reporting, as long as the public health department has someone assigned to receive the 
reports 2//.
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Control
Developed a public health response plan, including pandemic influenza response, crisis and 
emergency risk communication, and Strategic National Stockpile (SNS)1, 2 100%
State plan to receive and distribute SNS assets reviewed by CDC2 [0 states] 98%
-  Mean score on CDC technical assistance review (1-100) 9
Total number of cities in the Cities Readiness Initiative 2
Crosscutting
Developed roles and responsibilities for a multi-jurisdictional response (ICS) with:1  (8/0 – 8/0)
-  Hospitals 91%
-  Local/regional emergency management agencies 9%
-  Federal emergency management agencies 0%
Public health department staff participated in training to support cooperative agreement 
activities 100%
Public health laboratories conducted training for first responders  (8/0 – 8/0) [ states and DC] 0%
Activated public health emergency operations center as part of a drill, exercise, or real event*† 
(partial year, 9/0 – 2/0) %
Conducted a drill or exercise for key response partners to test communications when power and 
land lines were unavailable† (partial year, 9/0 – 2/0) %
Improve Finalized at least one after-action report with an improvement plan following an exercise or real event† (partial year, 9/0 – 2/0) 98%
* Activation means rapidly staffing all eight core ICS functional roles in the public health emergency operations center with one person per position. This capability is critical 
to maintain in case of large-scale or complex incidents, even though not every incident requires full staffing of the ICS.
† States were expected to perform these activities from 9/1/200 to 8/0/200. These data represent results from the first half of this period only.
1 CDC, DSLR; 200; 2 CDC, DSNS; 200;  CDC, DSNS CRI; 200;  CDC, DSLR; 1999-200;  APHL, Chemical Terrorism Preparedness; May 200;  CDC, DSLR; 200
Response
Planning provides a framework for how a public health department will respond during an emergency. The plans can be tested 
through external reviews, exercises, and real events. After-action reports assess what worked well during an exercise or real event and 





























In March 2007, numerous tornadoes 
swept across the state of Alabama. 
Two of these tornadoes seriously 
affected residents, particularly 
in the towns of Enterprise and Miller’s Ferry which 
reported fatalities.  Hundreds of homes were destroyed 
or suffered major damage. The Governor activated the 
state emergency operations center and declared a state of 
emergency. The Alabama Department of Public Health 
(ADPH) put its 24 emergency response teams on alert 
for statewide deployment. Public health nurses and social 
workers assisted in shelters managed by the American 
Red Cross. In addition, surveillance nurses investigated 
emergency room visits made by first responders and 
tornado victims who presented with burns because of 
exposure to an unknown chemical at a school. 
Throughout the response, ADPH coordinated with local 
public health departments, emergency management 
agencies, non-profit organizations, and others to mitigate 
health threats across Alabama. ADPH provided a mobile 
unit for those residents who needed tetanus shots, 
first aid, and masks. ADPH arranged for commercial 
pharmacies to provide medications to people who had 
lost theirs in the tornado. Walking teams of public 
health nurses and social workers also visited badly-hit 
neighborhoods to assess for unmet needs.  ADPH also 
issued press releases to warn citizens of the dangers 
that often follow disasters, including carbon monoxide 
poisoning when using gasoline powered generators 
and poor water quality in homes with private wells. 
Cooperative agreement funds allowed ADPH to provide 
these critical services to Alabama residents.
Snapshot of Public Health Preparedness
Below are activities conducted by Alabama in the area of public health preparedness. They support CDC preparedness 
goals in the areas of detection and reporting, control, and improvement; crosscutting activities help prepare for all stages 
of an event. These data are not comprehensive and do not cover all preparedness activities.
Disease Detection and Investigation
The sooner public health professionals can detect diseases or other health threats and investigate their causes and effects in 
the community, the more quickly they can minimize population exposure. 
Detect &
Report
Could receive and investigate urgent disease reports 24/7/3651 Yes
-  Primary method for receiving urgent disease reports*2 Telephone
Linked state and local health personnel to share information about disease outbreaks 
across state lines (through the CDC Epi-X system)3 Yes
Conducted year-round surveillance for seasonal influenza4 Yes
* Telephone, fax, and electronic reporting are all viable options for urgent disease reporting, as long as the public health department has someone assigned 
to receive the reports 24/7/365.
1 CDC, DSLR; 2005; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2006; 3 CDC, Epi-X; 2007; 4 HHS, OIG; 2007
Alabama Responds to Severe Tornadoes 
Prepared public health professionals protect community health during emergencies.
Alabama
http://www.adph.org/aldph.asp
According to the Alabama Department of 
Public Health, the cooperative agreement 
is valuable because health departments have 
a greater capacity to respond to emergencies 
than they did prior to the cooperative 
agreement. The cooperative agreement has 
provided training to prepare staff to deal 
with many types of events, equipment such 
as communication gear, computers, and state-
of-the-art tools to detect biological agents, 
and additional staff that have led ADPH’s 





obilizing State by State
Public Health Laboratories
Public health laboratories test and confirm agents that can threaten health. For example, advanced DNA “fingerprinting” 
techniques and subsequent reporting to the CDC database (PulseNet) are critical to recognize nationwide outbreaks from 
bacteria that can cause severe illness, such as E. coli O157:H7 and Listeria monocytogenes. 
Detect & Report
Number of Alabama laboratories in the Laboratory Response Network1 1
Rapidly identified E. coli O157:H7 using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) None
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days  N/A
Rapidly identified Listeria monocytogenes using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) 1
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days 100%
Had a laboratory information management system that could create, send, and receive 
messages3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
-  System complied with CDC information technology standards (PHIN)3 (8/05 – 8/06) No
Had a rapid method to send urgent messages to frontline laboratories that perform 
initial screening of clinical specimens3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Crosscutting
Conducted bioterrorism exercise that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) No
Conducted exercise to test chemical readiness that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
1 CDC, DBPR; 2007; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2007; 3 APHL, Public Health Laboratory Issues in Brief: Bioterrorism Capacity; May 2007; 4 CDC, DSLR; 2006
Response
Planning provides a framework for how a public health department will respond during an emergency. The plans can be 
tested through external reviews, exercises, and real events. After-action reports assess what worked well during an exercise or 
real event and how the department can improve. 
Control
Developed a public health response plan, including pandemic influenza response, crisis 
and emergency risk communication, and Strategic National Stockpile (SNS)1, 2 Yes
Alabama SNS plan reviewed by CDC2 Yes
-  Score on CDC technical assistance review (1-100) 92
Number of Alabama cities in the Cities Readiness Initiative3 1
Crosscutting
Developed roles and responsibilities for a multi-jurisdictional response (ICS) with:1  (8/05 – 8/06)
-  Hospitals Yes
-  Local/regional emergency management agencies Yes
-  Federal emergency management agencies No
Public health department staff participated in training to support cooperative 
agreement activities4 Yes
Public health laboratories conducted training for first responders5  (8/05 – 8/06) No response
Activated public health emergency operations center as part of a drill, exercise, or real 
event*†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) No
Conducted a drill or exercise for key response partners to test communications when 
power and land lines were unavailable†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) No
Improve Finalized at least one after-action report with an improvement plan following an exercise or real event†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
* Activation means rapidly staffing all eight core ICS functional roles in the public health emergency operations center with one person per position. This 
capability is critical to maintain in case of large-scale or complex incidents, even though not every incident requires full staffing of the ICS.
† States were expected to perform these activities from 9/1/2006 to 8/30/2007. These data represent results from the first half of this period only.






























The Alaska Division of Public 
Health (DPH) seized an opportunity 
in 2007 to exercise response to an 
outbreak that was similar to an 
influenza pandemic scenario, which could potentially 
overwhelm public health, emergency response, and health 
care systems. In late January, a northern Alaskan hospital 
in the town of Barrow started receiving pediatric patients 
suffering with respiratory syncytial virus (RSV), the 
most common cause of respiratory tract infection among 
children younger than 1 year old. Within one month, 
the town had already seen triple their annual number of 
RSV cases. With cases occurring across Alaska, patients 
quickly filled all of the available pediatric intensive 
care units in the state and necessitated the use of adult 
ICU beds for overflow. DPH activated its Emergency 
Operations Center (EOC) and coordinated an inter-
agency teleconference to share outbreak information 
with all partner agencies and to address the immediate 
needs of medical communities in affected cities. The 
teleconference included representatives from public health 
and emergency response agencies at the local and state 
levels, hospitals, and the Alaska Native Tribal Health 
Consortium. 
In addition, epidemiologists started a statewide program 
to track the spread of RSV and other respiratory illnesses. 
The EOC used this information to track possible hot 
spots in an attempt to stem any other outbreaks similar in 
size and scope to the one in Barrow. The EOC was able to 
train DPH staff in their roles in an emergency and engage 
partner agencies in their expected roles during a large-scale 
event. The public information team was able to practice 
developing and disseminating risk communication and 
public education materials for a statewide event.
Snapshot of Public Health Preparedness
Below are activities conducted by Alaska in the area of public health preparedness. They support CDC preparedness goals 
in the areas of detection and reporting, control, and improvement; crosscutting activities help prepare for all stages of an 
event. These data are not comprehensive and do not cover all preparedness activities.
Disease Detection and Investigation
The sooner public health professionals can detect diseases or other health threats and investigate their causes and effects in 
the community, the more quickly they can minimize population exposure. 
Detect &
Report
Could receive and investigate urgent disease reports 24/7/3651 Yes
-  Primary method for receiving urgent disease reports*2 Telephone
Linked state and local health personnel to share information about disease outbreaks 
across state lines (through the CDC Epi-X system)3 Yes
Conducted year-round surveillance for seasonal influenza4 Yes
* Telephone, fax, and electronic reporting are all viable options for urgent disease reporting, as long as the public health department has someone assigned 
to receive the reports 24/7/365.
1 CDC, DSLR; 2005; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2006; 3 CDC, Epi-X; 2007; 4 HHS, OIG; 2007
Alaska Exercises Pandemic Influenza Plan during a Real Outbreak 
Exercising response plans during real events improves preparation for future large-scale events.
Alaska
http://www.hss.state.ak.us/dph/dphpp/default.cfm
According to the Alaska Division of Public 
Health, the cooperative agreement is 
valuable because funds have been critical in 
connecting important stakeholders for an all-
hazards approach to preparedness. Bringing 
together hospitals, environmental health 
organizations, tribal health organizations, 
homeland security, local emergency 






obilizing State by State
Public Health Laboratories
Public health laboratories test and confirm agents that can threaten health. For example, advanced DNA “fingerprinting” 
techniques and subsequent reporting to the CDC database (PulseNet) are critical to recognize nationwide outbreaks from 
bacteria that can cause severe illness, such as E. coli O157:H7 and Listeria monocytogenes. 
Detect & Report
Number of Alaska laboratories in the Laboratory Response Network1 2
Rapidly identified E. coli O157:H7 using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) 2
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days  100%
Rapidly identified Listeria monocytogenes using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) None
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days N/A
Had a laboratory information management system that could create, send, and receive 
messages3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
-  System complied with CDC information technology standards (PHIN)3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Had a rapid method to send urgent messages to frontline laboratories that perform 
initial screening of clinical specimens3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Crosscutting
Conducted bioterrorism exercise that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Conducted exercise to test chemical readiness that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
1 CDC, DBPR; 2007; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2007; 3 APHL, Public Health Laboratory Issues in Brief: Bioterrorism Capacity; May 2007; 4 CDC, DSLR; 2006
Response
Planning provides a framework for how a public health department will respond during an emergency. The plans can be 
tested through external reviews, exercises, and real events. After-action reports assess what worked well during an exercise or 
real event and how the department can improve. 
Control
Developed a public health response plan, including pandemic influenza response, crisis 
and emergency risk communication, and Strategic National Stockpile (SNS)1, 2 Yes
Alaska SNS plan reviewed by CDC2 Yes
-  Score on CDC technical assistance review (1-100) 80
Number of Alaska cities in the Cities Readiness Initiative3 1
Crosscutting
Developed roles and responsibilities for a multi-jurisdictional response (ICS) with:1  (8/05 – 8/06)
-  Hospitals Yes
-  Local/regional emergency management agencies Yes
-  Federal emergency management agencies Yes
Public health department staff participated in training to support cooperative 
agreement activities4 Yes
Public health laboratories conducted training for first responders5  (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Activated public health emergency operations center as part of a drill, exercise, or real 
event*†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
Conducted a drill or exercise for key response partners to test communications when 
power and land lines were unavailable†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
Improve Finalized at least one after-action report with an improvement plan following an exercise or real event†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
* Activation means rapidly staffing all eight core ICS functional roles in the public health emergency operations center with one person per position. This 
capability is critical to maintain in case of large-scale or complex incidents, even though not every incident requires full staffing of the ICS.
† States were expected to perform these activities from 9/1/2006 to 8/30/2007. These data represent results from the first half of this period only.






























Phoenix, Arizona received 576 
evacuees by plane from New Orleans 
within one week of Hurricane 
Katrina’s landfall in 2005. Because of 
cooperative agreement funding, the Arizona Department 
of Health Services had the resources to coordinate 
the sheltering of evacuees, conduct effective infection 
control and health screening, and implement an on-site 
clinic at the shelter. Local organizations and the medical 
community also contributed resources to assist the 
evacuees over the two weeks of public health and medical 
operations.  
Public health activities included the administration of 
vaccines, tuberculosis screening, laboratory analyses of 
patient samples, pharmacy services, emergency medical 
services transports, hospital referrals, behavioral health 
services, food safety inspections, and comprehensive 
infection control and sanitation services.
The clinic served both evacuees housed at the shelter and 
other evacuees who arrived independently. Medical and 
epidemiological data were collected at the clinic, and 
other data also were obtained from various organizations 
providing health services to evacuees. In total, 826 
patients were seen at the clinic, for a total of 1,427 
visits. Because of the comprehensive infection control 
measures taken at the shelter throughout the operation no 
outbreaks were detected, although many patients reported 
symptoms related to infectious diseases.
Snapshot of Public Health Preparedness
Below are activities conducted by Arizona in the area of public health preparedness. They support CDC preparedness 
goals in the areas of detection and reporting, control, and improvement; crosscutting activities help prepare for all stages 
of an event. These data are not comprehensive and do not cover all preparedness activities.
Disease Detection and Investigation
The sooner public health professionals can detect diseases or other health threats and investigate their causes and effects in 
the community, the more quickly they can minimize population exposure. 
Detect &
Report
Could receive and investigate urgent disease reports 24/7/3651 Yes
-  Primary method for receiving urgent disease reports*2 Telephone
Linked state and local health personnel to share information about disease outbreaks 
across state lines (through the CDC Epi-X system)3 Yes
Conducted year-round surveillance for seasonal influenza4 Yes
* Telephone, fax, and electronic reporting are all viable options for urgent disease reporting, as long as the public health department has someone assigned 
to receive the reports 24/7/365.
1 CDC, DSLR; 2005; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2006; 3 CDC, Epi-X; 2007; 4 HHS, OIG; 2007
Arizona Responds to an Influx of Hurricane Katrina Evacuees 
Partnerships play key roles in comprehensive emergency response.
Arizona
http://www.azdhs.gov/phs/edc/edrp
According to the Arizona Department 
of Health Services, the cooperative 
agreement is valuable because funds have 
supported all required planning, development, 
implementation, monitoring activities, and 
resources to improve Arizona’s capability to 
respond to a public health emergency. Five 
years prior to the cooperative agreement, no 
one program was solely dedicated to public 
health emergency preparedness and response. 
Since then, the state has consolidated its 
two public health preparedness and response 






obilizing State by State
Public Health Laboratories
Public health laboratories test and confirm agents that can threaten health. For example, advanced DNA “fingerprinting” 
techniques and subsequent reporting to the CDC database (PulseNet) are critical to recognize nationwide outbreaks from 
bacteria that can cause severe illness, such as E. coli O157:H7 and Listeria monocytogenes. 
Detect & Report
Number of Arizona laboratories in the Laboratory Response Network1 1
Rapidly identified E. coli O157:H7 using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) 22
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days  77%
Rapidly identified Listeria monocytogenes using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) 3
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days 67%
Had a laboratory information management system that could create, send, and receive 
messages3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
-  System complied with CDC information technology standards (PHIN)3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Had a rapid method to send urgent messages to frontline laboratories that perform 
initial screening of clinical specimens3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Crosscutting
Conducted bioterrorism exercise that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Conducted exercise to test chemical readiness that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
1 CDC, DBPR; 2007; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2007; 3 APHL, Public Health Laboratory Issues in Brief: Bioterrorism Capacity; May 2007; 4 CDC, DSLR; 2006
Response
Planning provides a framework for how a public health department will respond during an emergency. The plans can be 
tested through external reviews, exercises, and real events. After-action reports assess what worked well during an exercise or 
real event and how the department can improve. 
Control
Developed a public health response plan, including pandemic influenza response, crisis 
and emergency risk communication, and Strategic National Stockpile (SNS)1, 2 Yes
Arizona SNS plan reviewed by CDC2 Yes
-  Score on CDC technical assistance review (1-100) 86
Number of Arizona cities in the Cities Readiness Initiative3 1
Crosscutting
Developed roles and responsibilities for a multi-jurisdictional response (ICS) with:1  (8/05 – 8/06)
-  Hospitals Yes
-  Local/regional emergency management agencies Yes
-  Federal emergency management agencies Yes
Public health department staff participated in training to support cooperative 
agreement activities4 Yes
Public health laboratories conducted training for first responders5  (8/05 – 8/06) No
Activated public health emergency operations center as part of a drill, exercise, or real 
event*†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
Conducted a drill or exercise for key response partners to test communications when 
power and land lines were unavailable†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
Improve Finalized at least one after-action report with an improvement plan following an exercise or real event†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
* Activation means rapidly staffing all eight core ICS functional roles in the public health emergency operations center with one person per position. This 
capability is critical to maintain in case of large-scale or complex incidents, even though not every incident requires full staffing of the ICS.
† States were expected to perform these activities from 9/1/2006 to 8/30/2007. These data represent results from the first half of this period only.






























In September 2005, the Arkansas 
Department of Health (DOH) 
activated and fully staffed its 
Emergency Operations Center 
(EOC) as reports began coming in that thousands of 
Katrina evacuees were on their way by plane, car, and bus 
to Arkansas. The state’s greatest concern was how to house 
and feed the evacuees while simultaneously preventing the 
spread of disease in mass shelters.  
DOH accomplished hundreds of logistical tasks during 
this mass evacuation, including processing thousands of 
applications for services ranging from medical assistance 
and social services to temporary employment assistance 
(TEA). During the months of September and October, 
more than 12,000 applications were processed. Benefits 
authorizing food stamps amounted to $2.3 million. 
Arkansas Medicaid applications were approved for 1,315 
people and TEA benefits totaled $78,871.
In the end, approximately 31,000 evacuees were processed 
through the Arkansas system. In addition, coordination 
with CDC allowed for an epidemiological team to assess 
the health status of the evacuees. Rapid needs assessments 
and evaluations of the impact on environmental services 
systems allowed for a more efficient response to Hurricane 
Katrina. The Arkansas Public Health Laboratory also 
conducted drinking water analysis for several months 
following Hurricane Katrina. Increased laboratory 
infrastructure provided through preparedness initiatives 
was essential to manage increased workloads.
Snapshot of Public Health Preparedness
Below are activities conducted by Arkansas in the area of public health preparedness. They support CDC preparedness 
goals in the areas of detection and reporting, control, and improvement; crosscutting activities help prepare for all stages 
of an event. These data are not comprehensive and do not cover all preparedness activities.
Disease Detection and Investigation
The sooner public health professionals can detect diseases or other health threats and investigate their causes and effects in 
the community, the more quickly they can minimize population exposure. 
Detect &
Report
Could receive and investigate urgent disease reports 24/7/3651 Yes
-  Primary method for receiving urgent disease reports*2 Telephone
Linked state and local health personnel to share information about disease outbreaks 
across state lines (through the CDC Epi-X system)3 Yes
Conducted year-round surveillance for seasonal influenza4 Yes
* Telephone, fax, and electronic reporting are all viable options for urgent disease reporting, as long as the public health department has someone assigned 
to receive the reports 24/7/365.
1 CDC, DSLR; 2005; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2006; 3 CDC, Epi-X; 2007; 4 HHS, OIG; 2007
Arkansas Assists Hurricane Katrina Evacuees 
Coordination of government programs improves public health in the wake of devastating emergencies.
Arkansas
http://www.healthyarkansas.com
According to the Arkansas Department 
of Health, the cooperative agreement is 
valuable because Arkansas has been able 
to convert from statewide telephone line 
and modem communications systems to a 
real-time high speed 24/7 intranet system. 
In addition, the cooperative agreement has 
had immeasurable effects on the state public 
health laboratory, especially in the clinical 
microbiology, molecular diagnostics, and 
virology testing units. Arkansas has moved 
from traditional time-consuming methods 
to modern methods that can identify most 





obilizing State by State
Public Health Laboratories
Public health laboratories test and confirm agents that can threaten health. For example, advanced DNA “fingerprinting” 
techniques and subsequent reporting to the CDC database (PulseNet) are critical to recognize nationwide outbreaks from 
bacteria that can cause severe illness, such as E. coli O157:H7 and Listeria monocytogenes. 
Detect & Report
Number of Arkansas laboratories in the Laboratory Response Network1 2
Rapidly identified E. coli O157:H7 using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) 21
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days  100%
Rapidly identified Listeria monocytogenes using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) None
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days N/A
Had a laboratory information management system that could create, send, and receive 
messages3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
-  System complied with CDC information technology standards (PHIN)3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Had a rapid method to send urgent messages to frontline laboratories that perform 
initial screening of clinical specimens3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Crosscutting
Conducted bioterrorism exercise that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) No
Conducted exercise to test chemical readiness that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
1 CDC, DBPR; 2007; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2007; 3 APHL, Public Health Laboratory Issues in Brief: Bioterrorism Capacity; May 2007; 4 CDC, DSLR; 2006
Response
Planning provides a framework for how a public health department will respond during an emergency. The plans can be 
tested through external reviews, exercises, and real events. After-action reports assess what worked well during an exercise or 
real event and how the department can improve. 
Control
Developed a public health response plan, including pandemic influenza response, crisis 
and emergency risk communication, and Strategic National Stockpile (SNS)1, 2 Yes
Arkansas SNS plan reviewed by CDC2 Yes
-  Score on CDC technical assistance review (1-100) 83
Number of Arkansas cities in the Cities Readiness Initiative3 1
Crosscutting
Developed roles and responsibilities for a multi-jurisdictional response (ICS) with:1  (8/05 – 8/06)
-  Hospitals Yes
-  Local/regional emergency management agencies Yes
-  Federal emergency management agencies Yes
Public health department staff participated in training to support cooperative 
agreement activities4 Yes
Public health laboratories conducted training for first responders5  (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Activated public health emergency operations center as part of a drill, exercise, or real 
event*†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
Conducted a drill or exercise for key response partners to test communications when 
power and land lines were unavailable†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
Improve Finalized at least one after-action report with an improvement plan following an exercise or real event†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
* Activation means rapidly staffing all eight core ICS functional roles in the public health emergency operations center with one person per position. This 
capability is critical to maintain in case of large-scale or complex incidents, even though not every incident requires full staffing of the ICS.
† States were expected to perform these activities from 9/1/2006 to 8/30/2007. These data represent results from the first half of this period only.






























July 2006 was the hottest July 
on record for California. When 
temperatures climbed well above 100 
degrees and stayed there for weeks, 
the health and safety of the public was threatened. At least 
100 deaths were attributed to extreme heat.
Many of the early heat-related fatalities were elderly 
people or those living alone. To target this high-risk 
group, California Department of Health Services (CDHS) 
staff contacted all long-term care facilities in the state 
to check temperatures inside the facilities and provide 
advice to those without air conditioning. Local health 
department workers contacted single-room occupancy 
hotels to inquire about frail and elderly residents who 
needed assistance. Seventy-five cooling centers were 
opened at fairgrounds and other locations to provide safe 
shelter for residents without access to air conditioning. 
Information on how to avoid heat-related illnesses was 
disseminated through news conferences and releases and 
posted on state agency websites.
To coordinate these activities, the CDHS activated its 
Joint Emergency Operations Center (JEOC). Unlike 
some emergency events, heat waves last for extended 
periods of time. The activation of the JEOC allowed 
CDHS to successfully coordinate intra- and interagency 
response activities for the duration of the heat wave. Both 
the physical structure of the JEOC and previous staff 
training ensured that a consistent high-level response was 
maintained. Following the summer heat wave, a task force 
of state and local partners convened and developed an 
interim contingency plan for future heat emergencies.
Snapshot of Public Health Preparedness
Below are activities conducted by California in the area of public health preparedness. They support CDC preparedness 
goals in the areas of detection and reporting, control, and improvement; crosscutting activities help prepare for all stages 
of an event. These data are not comprehensive and do not cover all preparedness activities.
Disease Detection and Investigation
The sooner public health professionals can detect diseases or other health threats and investigate their causes and effects in 
the community, the more quickly they can minimize population exposure. 
Detect &
Report
Could receive and investigate urgent disease reports 24/7/3651 Yes
-  Primary method for receiving urgent disease reports*2 Telephone
Linked state and local health personnel to share information about disease outbreaks 
across state lines (through the CDC Epi-X system)3 Yes
Conducted year-round surveillance for seasonal influenza4 Yes
* Telephone, fax, and electronic reporting are all viable options for urgent disease reporting, as long as the public health department has someone assigned 
to receive the reports 24/7/365.
1 CDC, DSLR; 2005; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2006; 3 CDC, Epi-X; 2007; 4 HHS, OIG; 2007
California’s Response to Life-Threatening High Temperatures 
Strong emergency operation capacity maintains high-level response for extended emergencies.
California
http://bePreparedCalifornia.ca.gov/epo
According to the California Department 
of Health Services, the cooperative 
agreement is valuable because funding 
has provided resources for training in the 
Standard Emergency Management System 
(SEMS) and other aspects of emergency 
preparedness. California has been able to 
upgrade biological and chemical laboratories, 
develop a new emergency operations center, 
and develop protocols compliant with SEMS 
and NIMS. The state has greatly improved its 
preparedness capability at both the state and 






obilizing State by State
Public Health Laboratories
Public health laboratories test and confirm agents that can threaten health. For example, advanced DNA “fingerprinting” 
techniques and subsequent reporting to the CDC database (PulseNet) are critical to recognize nationwide outbreaks from 
bacteria that can cause severe illness, such as E. coli O157:H7 and Listeria monocytogenes. 
Detect & Report
Number of California laboratories in the Laboratory Response Network1 21
Rapidly identified E. coli O157:H7 using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) 257
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days  91%
Rapidly identified Listeria monocytogenes using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) 3
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days 33%
Had a laboratory information management system that could create, send, and receive 
messages3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
-  System complied with CDC information technology standards (PHIN)3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Had a rapid method to send urgent messages to frontline laboratories that perform 
initial screening of clinical specimens3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Crosscutting
Conducted bioterrorism exercise that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) No
Conducted exercise to test chemical readiness that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
1 CDC, DBPR; 2007; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2007; 3 APHL, Public Health Laboratory Issues in Brief: Bioterrorism Capacity; May 2007; 4 CDC, DSLR; 2006
Response
Planning provides a framework for how a public health department will respond during an emergency. The plans can be 
tested through external reviews, exercises, and real events. After-action reports assess what worked well during an exercise or 
real event and how the department can improve. 
Control
Developed a public health response plan, including pandemic influenza response, crisis 
and emergency risk communication, and Strategic National Stockpile (SNS)1, 2 Yes
California SNS plan reviewed by CDC2 Yes
-  Score on CDC technical assistance review (1-100) 97
Number of California cities in the Cities Readiness Initiative3 7
Crosscutting
Developed roles and responsibilities for a multi-jurisdictional response (ICS) with:1  (8/05 – 8/06)
-  Hospitals Yes
-  Local/regional emergency management agencies Yes
-  Federal emergency management agencies Yes
Public health department staff participated in training to support cooperative 
agreement activities4 Yes
Public health laboratories conducted training for first responders5  (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Activated public health emergency operations center as part of a drill, exercise, or real 
event*†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
Conducted a drill or exercise for key response partners to test communications when 
power and land lines were unavailable†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) No
Improve Finalized at least one after-action report with an improvement plan following an exercise or real event†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
* Activation means rapidly staffing all eight core ICS functional roles in the public health emergency operations center with one person per position. This 
capability is critical to maintain in case of large-scale or complex incidents, even though not every incident requires full staffing of the ICS.
† States were expected to perform these activities from 9/1/2006 to 8/30/2007. These data represent results from the first half of this period only.






























The 20th annual “Taste of Chicago” 
festival was held in 2007 and drew 
an estimated 3.5 million people. 
Many hailed from the tri-state area, 
while others traveled from across the United States as 
well as overseas. However, for the first time in the event’s 
history, the festival was marred by a salmonella outbreak 
that affected almost 800 people. Compared to the 
typical salmonella case count of only 300 per year in the 
Chicago area, this outbreak was unprecedented in both 
number and scope and tested the city’s ability to respond 
effectively to contain the outbreak and inform the public. 
 
The Chicago Department of Public Health called upon 
many resources in order to contact patients and conduct 
interviews as part of the epidemiological investigation. 
Staff were able to investigate and trace the source of 
salmonella back to a single dish from a single vendor. 
During the outbreak investigation, the department’s 
resources were stretched thin by other concurrent health-
related incidents. Some of these incidents included the 
discovery of imported counterfeit toothpaste, 
continued monitoring of West Nile Virus activity, and 
the citywide response to the health-endangering heat 
wave. The response to all of these events required a well-
organized and trained organization capable of carrying 
out multi-faceted tasks and adapting to rapidly-evolving 
situations.
Snapshot of Public Health Preparedness
Below are activities conducted by Chicago in the area of public health preparedness. They support CDC preparedness 
goals in the areas of detection and reporting, control, and improvement; crosscutting activities help prepare for all stages 
of an event. These data are not comprehensive and do not cover all preparedness activities.
Disease Detection and Investigation
The sooner public health professionals can detect diseases or other health threats and investigate their causes and effects in 
the community, the more quickly they can minimize population exposure. 
Detect &
Report
Could receive and investigate urgent disease reports 24/7/3651 Yes
-  Primary method for receiving urgent disease reports*2 Telephone
Linked state and local health personnel to share information about disease outbreaks 
across state lines (through the CDC Epi-X system)3 Yes
Conducted year-round surveillance for seasonal influenza†4 —
* Telephone, fax, and electronic reporting are all viable options for urgent disease reporting, as long as the public health department has someone assigned 
to receive the reports 24/7/365.
† Localities were not asked to respond to this question.
Chicago Responds to Salmonella Outbreak at a Citywide Food Festival 
Robust public health capabilities are needed to respond to multiple emergencies.
Chicago
http://egov.cityofchicago.org
According to the Chicago Department 
of Health, the cooperative agreement is 
valuable because previously, it would have 
been difficult to have the surge capacity to 
respond to large-scale or multiple events 
as the public health infrastructure and 
resources became depleted. Chicago has been 
able to hire staff with relevant expertise in 
preparedness. Additional resources have also 
enabled the city to increase competencies and 





obilizing State by State
Public Health Laboratories
Public health laboratories test and confirm agents that can threaten health. For example, advanced DNA “fingerprinting” 
techniques and subsequent reporting to the CDC database (PulseNet) are critical to recognize nationwide outbreaks from 
bacteria that can cause severe illness, such as E. coli O157:H7 and Listeria monocytogenes. 
Detect & Report
Number of Chicago laboratories in the Laboratory Response Network1 1
Rapidly identified E. coli O157:H7 using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):*2
Rapidly identified Listeria monocytogenes using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):*2
Had a laboratory information management system that could create, send, and receive 
messages*3 (8/05 – 8/06) —
- System complied with CDC information technology standards (PHIN)*3 (8/05 – 8/06) —
Had a rapid method to send urgent messages to frontline laboratories that perform 
initial screening of clinical specimens*3 (8/05 – 8/06) —
Crosscutting
Conducted bioterrorism exercise that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Conducted exercise to test chemical readiness that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) N/A
* Localities were not asked to respond to this question.
1 CDC, DBPR; 2007; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2007; 3 APHL, Public Health Laboratory Issues in Brief: Bioterrorism Capacity; May 2007; 4 CDC, DSLR; 2006
Response
Planning provides a framework for how a public health department will respond during an emergency. The plans can be 
tested through external reviews, exercises, and real events. After-action reports assess what worked well during an exercise or 
real event and how the department can improve. 
Control
Developed a public health response plan, including pandemic influenza response, crisis 
and emergency risk communication, and Strategic National Stockpile (SNS)1, 2 Yes
Chicago SNS plan reviewed by CDC2 Yes
-  Score on CDC technical assistance review (1-100) 88
Participated in the Cities Readiness Initiative2 Yes
Crosscutting
Developed roles and responsibilities for a multi-jurisdictional response (ICS) with:1  (8/05 – 8/06)
-  Hospitals Yes
-  Local/regional emergency management agencies Yes
-  Federal emergency management agencies No
Public health department staff participated in training to support cooperative 
agreement activities3 Yes
Public health laboratories conducted training for first responders*4  (8/05 – 8/06) —
Activated public health emergency operations center as part of a drill, exercise, or real 
event†‡5 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) No
Conducted a drill or exercise for key response partners to test communications when 
power and land lines were unavailable‡5 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) No
Improve Finalized at least one after-action report with an improvement plan following an exercise or real event‡5 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
* Localities were not asked to respond to this question.
† Activation means rapidly staffing all eight core ICS functional roles in the public health emergency operations center with one person per position. This 
capability is critical to maintain in case of large-scale or complex incidents, even though not every incident requires full staffing of the ICS.
‡ Localities were expected to perform these activities from 9/1/2006 to 8/30/2007. These data represent results from the first half of this period only.






























In the last weeks of December 
2006, two major winter storms hit 
Colorado. The first storm brought 
the Denver metropolitan area to a 
standstill; the second storm, which caused relatively minor 
problems in Denver, moved east and paralyzed the rest of 
the state with up to 4 feet of snow and drifts as high as 10 
feet.
The Colorado Department of Public Health and 
Environment (DPHE) began monitoring the situation as 
soon as the state’s Division of Emergency Management 
activated several state agencies. Although DPHE was not 
initially activated with the other agencies, it soon became 
apparent that DPHE needed to respond when reports 
came in that thousands of families were without power 
for 3 days or more. Without power for an extended time, 
food safety, sanitation, extreme cold, and transportation 
became serious public health concerns. Among other 
activities, public health workers rapidly assessed disrupted 
health sectors, monitored pharmaceutical supplies, located 
and assisted at-risk populations, and developed public 
health messages for the public.
Public health involvement is critical to help coordinate 
response and ensure continued access to needed care. 
Persistent efforts of Colorado public health officials during 
this incident made clear the important role of public 
health in emergency planning and response.
Snapshot of Public Health Preparedness
Below are activities conducted by Colorado in the area of public health preparedness. They support CDC preparedness 
goals in the areas of detection and reporting, control, and improvement; crosscutting activities help prepare for all stages 
of an event. These data are not comprehensive and do not cover all preparedness activities.
Disease Detection and Investigation
The sooner public health professionals can detect diseases or other health threats and investigate their causes and effects in 
the community, the more quickly they can minimize population exposure. 
Detect &
Report
Could receive and investigate urgent disease reports 24/7/3651 Yes
-  Primary method for receiving urgent disease reports*2 Telephone
Linked state and local health personnel to share information about disease outbreaks 
across state lines (through the CDC Epi-X system)3 Yes
Conducted year-round surveillance for seasonal influenza4 Yes
* Telephone, fax, and electronic reporting are all viable options for urgent disease reporting, as long as the public health department has someone assigned 
to receive the reports 24/7/365.
1 CDC, DSLR; 2005; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2006; 3 CDC, Epi-X; 2007; 4 HHS, OIG; 2007
Colorado Responds to Major Winter Storms 
Public health has an important role in every kind of emergency.
Colorado
http://www.cdphe.state.co.us/epr
According to the Colorado Department 
of Public Health and Environment, the 
cooperative agreement is valuable because 
funding has allowed Colorado to set rigorous 
public health preparedness goals and devise 
a framework to achieve them. Without the 
cooperative agreement, no state funding 
would have been available for these public 
health efforts, and progress in emergency 






obilizing State by State
Public Health Laboratories
Public health laboratories test and confirm agents that can threaten health. For example, advanced DNA “fingerprinting” 
techniques and subsequent reporting to the CDC database (PulseNet) are critical to recognize nationwide outbreaks from 
bacteria that can cause severe illness, such as E. coli O157:H7 and Listeria monocytogenes. 
Detect & Report
Number of Colorado laboratories in the Laboratory Response Network1 7
Rapidly identified E. coli O157:H7 using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) 80
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days  35%
Rapidly identified Listeria monocytogenes using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) 5
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days 0%
Had a laboratory information management system that could create, send, and receive 
messages3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
-  System complied with CDC information technology standards (PHIN)3 (8/05 – 8/06) No
Had a rapid method to send urgent messages to frontline laboratories that perform 
initial screening of clinical specimens3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Crosscutting
Conducted bioterrorism exercise that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Conducted exercise to test chemical readiness that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
1 CDC, DBPR; 2007; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2007; 3 APHL, Public Health Laboratory Issues in Brief: Bioterrorism Capacity; May 2007; 4 CDC, DSLR; 2006
Response
Planning provides a framework for how a public health department will respond during an emergency. The plans can be 
tested through external reviews, exercises, and real events. After-action reports assess what worked well during an exercise or 
real event and how the department can improve. 
Control
Developed a public health response plan, including pandemic influenza response, crisis 
and emergency risk communication, and Strategic National Stockpile (SNS)1, 2 Yes
Colorado SNS plan reviewed by CDC2 Yes
-  Score on CDC technical assistance review (1-100) 87
Number of Colorado cities in the Cities Readiness Initiative3 1
Crosscutting
Developed roles and responsibilities for a multi-jurisdictional response (ICS) with:1  (8/05 – 8/06)
-  Hospitals Yes
-  Local/regional emergency management agencies Yes
-  Federal emergency management agencies Yes
Public health department staff participated in training to support cooperative 
agreement activities4 Yes
Public health laboratories conducted training for first responders5  (8/05 – 8/06) No
Activated public health emergency operations center as part of a drill, exercise, or real 
event*†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
Conducted a drill or exercise for key response partners to test communications when 
power and land lines were unavailable†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
Improve Finalized at least one after-action report with an improvement plan following an exercise or real event†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
* Activation means rapidly staffing all eight core ICS functional roles in the public health emergency operations center with one person per position. This 
capability is critical to maintain in case of large-scale or complex incidents, even though not every incident requires full staffing of the ICS.
† States were expected to perform these activities from 9/1/2006 to 8/30/2007. These data represent results from the first half of this period only.






























In April 2006, the Connecticut 
Department of Public Health 
(DPH) conducted a full-scale 
seven-day exercise to test the state’s 
ability to order, receive, and distribute medications 
from the CDC Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) in 
the event of a public health emergency. An outbreak of 
a deadly infectious disease was simulated in which the 
local pharmaceutical supply ran out. The cooperation of 
federal, state and local government agencies, hospitals, 
municipalities, and schools was critical to the success of 
this exercise.
The exercise involved a mock receipt, storage, and staging 
of medical assets from the SNS and the distribution of 
assets to seven local public health departments and four 
hospitals across the state that acted as local points of 
dispensing (POD) and treatment centers, respectively. 
DPH delivered simulated medications to distribution 
points throughout the state within 24 hours of receipt. 
Local public health officials then worked to dispense 
1,000 regimens per hour to residents and hospitals.  
DPH collaborated with the Department of Emergency 
Management and Homeland Security (DEMHS) to plan 
this exercise according to Federal Homeland Security 
Exercise and Evaluation Program guidelines. Local public 
health departments that did not host a POD provided 
planning and operational support. DPH, DEMHS, 
and participating localities and hospitals activated their 
respective emergency operations centers and used the 
Incident Command System throughout the response. As 
a result, PODs distributed medication to a total of 1,539 
volunteer “patients” across the state. This was the first time 
dispensing throughput had been documented in great 
detail, and the data will serve as a baseline on which to 
improve mass dispensing.
Snapshot of Public Health Preparedness
Below are activities conducted by Connecticut in the area of public health preparedness. They support CDC 
preparedness goals in the areas of detection and reporting, control, and improvement; crosscutting activities help prepare 
for all stages of an event. These data are not comprehensive and do not cover all preparedness activities.
Disease Detection and Investigation
The sooner public health professionals can detect diseases or other health threats and investigate their causes and effects in 
the community, the more quickly they can minimize population exposure. 
Detect &
Report
Could receive and investigate urgent disease reports 24/7/3651 Yes
-  Primary method for receiving urgent disease reports*2 Telephone
Linked state and local health personnel to share information about disease outbreaks 
across state lines (through the CDC Epi-X system)3 Yes
Conducted year-round surveillance for seasonal influenza4 Yes
* Telephone, fax, and electronic reporting are all viable options for urgent disease reporting, as long as the public health department has someone assigned 
to receive the reports 24/7/365.
1 CDC, DSLR; 2005; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2006; 3 CDC, Epi-X; 2007; 4 HHS, OIG; 2007
Connecticut’s Statewide Exercise to Distribute Emergency Medications  
Exercises are critical to ensure successful federal-state-local interactions during an emergency.
Connecticut
http://www.ct.gov/dph
According to the Connecticut Department 
of Public Health, the cooperative 
agreement is valuable because the state has 
been able to build several key preparedness 
components and bring authority and 
legitimacy to planning for emergencies 
that might never have happened without 
the cooperative agreement. Newly hired 
staff for planning have also been critical for 
exercising, improved communications, and 





obilizing State by State
Public Health Laboratories
Public health laboratories test and confirm agents that can threaten health. For example, advanced DNA “fingerprinting” 
techniques and subsequent reporting to the CDC database (PulseNet) are critical to recognize nationwide outbreaks from 
bacteria that can cause severe illness, such as E. coli O157:H7 and Listeria monocytogenes. 
Detect & Report
Number of Connecticut laboratories in the Laboratory Response Network1 1
Rapidly identified E. coli O157:H7 using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) None
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days  N/A
Rapidly identified Listeria monocytogenes using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) 17
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days 100%
Had a laboratory information management system that could create, send, and receive 
messages3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
-  System complied with CDC information technology standards (PHIN)3 (8/05 – 8/06) No
Had a rapid method to send urgent messages to frontline laboratories that perform 
initial screening of clinical specimens3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Crosscutting
Conducted bioterrorism exercise that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Conducted exercise to test chemical readiness that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
1 CDC, DBPR; 2007; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2007; 3 APHL, Public Health Laboratory Issues in Brief: Bioterrorism Capacity; May 2007; 4 CDC, DSLR; 2006
Response
Planning provides a framework for how a public health department will respond during an emergency. The plans can be 
tested through external reviews, exercises, and real events. After-action reports assess what worked well during an exercise or 
real event and how the department can improve. 
Control
Developed a public health response plan, including pandemic influenza response, crisis 
and emergency risk communication, and Strategic National Stockpile (SNS)1, 2 Yes
Connecticut SNS plan reviewed by CDC2 Yes
-  Score on CDC technical assistance review (1-100) 69
Number of Connecticut cities in the Cities Readiness Initiative3 2
Crosscutting
Developed roles and responsibilities for a multi-jurisdictional response (ICS) with:1  (8/05 – 8/06)
-  Hospitals Yes
-  Local/regional emergency management agencies Yes
-  Federal emergency management agencies Yes
Public health department staff participated in training to support cooperative 
agreement activities4 Yes
Public health laboratories conducted training for first responders5  (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Activated public health emergency operations center as part of a drill, exercise, or real 
event*†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
Conducted a drill or exercise for key response partners to test communications when 
power and land lines were unavailable†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) No
Improve Finalized at least one after-action report with an improvement plan following an exercise or real event†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
* Activation means rapidly staffing all eight core ICS functional roles in the public health emergency operations center with one person per position. This 
capability is critical to maintain in case of large-scale or complex incidents, even though not every incident requires full staffing of the ICS.
† States were expected to perform these activities from 9/1/2006 to 8/30/2007. These data represent results from the first half of this period only.






























Delaware’s Division of Public Health 
(DPH) was concerned that its public 
health response and recovery plans 
did not meet the needs of all people, 
especially at-risk populations (identified as children, 
disabled, homeless, economically disadvantaged, medically 
fragile, institutionalized, or persons temporarily injured). 
Emergency planning for at-risk populations includes 
making provisions and developing systems that meet the 
needs of all individuals.  
Over the last 3 years, DPH has completed substantial 
work to reach and plan for these populations. Response 
plans and exercises incorporated at-risk population 
groups, such as individuals with visual impairments in a 
2004 large-scale, functional exercise, and also 319 people 
with special needs added to the 911 registry during a 
2007 call center exercise. DPH provided tips for helping 
at-risk populations to all first responders in the state and 
also developed a guide for emergency planners to help 
address the needs of at-risk populations. DPH also 
distributed almost 6,000 specialized publications for at-
risk populations regarding actions to take in a disaster 
(developed in Braille, Spanish, large print, and audio). 
These activities support emergency response capabilities 
that can reach and protect the health of all Delaware 
residents.
Snapshot of Public Health Preparedness
Below are activities conducted by Delaware in the area of public health preparedness. They support CDC preparedness 
goals in the areas of detection and reporting, control, and improvement; crosscutting activities help prepare for all stages 
of an event. These data are not comprehensive and do not cover all preparedness activities.
Disease Detection and Investigation
The sooner public health professionals can detect diseases or other health threats and investigate their causes and effects in 
the community, the more quickly they can minimize population exposure. 
Detect &
Report
Could receive and investigate urgent disease reports 24/7/3651 Yes
-  Primary method for receiving urgent disease reports*2 Telephone
Linked state and local health personnel to share information about disease outbreaks 
across state lines (through the CDC Epi-X system)3 Yes
Conducted year-round surveillance for seasonal influenza4 Yes
* Telephone, fax, and electronic reporting are all viable options for urgent disease reporting, as long as the public health department has someone assigned 
to receive the reports 24/7/365.
1 CDC, DSLR; 2005; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2006; 3 CDC, Epi-X; 2007; 4 HHS, OIG; 2007
Delaware Ensures Preparedness Efforts for All Residents 
Addressing the needs of at-risk populations helps public health departments serve all residents.
Delaware
http://www.dhss.delaware.gov/dhss/dph
According to the Delaware Division of 
Public Health, the cooperative agreement 
is valuable because funding has provided 
several critical components for building a 
strong preparedness response plan. Delaware 
has been able to hire the staff needed to 
operate daily and emergency operations, 
purchase and stockpile equipment and 
supplies to support mass prophylaxis of the 
population during public health emergencies, 
and purchase electronic systems that were not 





obilizing State by State
Public Health Laboratories
Public health laboratories test and confirm agents that can threaten health. For example, advanced DNA “fingerprinting” 
techniques and subsequent reporting to the CDC database (PulseNet) are critical to recognize nationwide outbreaks from 
bacteria that can cause severe illness, such as E. coli O157:H7 and Listeria monocytogenes. 
Detect & Report
Number of Delaware laboratories in the Laboratory Response Network1 1
Rapidly identified E. coli O157:H7 using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) 8
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days  75%
Rapidly identified Listeria monocytogenes using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) None
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days N/A
Had a laboratory information management system that could create, send, and receive 
messages3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
-  System complied with CDC information technology standards (PHIN)3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Had a rapid method to send urgent messages to frontline laboratories that perform 
initial screening of clinical specimens3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Crosscutting
Conducted bioterrorism exercise that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Conducted exercise to test chemical readiness that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) No
1 CDC, DBPR; 2007; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2007; 3 APHL, Public Health Laboratory Issues in Brief: Bioterrorism Capacity; May 2007; 4 CDC, DSLR; 2006
Response
Planning provides a framework for how a public health department will respond during an emergency. The plans can be 
tested through external reviews, exercises, and real events. After-action reports assess what worked well during an exercise or 
real event and how the department can improve. 
Control
Developed a public health response plan, including pandemic influenza response, crisis 
and emergency risk communication, and Strategic National Stockpile (SNS)1, 2 Yes
Delaware SNS plan reviewed by CDC2 Yes
-  Score on CDC technical assistance review (1-100) 94
Number of Delaware cities in the Cities Readiness Initiative3 1
Crosscutting
Developed roles and responsibilities for a multi-jurisdictional response (ICS) with:1  (8/05 – 8/06)
-  Hospitals Yes
-  Local/regional emergency management agencies Yes
-  Federal emergency management agencies Yes
Public health department staff participated in training to support cooperative 
agreement activities4 Yes
Public health laboratories conducted training for first responders5  (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Activated public health emergency operations center as part of a drill, exercise, or real 
event*†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
Conducted a drill or exercise for key response partners to test communications when 
power and land lines were unavailable†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
Improve Finalized at least one after-action report with an improvement plan following an exercise or real event†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
* Activation means rapidly staffing all eight core ICS functional roles in the public health emergency operations center with one person per position. This 
capability is critical to maintain in case of large-scale or complex incidents, even though not every incident requires full staffing of the ICS.
† States were expected to perform these activities from 9/1/2006 to 8/30/2007. These data represent results from the first half of this period only.






























One morning in July 2007, an 
alarming number of dead birds, 
accompanied by an unknown 
powder, were reported at multiple 
transit stations across the District of Columbia. Transit 
officials who had not been notified of any planned 
pest control activities became suspicious of a chemical 
terrorism threat.
Public health officials and animal specialists monitored 
the situation both on site and remotely with regional 
and federal emergency response coordination. The fire 
department and emergency responders were able to 
immediately investigate the chemical on-site, and the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation also became involved 
due to the potential for this incident to have a nexus to 
terrorism. Within hours the chemical agent was identified 
as a skin and eye irritant and an ingredient commonly 
found in laundry detergents and rat poison. In total, 
between 70 and 90 birds died across seven transit stations. 
Humans were not harmed. 
Local emergency response was able to successfully contain 
this situation within 5 hours because of effective 
collaboration among local, regional, and federal partners 
in public health, law enforcement, and public safety; on-
site and remote emergency response coordination and 
operations at both regional and federal levels; and the 
ability of emergency responders to immediately conduct 
environmental tests.
Snapshot of Public Health Preparedness
Below are activities conducted by District of Columbia in the area of public health preparedness. They support CDC 
preparedness goals in the areas of detection and reporting, control, and improvement; crosscutting activities help prepare 
for all stages of an event. These data are not comprehensive and do not cover all preparedness activities.
Disease Detection and Investigation
The sooner public health professionals can detect diseases or other health threats and investigate their causes and effects in 
the community, the more quickly they can minimize population exposure. 
Detect &
Report
Could receive and investigate urgent disease reports 24/7/3651 Yes
-  Primary method for receiving urgent disease reports*2 Electronic Reporting
Linked state and local health personnel to share information about disease outbreaks 
across state lines (through the CDC Epi-X system)3 Yes
Conducted year-round surveillance for seasonal influenza†4 Yes
* Telephone, fax, and electronic reporting are all viable options for urgent disease reporting, as long as the public health department has someone assigned 
to receive the reports 24/7/365.
1 CDC, DSLR; 2005; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2006; 3 CDC, Epi-X; 2007; 4 HHS, OIG; 2007
District of Columbia Responds to a Chemical Incident 
Cross-jurisdictional collaboration plays a key role in emergency response.
District of Columbia
http://bioterrorism.doh.dc.gov/biot/site
According to the District of Columbia 
Department of Health, the cooperative 
agreement is valuable because it has allowed 
the District of Columbia to build capabilities 
and expand capacity in a wide variety of 
public health emergency preparedness areas. 
These have included syndromic and disease 
surveillance, interoperable communications, 
planning, preparedness and response, 
chemical and biological laboratory testing, 
mass prophylaxis/vaccination, and other key 
initiatives to build a District that is stronger, 
more resilient, and better prepared to handle 





obilizing State by State
Public Health Laboratories
Public health laboratories test and confirm agents that can threaten health. For example, advanced DNA “fingerprinting” 
techniques and subsequent reporting to the CDC database (PulseNet) are critical to recognize nationwide outbreaks from 
bacteria that can cause severe illness, such as E. coli O157:H7 and Listeria monocytogenes. 
Detect & Report
Number of District of Columbia laboratories in the Laboratory Response Network1 3
Rapidly identified E. coli O157:H7 using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):*2
Rapidly identified Listeria monocytogenes using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):*2
Had a laboratory information management system that could create, send, and receive 
messages3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
-  System complied with CDC information technology standards (PHIN)3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Had a rapid method to send urgent messages to frontline laboratories that perform 
initial screening of clinical specimens3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Crosscutting
Conducted bioterrorism exercise that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Conducted exercise to test chemical readiness that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
* Localities were not asked to respond to this question.
1 CDC, DBPR; 2007; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2007; 3 APHL, Public Health Laboratory Issues in Brief: Bioterrorism Capacity; May 2007; 4 CDC, DSLR; 2006
Response
Planning provides a framework for how a public health department will respond during an emergency. The plans can be 
tested through external reviews, exercises, and real events. After-action reports assess what worked well during an exercise or 
real event and how the department can improve. 
Control
Developed a public health response plan, including pandemic influenza response, crisis 
and emergency risk communication, and Strategic National Stockpile (SNS)1, 2 Yes
District of Columbia SNS plan reviewed by CDC2 Yes
-  Score on CDC technical assistance review (1-100) 91
Participated in the Cities Readiness Initiative2 Yes
Crosscutting
Developed roles and responsibilities for a multi-jurisdictional response (ICS) with:1  (8/05 – 8/06)
-  Hospitals Yes
-  Local/regional emergency management agencies Yes
-  Federal emergency management agencies Yes
Public health department staff participated in training to support cooperative 
agreement activities3 Yes
Public health laboratories conducted training for first responders4  (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Activated public health emergency operations center as part of a drill, exercise, or real 
event*†5 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) No
Conducted a drill or exercise for key response partners to test communications when 
power and land lines were unavailable†5 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) No
Improve Finalized at least one after-action report with an improvement plan following an exercise or real event†5 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
* Activation means rapidly staffing all eight core ICS functional roles in the public health emergency operations center with one person per position. This 
capability is critical to maintain in case of large-scale or complex incidents, even though not every incident requires full staffing of the ICS.
† Localities were expected to perform these activities from 9/1/2006 to 8/30/2007. These data represent results from the first half of this period only.






























In May 2007, a university student 
went to the student health service 
center with a rash-like illness that 
was diagnosed as measles and later 
confirmed through subsequent testing. It had been over 
20 years since the last case of measles in Alachua County. 
The student was a member of a religious group that, 
while not prohibiting vaccination, did not actively receive 
immunizations. Investigations proved that several other 
members of this religious group had been ill, with one 
potential case having returned from a major festival in 
India. Because of the highly contagious nature of measles, 
the public health department needed to respond quickly 
and conduct ongoing monitoring.
The Alachua County Health Department established a 
basic Incident Command System (ICS) structure for the 
measles outbreak. While all of the staff involved had been 
trained in ICS and most had used it in major hurricane 
deployments, this was their first use of the system in a 
biological event. Public health workers are now convinced 
that this training and the system itself provided a 
better framework to identify activities and outcomes, 
track completion of assignments, and allow for proper 
accounting of the associated costs.  
Public health workers responded by conducting 
surveillance of the entire primary care medical community 
for new cases, looking back for unreported cases (four 
were found), setting up immunization clinics at the 
religious group’s headquarters, school sites, and satellite 
clinics, and establishing an ongoing “rash room” entrance 
for diagnosis and prevention of potential new cases from 
entering the general population. As a result, no further 
cases occurred, and the incident was closed in June, only 
one month after the first diagnosis.
Snapshot of Public Health Preparedness
Below are activities conducted by Florida in the area of public health preparedness. They support CDC preparedness 
goals in the areas of detection and reporting, control, and improvement; crosscutting activities help prepare for all stages 
of an event. These data are not comprehensive and do not cover all preparedness activities.
Disease Detection and Investigation
The sooner public health professionals can detect diseases or other health threats and investigate their causes and effects in 
the community, the more quickly they can minimize population exposure. 
Detect &
Report
Could receive and investigate urgent disease reports 24/7/3651 Yes
-  Primary method for receiving urgent disease reports*2 Telephone
Linked state and local health personnel to share information about disease outbreaks 
across state lines (through the CDC Epi-X system)3 Yes
Conducted year-round surveillance for seasonal influenza4 Yes
* Telephone, fax, and electronic reporting are all viable options for urgent disease reporting, as long as the public health department has someone assigned 
to receive the reports 24/7/365.
1 CDC, DSLR; 2005; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2006; 3 CDC, Epi-X; 2007; 4 HHS, OIG; 2007
Florida Responds to a Measles Outbreak 
Epidemiological investigations are critical for effective surveillance in public health emergencies.
Florida
http://www.doh.state.fl.us/demo
According to the Florida Department 
of Health, the cooperative agreement is 
valuable because funds have allowed the state 
to hire dedicated preparedness personnel to 
coordinate and facilitate planning, training, 
and exercising of public health and response 
partners. Florida also has been able to provide 
ICS training that has drastically increased 
the state’s ability to respond, eliminate 






obilizing State by State
Public Health Laboratories
Public health laboratories test and confirm agents that can threaten health. For example, advanced DNA “fingerprinting” 
techniques and subsequent reporting to the CDC database (PulseNet) are critical to recognize nationwide outbreaks from 
bacteria that can cause severe illness, such as E. coli O157:H7 and Listeria monocytogenes. 
Detect & Report
Number of Florida laboratories in the Laboratory Response Network1 5
Rapidly identified E. coli O157:H7 using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) 17
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days  82%
Rapidly identified Listeria monocytogenes using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) None
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days N/A
Had a laboratory information management system that could create, send, and receive 
messages3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
-  System complied with CDC information technology standards (PHIN)3 (8/05 – 8/06) No
Had a rapid method to send urgent messages to frontline laboratories that perform 
initial screening of clinical specimens3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Crosscutting
Conducted bioterrorism exercise that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) No
Conducted exercise to test chemical readiness that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
1 CDC, DBPR; 2007; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2007; 3 APHL, Public Health Laboratory Issues in Brief: Bioterrorism Capacity; May 2007; 4 CDC, DSLR; 2006
Response
Planning provides a framework for how a public health department will respond during an emergency. The plans can be 
tested through external reviews, exercises, and real events. After-action reports assess what worked well during an exercise or 
real event and how the department can improve. 
Control
Developed a public health response plan, including pandemic influenza response, crisis 
and emergency risk communication, and Strategic National Stockpile (SNS)1, 2 Yes
Florida SNS plan reviewed by CDC2 Yes
-  Score on CDC technical assistance review (1-100) 86
Number of Florida cities in the Cities Readiness Initiative3 3
Crosscutting
Developed roles and responsibilities for a multi-jurisdictional response (ICS) with:1  (8/05 – 8/06)
-  Hospitals Yes
-  Local/regional emergency management agencies Yes
-  Federal emergency management agencies Yes
Public health department staff participated in training to support cooperative 
agreement activities4 Yes
Public health laboratories conducted training for first responders5  (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Activated public health emergency operations center as part of a drill, exercise, or real 
event*†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
Conducted a drill or exercise for key response partners to test communications when 
power and land lines were unavailable†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) No
Improve Finalized at least one after-action report with an improvement plan following an exercise or real event†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
* Activation means rapidly staffing all eight core ICS functional roles in the public health emergency operations center with one person per position. This 
capability is critical to maintain in case of large-scale or complex incidents, even though not every incident requires full staffing of the ICS.
† States were expected to perform these activities from 9/1/2006 to 8/30/2007. These data represent results from the first half of this period only.






























When severe wildfires struck 
southeast Georgia in spring 
2007, the public health district 
office, which covers 16 counties 
and 17 local public health departments, opened its 
district operations center. From there, the district staff 
coordinated with local health departments to respond to 
the fire and deal with the smoky conditions which had 
increased the public health risk for respiratory problems. 
The district also helped health department staff give 
protective masks and tetanus shots to first responders 
working in wooded areas. 
The district public information officer informed the 
community, media, and local emergency response 
agencies about the wildfires through numerous public 
service announcements, press releases, and the district’s 
website. Nurse managers and staff went door-to-door 
to provide information about the smoke to residents 
living in more remote areas. Local “hangouts” were 
used to get information out to the public and the 
emergency management agency set up a hotline to 
address community questions and concerns. Town hall 
meetings also were held to inform the public and allow for 
questions.  
Since 2001, communication between local agencies 
(first responders and others) and public health has 
increased significantly. Today, public health is included in 
emergency planning and response. As a result of increased 
partnership and communication, the counties affected 
by the wildfires have not seen an increase in respiratory 
problems. In addition, first responders are now protected 
from tetanus infection for future emergency response 
situations outdoors.
Snapshot of Public Health Preparedness
Below are activities conducted by Georgia in the area of public health preparedness. They support CDC preparedness 
goals in the areas of detection and reporting, control, and improvement; crosscutting activities help prepare for all stages 
of an event. These data are not comprehensive and do not cover all preparedness activities.
Disease Detection and Investigation
The sooner public health professionals can detect diseases or other health threats and investigate their causes and effects in 
the community, the more quickly they can minimize population exposure. 
Detect &
Report
Could receive and investigate urgent disease reports 24/7/3651 Yes
-  Primary method for receiving urgent disease reports*2 Electronic Reporting
Linked state and local health personnel to share information about disease outbreaks 
across state lines (through the CDC Epi-X system)3 Yes
Conducted year-round surveillance for seasonal influenza4 Yes
* Telephone, fax, and electronic reporting are all viable options for urgent disease reporting, as long as the public health department has someone assigned 
to receive the reports 24/7/365.
1 CDC, DSLR; 2005; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2006; 3 CDC, Epi-X; 2007; 4 HHS, OIG; 2007
Georgia Responds to Wildfires 
Better communication increases comprehensive and coordinated emergency response.
Georgia
http://health.state.ga.us/programs/emerprep
According to the Georgia Division of 
Public Health, the cooperative agreement 
is valuable because funding has built a 
strong, statewide foundation for preparedness 
through extensive planning and training 
efforts combined with procurement of 
critical assets necessary in a response. This 
infrastructure has benefits in daily operations 






obilizing State by State
Public Health Laboratories
Public health laboratories test and confirm agents that can threaten health. For example, advanced DNA “fingerprinting” 
techniques and subsequent reporting to the CDC database (PulseNet) are critical to recognize nationwide outbreaks from 
bacteria that can cause severe illness, such as E. coli O157:H7 and Listeria monocytogenes. 
Detect & Report
Number of Georgia laboratories in the Laboratory Response Network1 7
Rapidly identified E. coli O157:H7 using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) 13
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days  85%
Rapidly identified Listeria monocytogenes using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) 8
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days 25%
Had a laboratory information management system that could create, send, and receive 
messages3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
-  System complied with CDC information technology standards (PHIN)3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Had a rapid method to send urgent messages to frontline laboratories that perform 
initial screening of clinical specimens3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Crosscutting
Conducted bioterrorism exercise that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Conducted exercise to test chemical readiness that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) No
1 CDC, DBPR; 2007; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2007; 3 APHL, Public Health Laboratory Issues in Brief: Bioterrorism Capacity; May 2007; 4 CDC, DSLR; 2006
Response
Planning provides a framework for how a public health department will respond during an emergency. The plans can be 
tested through external reviews, exercises, and real events. After-action reports assess what worked well during an exercise or 
real event and how the department can improve. 
Control
Developed a public health response plan, including pandemic influenza response, crisis 
and emergency risk communication, and Strategic National Stockpile (SNS)1, 2 Yes
Georgia SNS plan reviewed by CDC2 Yes
-  Score on CDC technical assistance review (1-100) 24
Number of Georgia cities in the Cities Readiness Initiative3 1
Crosscutting
Developed roles and responsibilities for a multi-jurisdictional response (ICS) with:1  (8/05 – 8/06)
-  Hospitals Yes
-  Local/regional emergency management agencies Yes
-  Federal emergency management agencies Yes
Public health department staff participated in training to support cooperative 
agreement activities4 Yes
Public health laboratories conducted training for first responders5  (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Activated public health emergency operations center as part of a drill, exercise, or real 
event*†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
Conducted a drill or exercise for key response partners to test communications when 
power and land lines were unavailable†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
Improve Finalized at least one after-action report with an improvement plan following an exercise or real event†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
* Activation means rapidly staffing all eight core ICS functional roles in the public health emergency operations center with one person per position. This 
capability is critical to maintain in case of large-scale or complex incidents, even though not every incident requires full staffing of the ICS.
† States were expected to perform these activities from 9/1/2006 to 8/30/2007. These data represent results from the first half of this period only.






























In June 2007, the Hawaii 
Department of Health (HDOH), 
along with the United States 
Postal Service (USPS), conducted 
a full-scale exercise of the Biohazard Detection System 
(BDS). This exercise, called the Maka’ala II exercise, was 
developed to test a multi-agency response to the detection 
of anthrax spores in the USPS mail sorting facility located 
near the Honolulu International Airport. The exercise 
planning team was composed of multiple agencies 
from the federal (USPS, Federal Fire Department), 
state (HDOH, state civil defense, Sheriff’s Department, 
Department of Transportation), and local (Department 
of Emergency Management, Honolulu Police, Honolulu 
Fire, and Honolulu Emergency Medical Services) levels.  
Maka’ala II tested response team members and their roles 
and actions during an activation and alert of the BDS at 
the mail sorting facility. HDOH participation was part of 
the USPS overall response plan to a BDS alarm. HDOH 
partnered with USPS to establish a dispensing clinic for 
USPS-purchased medications. The purpose of the clinic 
was to screen postal employees and dispense medication 
to protect against anthrax as needed. After proceeding 
through a decontamination area, the USPS employees 
came to the dispensing clinic and were quickly processed 
and issued medication. 
Snapshot of Public Health Preparedness
Below are activities conducted by Hawaii in the area of public health preparedness. They support CDC preparedness 
goals in the areas of detection and reporting, control, and improvement; crosscutting activities help prepare for all stages 
of an event. These data are not comprehensive and do not cover all preparedness activities.
Disease Detection and Investigation
The sooner public health professionals can detect diseases or other health threats and investigate their causes and effects in 
the community, the more quickly they can minimize population exposure. 
Detect &
Report
Could receive and investigate urgent disease reports 24/7/3651 Yes
-  Primary method for receiving urgent disease reports*2 Telephone
Linked state and local health personnel to share information about disease outbreaks 
across state lines (through the CDC Epi-X system)3 Yes
Conducted year-round surveillance for seasonal influenza4 Yes
* Telephone, fax, and electronic reporting are all viable options for urgent disease reporting, as long as the public health department has someone assigned 
to receive the reports 24/7/365.
1 CDC, DSLR; 2005; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2006; 3 CDC, Epi-X; 2007; 4 HHS, OIG; 2007
Hawaii Exercises the Biohazard Detection System with the Postal Service 
Full-scale exercises involving multiple agencies ensure a coordinated response to public health incidents.
Hawaii
http://hawaii.gov/health/emergencyprep
According to the Hawaii Department 
of Health, the cooperative agreement is 
valuable because funds have provided the 
state with the opportunity to make much 
progress in preparedness that otherwise 
would have been impossible. The state has 
been able to increase personnel, purchase 
software, build an information technology 
infrastructure, produce public information 





obilizing State by State
Public Health Laboratories
Public health laboratories test and confirm agents that can threaten health. For example, advanced DNA “fingerprinting” 
techniques and subsequent reporting to the CDC database (PulseNet) are critical to recognize nationwide outbreaks from 
bacteria that can cause severe illness, such as E. coli O157:H7 and Listeria monocytogenes. 
Detect & Report
Number of Hawaii laboratories in the Laboratory Response Network1 3
Rapidly identified E. coli O157:H7 using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) 9
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days  78%
Rapidly identified Listeria monocytogenes using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) 1
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days 100%
Had a laboratory information management system that could create, send, and receive 
messages3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
-  System complied with CDC information technology standards (PHIN)3 (8/05 – 8/06) No
Had a rapid method to send urgent messages to frontline laboratories that perform 
initial screening of clinical specimens3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Crosscutting
Conducted bioterrorism exercise that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) No
Conducted exercise to test chemical readiness that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
1 CDC, DBPR; 2007; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2007; 3 APHL, Public Health Laboratory Issues in Brief: Bioterrorism Capacity; May 2007; 4 CDC, DSLR; 2006
Response
Planning provides a framework for how a public health department will respond during an emergency. The plans can be 
tested through external reviews, exercises, and real events. After-action reports assess what worked well during an exercise or 
real event and how the department can improve. 
Control
Developed a public health response plan, including pandemic influenza response, crisis 
and emergency risk communication, and Strategic National Stockpile (SNS)1, 2 Yes
Hawaii SNS plan reviewed by CDC2 Yes
-  Score on CDC technical assistance review (1-100) 72
Number of Hawaii cities in the Cities Readiness Initiative3 1
Crosscutting
Developed roles and responsibilities for a multi-jurisdictional response (ICS) with:1  (8/05 – 8/06)
-  Hospitals Yes
-  Local/regional emergency management agencies Yes
-  Federal emergency management agencies No
Public health department staff participated in training to support cooperative 
agreement activities4 Yes
Public health laboratories conducted training for first responders5  (8/05 – 8/06) No
Activated public health emergency operations center as part of a drill, exercise, or real 
event*†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
Conducted a drill or exercise for key response partners to test communications when 
power and land lines were unavailable†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
Improve Finalized at least one after-action report with an improvement plan following an exercise or real event†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
* Activation means rapidly staffing all eight core ICS functional roles in the public health emergency operations center with one person per position. This 
capability is critical to maintain in case of large-scale or complex incidents, even though not every incident requires full staffing of the ICS.
† States were expected to perform these activities from 9/1/2006 to 8/30/2007. These data represent results from the first half of this period only.






























In June 2006, the Idaho 
Department of Health and Welfare 
(IDHW), in partnership with the 
seven district health departments 
(DHDs) and the Idaho Bureau of Homeland Security, 
conducted a full-scale exercise involving the CDC 
Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). This exercise covered 
over 46 different locations, involving over 5,800 state and 
local public health personnel, emergency responders, and 
volunteers, representing 52 agencies overall.  
State officials requested the deployment of SNS from 
federal partners, and DHDs prepared to receive and 
distribute SNS materials. DHDs also practiced providing 
preventive medicines on a mass scale to the public. 
DHDs noted the importance of robust volunteer 
participation to allow them the opportunity to better 
plan their distribution operations and understand how to 
adjust their plans to maximize effectiveness. Overall, the 
objectives of the exercise were met, including practicing 
roles and responsibilities under the Incident Command 
System and providing coordinated and accurate 
information to the public. Opportunities for 
improvement were identified and subsequently addressed. 
These included the need for continual training and 
refinement of plans and the recognized need to involve 
state and local health departments within the multi-
agency coordination system at the state emergency 
operations center. 
Snapshot of Public Health Preparedness
Below are activities conducted by Idaho in the area of public health preparedness. They support CDC preparedness goals 
in the areas of detection and reporting, control, and improvement; crosscutting activities help prepare for all stages of an 
event. These data are not comprehensive and do not cover all preparedness activities.
Disease Detection and Investigation
The sooner public health professionals can detect diseases or other health threats and investigate their causes and effects in 
the community, the more quickly they can minimize population exposure. 
Detect &
Report
Could receive and investigate urgent disease reports 24/7/3651 Yes
-  Primary method for receiving urgent disease reports*2 Telephone
Linked state and local health personnel to share information about disease outbreaks 
across state lines (through the CDC Epi-X system)3 Yes
Conducted year-round surveillance for seasonal influenza4 Yes
* Telephone, fax, and electronic reporting are all viable options for urgent disease reporting, as long as the public health department has someone assigned 
to receive the reports 24/7/365.
1 CDC, DSLR; 2005; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2006; 3 CDC, Epi-X; 2007; 4 HHS, OIG; 2007
Idaho Conducts Full-Scale Exercise of the Strategic National Stockpile 
Exercising operational plans highlights areas of improvement for a more effective response.
Idaho
http://www.healthandwelfare.idaho.gov
According to the Idaho Department of 
Health and Welfare, the cooperative 
agreement is valuable because public health 
has become an active partner in statewide 
response efforts and has developed many 
relationships with state agency response 
partners, including border states and 
Canadian partners. Cooperative agreement 
funding has provided an opportunity to 
improve Idaho’s public health preparedness 
and response infrastructure by both state and 





obilizing State by State
Public Health Laboratories
Public health laboratories test and confirm agents that can threaten health. For example, advanced DNA “fingerprinting” 
techniques and subsequent reporting to the CDC database (PulseNet) are critical to recognize nationwide outbreaks from 
bacteria that can cause severe illness, such as E. coli O157:H7 and Listeria monocytogenes. 
Detect & Report
Number of Idaho laboratories in the Laboratory Response Network1 1
Rapidly identified E. coli O157:H7 using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) 26
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days  35%
Rapidly identified Listeria monocytogenes using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) None
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days N/A
Had a laboratory information management system that could create, send, and receive 
messages3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
-  System complied with CDC information technology standards (PHIN)3 (8/05 – 8/06) No
Had a rapid method to send urgent messages to frontline laboratories that perform 
initial screening of clinical specimens3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Crosscutting
Conducted bioterrorism exercise that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) No
Conducted exercise to test chemical readiness that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
1 CDC, DBPR; 2007; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2007; 3 APHL, Public Health Laboratory Issues in Brief: Bioterrorism Capacity; May 2007; 4 CDC, DSLR; 2006
Response
Planning provides a framework for how a public health department will respond during an emergency. The plans can be 
tested through external reviews, exercises, and real events. After-action reports assess what worked well during an exercise or 
real event and how the department can improve. 
Control
Developed a public health response plan, including pandemic influenza response, crisis 
and emergency risk communication, and Strategic National Stockpile (SNS)1, 2 Yes
Idaho SNS plan reviewed by CDC2 Yes
-  Score on CDC technical assistance review (1-100) 90
Number of Idaho cities in the Cities Readiness Initiative3 1
Crosscutting
Developed roles and responsibilities for a multi-jurisdictional response (ICS) with:1  (8/05 – 8/06)
-  Hospitals No
-  Local/regional emergency management agencies Yes
-  Federal emergency management agencies No
Public health department staff participated in training to support cooperative 
agreement activities4 Yes
Public health laboratories conducted training for first responders5  (8/05 – 8/06) No
Activated public health emergency operations center as part of a drill, exercise, or real 
event*†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
Conducted a drill or exercise for key response partners to test communications when 
power and land lines were unavailable†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) No
Improve Finalized at least one after-action report with an improvement plan following an exercise or real event†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
* Activation means rapidly staffing all eight core ICS functional roles in the public health emergency operations center with one person per position. This 
capability is critical to maintain in case of large-scale or complex incidents, even though not every incident requires full staffing of the ICS.
† States were expected to perform these activities from 9/1/2006 to 8/30/2007. These data represent results from the first half of this period only.






























The Illinois Public Health Mutual 
Aid System (IPHMAS) program is 
a state and local partnership that 
provides mutual aid between all local 
health departments during emergencies. Local health 
departments provide program management and resources, 
and the state health department provides communication 
and administrative coordination. This innovative system 
allows local health departments to respond to emergencies 
more quickly and effectively. The work of IPHMAS and 
its developers was recognized nationally by the American 
Public Health Association with the 2007 Milton and Ruth 
Roemer Prize for Creative Local Public Health Work.
The program is routinely exercised and was successfully 
used in two recent incidents. In 2007, the Kane County 
Health Department used IPHMAS to request nurses 
to assist in providing over 1,700 immunoglobulin 
vaccinations to people exposed to Hepatitis A through an 
infected food handler. Over 15 local health departments 
in Illinois responded to this request for assistance. In 
addition, in 2006, after several severe storms resulted 
in power outages for several days, the East Side Health 
District in East St. Louis requested additional staff. The 
St. Clair County Health Department was able to provide 
shortly after the request was made.
Snapshot of Public Health Preparedness
Below are activities conducted by Illinois in the area of public health preparedness. They support CDC preparedness 
goals in the areas of detection and reporting, control, and improvement; crosscutting activities help prepare for all stages 
of an event. These data are not comprehensive and do not cover all preparedness activities.
Disease Detection and Investigation
The sooner public health professionals can detect diseases or other health threats and investigate their causes and effects in 
the community, the more quickly they can minimize population exposure. 
Detect &
Report
Could receive and investigate urgent disease reports 24/7/3651 Yes
-  Primary method for receiving urgent disease reports*2 Telephone
Linked state and local health personnel to share information about disease outbreaks 
across state lines (through the CDC Epi-X system)3 Yes
Conducted year-round surveillance for seasonal influenza4 Yes
* Telephone, fax, and electronic reporting are all viable options for urgent disease reporting, as long as the public health department has someone assigned 
to receive the reports 24/7/365.
1 CDC, DSLR; 2005; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2006; 3 CDC, Epi-X; 2007; 4 HHS, OIG; 2007
Illinois Develops a Public Health Mutual Aid System 
Innovative system helps deploy local public health resources across the state during an emergency.
Illinois
http://www.idph.state.il.us/Bioterrorism/default.htm
According to the Illinois Department of 
Public Health, the cooperative agreement 
is valuable because funding has enabled 
the Department to focus on public health 
preparedness and response, identify gaps, and 
take corrective actions to improve the state’s 
emergency response capabilities. Illinois can 
be more prepared for public health threats 
by providing the necessary resources of staff, 
equipment, training, and supplies; enhancing 
cooperation and coordination between 
multiple layers of state and local government; 
and creating a new preparedness “culture” in 





obilizing State by State
Public Health Laboratories
Public health laboratories test and confirm agents that can threaten health. For example, advanced DNA “fingerprinting” 
techniques and subsequent reporting to the CDC database (PulseNet) are critical to recognize nationwide outbreaks from 
bacteria that can cause severe illness, such as E. coli O157:H7 and Listeria monocytogenes. 
Detect & Report
Number of Illinois laboratories in the Laboratory Response Network1 3
Rapidly identified E. coli O157:H7 using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) 72
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days  43%
Rapidly identified Listeria monocytogenes using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) 17
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days 47%
Had a laboratory information management system that could create, send, and receive 
messages3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
-  System complied with CDC information technology standards (PHIN)3 (8/05 – 8/06) No
Had a rapid method to send urgent messages to frontline laboratories that perform 
initial screening of clinical specimens3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Crosscutting
Conducted bioterrorism exercise that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Conducted exercise to test chemical readiness that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
1 CDC, DBPR; 2007; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2007; 3 APHL, Public Health Laboratory Issues in Brief: Bioterrorism Capacity; May 2007; 4 CDC, DSLR; 2006
Response
Planning provides a framework for how a public health department will respond during an emergency. The plans can be 
tested through external reviews, exercises, and real events. After-action reports assess what worked well during an exercise or 
real event and how the department can improve. 
Control
Developed a public health response plan, including pandemic influenza response, crisis 
and emergency risk communication, and Strategic National Stockpile (SNS)1, 2 Yes
Illinois SNS plan reviewed by CDC2 Yes
-  Score on CDC technical assistance review (1-100) 91
Number of Illinois cities in the Cities Readiness Initiative3 2
Crosscutting
Developed roles and responsibilities for a multi-jurisdictional response (ICS) with:1  (8/05 – 8/06)
-  Hospitals Yes
-  Local/regional emergency management agencies Yes
-  Federal emergency management agencies Yes
Public health department staff participated in training to support cooperative 
agreement activities4 Yes
Public health laboratories conducted training for first responders5  (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Activated public health emergency operations center as part of a drill, exercise, or real 
event*†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) No
Conducted a drill or exercise for key response partners to test communications when 
power and land lines were unavailable†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) No
Improve Finalized at least one after-action report with an improvement plan following an exercise or real event†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
* Activation means rapidly staffing all eight core ICS functional roles in the public health emergency operations center with one person per position. This 
capability is critical to maintain in case of large-scale or complex incidents, even though not every incident requires full staffing of the ICS.
† States were expected to perform these activities from 9/1/2006 to 8/30/2007. These data represent results from the first half of this period only.






























During a 2007 nationwide outbreak 
of botulism from contaminated 
commercial food products, the 
Indiana State Department of Health 
(ISDH) investigated cases, monitored recall efforts, and 
relayed information to health care providers, local health 
departments, and the public.
The work of epidemiologists, public health coordinators, 
and communications specialists was crucial. Field 
epidemiologists facilitated communication between 
the local and state health departments and increased 
investigative capacity. Central office epidemiologists 
tracked cases, assisted local health departments with 
case investigations, and coordinated with other ISDH 
program areas and CDC. In addition, the Public Health 
Emergency Surveillance System allowed near real-time 
evaluation of chief complaint data from 73 hospitals 
statewide. Chief complaints that suggested botulism 
infection were immediately forwarded to an ISDH 
epidemiologist for investigation. 
District public health coordinators assisted the ISDH 
Food Protection Program in contacting local health 
departments to determine the effectiveness of the recall. 
Field public information officers prepared news releases, 
answered media inquiries, and staffed media interviews, 
including a news conference with the State Health 
Commissioner. State-of-the-art personal communications 
systems with wireless handheld devices and statewide 
networks were essential to providing timely, seamless 
communication. The Indiana Health Alert Network 
was used to rapidly communicate with large numbers of 
people in different disciplines and locations throughout 
the response.
Snapshot of Public Health Preparedness
Below are activities conducted by Indiana in the area of public health preparedness. They support CDC preparedness 
goals in the areas of detection and reporting, control, and improvement; crosscutting activities help prepare for all stages 
of an event. These data are not comprehensive and do not cover all preparedness activities.
Disease Detection and Investigation
The sooner public health professionals can detect diseases or other health threats and investigate their causes and effects in 
the community, the more quickly they can minimize population exposure. 
Detect &
Report
Could receive and investigate urgent disease reports 24/7/3651 Yes
-  Primary method for receiving urgent disease reports*2 Fax
Linked state and local health personnel to share information about disease outbreaks 
across state lines (through the CDC Epi-X system)3 Yes
Conducted year-round surveillance for seasonal influenza4 Yes
* Telephone, fax, and electronic reporting are all viable options for urgent disease reporting, as long as the public health department has someone assigned 
to receive the reports 24/7/365.
1 CDC, DSLR; 2005; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2006; 3 CDC, Epi-X; 2007; 4 HHS, OIG; 2007
Indiana Responds to a Nationwide Botulism Outbreak 
Well-trained staff and established communications systems are critical for effective emergency response.
Indiana
http://www.in.gov/isdh/bioterrorism
According to the Indiana State Department 
of Health, the cooperative agreement 
is valuable because funds have greatly 
improved personnel and infrastructure 
for public health preparedness. Without 
this funding source, having state and local 
personnel devoted to preparedness, the 
health alert system, and increased syndromic 
surveillance activities would not have been 






obilizing State by State
Public Health Laboratories
Public health laboratories test and confirm agents that can threaten health. For example, advanced DNA “fingerprinting” 
techniques and subsequent reporting to the CDC database (PulseNet) are critical to recognize nationwide outbreaks from 
bacteria that can cause severe illness, such as E. coli O157:H7 and Listeria monocytogenes. 
Detect & Report
Number of Indiana laboratories in the Laboratory Response Network1 1
Rapidly identified E. coli O157:H7 using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) 22
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days  100%
Rapidly identified Listeria monocytogenes using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) None
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days N/A
Had a laboratory information management system that could create, send, and receive 
messages3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
-  System complied with CDC information technology standards (PHIN)3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Had a rapid method to send urgent messages to frontline laboratories that perform 
initial screening of clinical specimens3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Crosscutting
Conducted bioterrorism exercise that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Conducted exercise to test chemical readiness that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
1 CDC, DBPR; 2007; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2007; 3 APHL, Public Health Laboratory Issues in Brief: Bioterrorism Capacity; May 2007; 4 CDC, DSLR; 2006
Response
Planning provides a framework for how a public health department will respond during an emergency. The plans can be 
tested through external reviews, exercises, and real events. After-action reports assess what worked well during an exercise or 
real event and how the department can improve. 
Control
Developed a public health response plan, including pandemic influenza response, crisis 
and emergency risk communication, and Strategic National Stockpile (SNS)1, 2 Yes
Indiana SNS plan reviewed by CDC2 Yes
-  Score on CDC technical assistance review (1-100) 91
Number of Indiana cities in the Cities Readiness Initiative3 1
Crosscutting
Developed roles and responsibilities for a multi-jurisdictional response (ICS) with:1  (8/05 – 8/06)
-  Hospitals Yes
-  Local/regional emergency management agencies Yes
-  Federal emergency management agencies Yes
Public health department staff participated in training to support cooperative 
agreement activities4 Yes
Public health laboratories conducted training for first responders5  (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Activated public health emergency operations center as part of a drill, exercise, or real 
event*†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
Conducted a drill or exercise for key response partners to test communications when 
power and land lines were unavailable†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) No
Improve Finalized at least one after-action report with an improvement plan following an exercise or real event†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
* Activation means rapidly staffing all eight core ICS functional roles in the public health emergency operations center with one person per position. This 
capability is critical to maintain in case of large-scale or complex incidents, even though not every incident requires full staffing of the ICS.
† States were expected to perform these activities from 9/1/2006 to 8/30/2007. These data represent results from the first half of this period only.






























In 2006, Iowa was the center 
of a national mumps epidemic, 
accounting for nearly 2,000 of 
the 2,600 cases nationwide. Iowa 
typically experiences only five cases of mumps per year. 
Based on an outbreak investigation by epidemiologists 
from the Iowa Department of Public Health (IDPH), 
Iowa quickly determined that 18 to 25 year olds were 
most at risk. IDPH launched a vaccination program 
targeting this population. Local public health departments 
set up vaccination clinics based on CDC Strategic 
National Stockpile exercises to administer the vaccines. 
Within a month of beginning the vaccination campaign, 
the number of reported mumps cases decreased by 65%. 
Within 2 months, the mumps epidemic was stopped. 
Prior to the recent investment in public health 
preparedness and infrastructure, the department lacked 
trained epidemiologists and other staff necessary for an 
effective response. In addition, this response allowed 
IDPH to utilize plans and procedures that were in place 
and allowed them to improve response for future public 
health emergencies.
Snapshot of Public Health Preparedness
Below are activities conducted by Iowa in the area of public health preparedness. They support CDC preparedness goals 
in the areas of detection and reporting, control, and improvement; crosscutting activities help prepare for all stages of an 
event. These data are not comprehensive and do not cover all preparedness activities.
Disease Detection and Investigation
The sooner public health professionals can detect diseases or other health threats and investigate their causes and effects in 
the community, the more quickly they can minimize population exposure. 
Detect &
Report
Could receive and investigate urgent disease reports 24/7/3651 Yes
-  Primary method for receiving urgent disease reports*2 Telephone
Linked state and local health personnel to share information about disease outbreaks 
across state lines (through the CDC Epi-X system)3 Yes
Conducted year-round surveillance for seasonal influenza4 Yes
* Telephone, fax, and electronic reporting are all viable options for urgent disease reporting, as long as the public health department has someone assigned 
to receive the reports 24/7/365.
1 CDC, DSLR; 2005; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2006; 3 CDC, Epi-X; 2007; 4 HHS, OIG; 2007
Iowa Responds to the Largest Mumps Outbreak in 20 Years 
Epidemiologists can investigate outbreaks and target interventions to protect the population.
Iowa
http://www.protectIowaHealth.org
According to the Iowa Department of 
Public Health, the cooperative agreement 
is valuable because prior to the cooperative 
agreement, public health had a limited role 
in responding to emergencies at the state or 
local level. Without this funding, Iowa would 
have been unable to address or complete the 
tasks to develop a public health preparedness 






obilizing State by State
Public Health Laboratories
Public health laboratories test and confirm agents that can threaten health. For example, advanced DNA “fingerprinting” 
techniques and subsequent reporting to the CDC database (PulseNet) are critical to recognize nationwide outbreaks from 
bacteria that can cause severe illness, such as E. coli O157:H7 and Listeria monocytogenes. 
Detect & Report
Number of Iowa laboratories in the Laboratory Response Network1 3
Rapidly identified E. coli O157:H7 using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) 39
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days  77%
Rapidly identified Listeria monocytogenes using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) 6
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days 33%
Had a laboratory information management system that could create, send, and receive 
messages3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
-  System complied with CDC information technology standards (PHIN)3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Had a rapid method to send urgent messages to frontline laboratories that perform 
initial screening of clinical specimens3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Crosscutting
Conducted bioterrorism exercise that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Conducted exercise to test chemical readiness that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
1 CDC, DBPR; 2007; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2007; 3 APHL, Public Health Laboratory Issues in Brief: Bioterrorism Capacity; May 2007; 4 CDC, DSLR; 2006
Response
Planning provides a framework for how a public health department will respond during an emergency. The plans can be 
tested through external reviews, exercises, and real events. After-action reports assess what worked well during an exercise or 
real event and how the department can improve. 
Control
Developed a public health response plan, including pandemic influenza response, crisis 
and emergency risk communication, and Strategic National Stockpile (SNS)1, 2 Yes
Iowa SNS plan reviewed by CDC2 Yes
-  Score on CDC technical assistance review (1-100) 88
Number of Iowa cities in the Cities Readiness Initiative3 1
Crosscutting
Developed roles and responsibilities for a multi-jurisdictional response (ICS) with:1  (8/05 – 8/06)
-  Hospitals Yes
-  Local/regional emergency management agencies No
-  Federal emergency management agencies No
Public health department staff participated in training to support cooperative 
agreement activities4 Yes
Public health laboratories conducted training for first responders5  (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Activated public health emergency operations center as part of a drill, exercise, or real 
event*†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) No
Conducted a drill or exercise for key response partners to test communications when 
power and land lines were unavailable†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) No
Improve Finalized at least one after-action report with an improvement plan following an exercise or real event†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
* Activation means rapidly staffing all eight core ICS functional roles in the public health emergency operations center with one person per position. This 
capability is critical to maintain in case of large-scale or complex incidents, even though not every incident requires full staffing of the ICS.
† States were expected to perform these activities from 9/1/2006 to 8/30/2007. These data represent results from the first half of this period only.






























The summer of 2007 brought 
multiple weather disasters to Kansas. 
In early May, tornadoes struck the 
southwest portion of the state, 
followed by massive flooding that affected over one third 
of the counties in Kansas. The city of Greensburg in 
Kiowa County was almost destroyed by one of the largest 
tornadoes ever recorded by the National Weather Service, 
and a state of disaster emergency was declared.
The Kansas Response Plan was activated and the Division 
of Emergency Management opened the State Emergency 
Operations Center (SEOC). The Kansas Department of 
Health and Environment (KDHE) played several roles in 
the response efforts, and public health preparedness staff 
assisted in the coordination of public health functions 
at the SEOC. Additional services provided by KDHE 
included the monitoring of air quality, debris disposal, 
and the restoration of the public water system in the city 
of Greensburg. KDHE also was able to rapidly 
disseminate fact sheets on health hazards related to mold 
to the public. KDHE served as the lead for the public 
health response efforts within the SEOC and helped staff 
the center, coordinate health and medical activities, and 
secure health and medical supplies and equipment to 
support local response.
Snapshot of Public Health Preparedness
Below are activities conducted by Kansas in the area of public health preparedness. They support CDC preparedness 
goals in the areas of detection and reporting, control, and improvement; crosscutting activities help prepare for all stages 
of an event. These data are not comprehensive and do not cover all preparedness activities.
Disease Detection and Investigation
The sooner public health professionals can detect diseases or other health threats and investigate their causes and effects in 
the community, the more quickly they can minimize population exposure. 
Detect &
Report
Could receive and investigate urgent disease reports 24/7/3651 Yes
-  Primary method for receiving urgent disease reports*2 Fax
Linked state and local health personnel to share information about disease outbreaks 
across state lines (through the CDC Epi-X system)3 Yes
Conducted year-round surveillance for seasonal influenza4 Yes
* Telephone, fax, and electronic reporting are all viable options for urgent disease reporting, as long as the public health department has someone assigned 
to receive the reports 24/7/365.
1 CDC, DSLR; 2005; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2006; 3 CDC, Epi-X; 2007; 4 HHS, OIG; 2007
Kansas Responds to Multiple Weather Emergencies 
A strong public health system allows for successful response to multiple disasters.
Kansas
http://www.kdheks.gov/biot
According to the Kansas Department of 
Health and Environment, the cooperative 
agreement is valuable because it has funded 
additional staff and updated technologies, 
training, exercising, surveillance capabilities, 
risk communications, laboratory capacity, and 
overall preparedness planning. Approximately 
half of the funding has been provided to local 






obilizing State by State
Public Health Laboratories
Public health laboratories test and confirm agents that can threaten health. For example, advanced DNA “fingerprinting” 
techniques and subsequent reporting to the CDC database (PulseNet) are critical to recognize nationwide outbreaks from 
bacteria that can cause severe illness, such as E. coli O157:H7 and Listeria monocytogenes. 
Detect & Report
Number of Kansas laboratories in the Laboratory Response Network1 2
Rapidly identified E. coli O157:H7 using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) 6
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days  50%
Rapidly identified Listeria monocytogenes using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) None
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days N/A
Had a laboratory information management system that could create, send, and receive 
messages3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
-  System complied with CDC information technology standards (PHIN)3 (8/05 – 8/06) No
Had a rapid method to send urgent messages to frontline laboratories that perform 
initial screening of clinical specimens3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Crosscutting
Conducted bioterrorism exercise that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Conducted exercise to test chemical readiness that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
1 CDC, DBPR; 2007; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2007; 3 APHL, Public Health Laboratory Issues in Brief: Bioterrorism Capacity; May 2007; 4 CDC, DSLR; 2006
Response
Planning provides a framework for how a public health department will respond during an emergency. The plans can be 
tested through external reviews, exercises, and real events. After-action reports assess what worked well during an exercise or 
real event and how the department can improve. 
Control
Developed a public health response plan, including pandemic influenza response, crisis 
and emergency risk communication, and Strategic National Stockpile (SNS)1, 2 Yes
Kansas SNS plan reviewed by CDC2 Yes
-  Score on CDC technical assistance review (1-100) 93
Number of Kansas cities in the Cities Readiness Initiative3 1
Crosscutting
Developed roles and responsibilities for a multi-jurisdictional response (ICS) with:1  (8/05 – 8/06)
-  Hospitals Yes
-  Local/regional emergency management agencies Yes
-  Federal emergency management agencies Yes
Public health department staff participated in training to support cooperative 
agreement activities4 Yes
Public health laboratories conducted training for first responders5  (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Activated public health emergency operations center as part of a drill, exercise, or real 
event*†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) No
Conducted a drill or exercise for key response partners to test communications when 
power and land lines were unavailable†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) No
Improve Finalized at least one after-action report with an improvement plan following an exercise or real event†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
* Activation means rapidly staffing all eight core ICS functional roles in the public health emergency operations center with one person per position. This 
capability is critical to maintain in case of large-scale or complex incidents, even though not every incident requires full staffing of the ICS.
† States were expected to perform these activities from 9/1/2006 to 8/30/2007. These data represent results from the first half of this period only.






























In September 2005, the Kentucky 
Department for Public Health 
(KDPH) deployed public health 
workers to assist the Mississippi 
Department for Public Health in Hurricane Katrina 
recovery efforts. Through improvements in infrastructure 
and training using funds from the cooperative agreement, 
KDPH strike teams were ready for deployment to a 
disaster region. Continuing partnerships with emergency 
management, sanitation, and hospitals allowed KDPH 
to send six teams over a three-month period through the 
Emergency Management Assistance Compact system. 
Teams consisted of public health environmentalists, 
nurses, pharmacists, and public health preparedness 
planners from both state and local public health 
departments. They assisted with food safety, food salvage 
and disposal, food- and water-related illness, water 
sampling, clean water sources, special needs shelters, and 
distribution of medications.  
During this critical time, KDPH used newly implemented 
information technology, such as interactive video 
conferencing, to allow public health officials to 
communicate “face-to-face” with response partners across 
the state and assist in planning for the 6,000 evacuees 
that were coming to Kentucky. Constant collaboration 
between state agencies helped connect displaced people 
with medical and social services. The web-based Health 
Alert Network and satellite radios were used to share 
information throughout the response. The online 
Kentucky Health Emergency Listing of Professionals for 
Surge was used to register volunteers for assistance, as 
well as evacuees coming into Kentucky. A toll-free phone 
center in the newly equipped KDPH Operations Center 
received calls from evacuees and volunteers.
Snapshot of Public Health Preparedness
Below are activities conducted by Kentucky in the area of public health preparedness. They support CDC preparedness 
goals in the areas of detection and reporting, control, and improvement; crosscutting activities help prepare for all stages 
of an event. These data are not comprehensive and do not cover all preparedness activities.
Disease Detection and Investigation
The sooner public health professionals can detect diseases or other health threats and investigate their causes and effects in 
the community, the more quickly they can minimize population exposure. 
Detect &
Report
Could receive and investigate urgent disease reports 24/7/3651 Yes
-  Primary method for receiving urgent disease reports*2 Electronic Reporting
Linked state and local health personnel to share information about disease outbreaks 
across state lines (through the CDC Epi-X system)3 Yes
Conducted year-round surveillance for seasonal influenza4 Yes
* Telephone, fax, and electronic reporting are all viable options for urgent disease reporting, as long as the public health department has someone assigned 
to receive the reports 24/7/365.
1 CDC, DSLR; 2005; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2006; 3 CDC, Epi-X; 2007; 4 HHS, OIG; 2007
Kentucky Deploys Public Health Teams to Support Hurricane Recovery 
Local investments in public health preparedness can support nationwide response efforts.
Kentucky
http://chfs.ky.gov/dph/epi/preparedness
According to the Kentucky Department for 
Public Health, the cooperative agreement 
is valuable because funds have addressed 
critical needs in Kentucky’s capacity to 
respond to the growing magnitude of public 
health threats and emergencies. The majority 
of funds have been placed at the local level 
since response to disasters occurs first at the 
local level. In addition, the necessary staff 






obilizing State by State
Public Health Laboratories
Public health laboratories test and confirm agents that can threaten health. For example, advanced DNA “fingerprinting” 
techniques and subsequent reporting to the CDC database (PulseNet) are critical to recognize nationwide outbreaks from 
bacteria that can cause severe illness, such as E. coli O157:H7 and Listeria monocytogenes. 
Detect & Report
Number of Kentucky laboratories in the Laboratory Response Network1 3
Rapidly identified E. coli O157:H7 using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) 36
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days  92%
Rapidly identified Listeria monocytogenes using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) None
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days N/A
Had a laboratory information management system that could create, send, and receive 
messages3 (8/05 – 8/06) No
-  System complied with CDC information technology standards (PHIN)3 (8/05 – 8/06) N/A
Had a rapid method to send urgent messages to frontline laboratories that perform 
initial screening of clinical specimens3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Crosscutting
Conducted bioterrorism exercise that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Conducted exercise to test chemical readiness that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) N/A
1 CDC, DBPR; 2007; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2007; 3 APHL, Public Health Laboratory Issues in Brief: Bioterrorism Capacity; May 2007; 4 CDC, DSLR; 2006
Response
Planning provides a framework for how a public health department will respond during an emergency. The plans can be 
tested through external reviews, exercises, and real events. After-action reports assess what worked well during an exercise or 
real event and how the department can improve. 
Control
Developed a public health response plan, including pandemic influenza response, crisis 
and emergency risk communication, and Strategic National Stockpile (SNS)1, 2 Yes
Kentucky SNS plan reviewed by CDC2 Yes
-  Score on CDC technical assistance review (1-100) 85
Number of Kentucky cities in the Cities Readiness Initiative3 1
Crosscutting
Developed roles and responsibilities for a multi-jurisdictional response (ICS) with:1  (8/05 – 8/06)
-  Hospitals Yes
-  Local/regional emergency management agencies Yes
-  Federal emergency management agencies Yes
Public health department staff participated in training to support cooperative 
agreement activities4 Yes
Public health laboratories conducted training for first responders5  (8/05 – 8/06) No Response
Activated public health emergency operations center as part of a drill, exercise, or real 
event*†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
Conducted a drill or exercise for key response partners to test communications when 
power and land lines were unavailable†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
Improve Finalized at least one after-action report with an improvement plan following an exercise or real event†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
* Activation means rapidly staffing all eight core ICS functional roles in the public health emergency operations center with one person per position. This 
capability is critical to maintain in case of large-scale or complex incidents, even though not every incident requires full staffing of the ICS.
† States were expected to perform these activities from 9/1/2006 to 8/30/2007. These data represent results from the first half of this period only.






























In the event of public health 
incidents of suspicious and possibly 
criminal origin, public health and 
law enforcement agencies must 
coordinate their investigations closely to reach shared 
objectives (e.g., determining where, when, and how 
the incident occurred). In an effort to promote close 
collaboration, the Los Angeles County Department 
of Public Health (LACDPH) developed and signed a 
memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) that guides the course 
of joint investigations. Under the MOU, LACDPH 
developed written protocols for sharing public health 
information with FBI and protocols for FBI to share 
threat intelligence information with LACDPH. 
 
LACDPH and FBI conducted a nationally unprecedented 
day-long, full-scale joint investigation exercise in March 
2007 to test the recently developed joint investigation 
protocols with over 100 LACDPH and FBI personnel. 
The exercise tested the ability of the two agencies to 
conduct a joint investigation of a covert bioterrorism 
event; conduct joint patient interviews with field staff 
from both agencies following established protocols at 
multiple sites; and exchange mission critical information 
in a timely manner. LACDPH and FBI activated their 
respective operations centers, deployed representatives 
at each agency’s operations center, exchanged situational 
analysis information, and tested their ability to jointly 
manage the event following Incident Command System 
standards.
Snapshot of Public Health Preparedness
Below are activities conducted by Los Angeles County in the area of public health preparedness. They support CDC 
preparedness goals in the areas of detection and reporting, control, and improvement; crosscutting activities help prepare 
for all stages of an event. These data are not comprehensive and do not cover all preparedness activities.
Disease Detection and Investigation
The sooner public health professionals can detect diseases or other health threats and investigate their causes and effects in 
the community, the more quickly they can minimize population exposure. 
Detect &
Report
Could receive and investigate urgent disease reports 24/7/3651 Yes
-  Primary method for receiving urgent disease reports*2 Telephone
Linked state and local health personnel to share information about disease outbreaks 
across state lines (through the CDC Epi-X system)3 Yes
Conducted year-round surveillance for seasonal influenza†4 —
* Telephone, fax, and electronic reporting are all viable options for urgent disease reporting, as long as the public health department has someone assigned 
to receive the reports 24/7/365.
† Localities were not asked to respond to this question.
Los Angeles County Collaborates with the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
Cross-jurisdictional investigation protocols promote timely and coordinated response.
Los Angeles County
http://www.labt.org
According to the Los Angeles County 
Department of Public Health, the 
cooperative agreement is valuable because 
it has enriched public health infrastructure 
across the board and has contributed to 
improvements in staff, equipment, and 
systems. More than 165 new positions have 
been added to work on preparedness efforts, 
and needed equipment and technologies have 
been purchased. Finally, the funding has 
allowed the county to improve detection and 
response to local emergencies, such as disease 
outbreaks and wildfires, which have served to 






obilizing State by State
Public Health Laboratories
Public health laboratories test and confirm agents that can threaten health. For example, advanced DNA “fingerprinting” 
techniques and subsequent reporting to the CDC database (PulseNet) are critical to recognize nationwide outbreaks from 
bacteria that can cause severe illness, such as E. coli O157:H7 and Listeria monocytogenes. 
Detect & Report
Number of Los Angeles County laboratories in the Laboratory Response Network1 1
Rapidly identified E. coli O157:H7 using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):*2
Rapidly identified Listeria monocytogenes using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):*2
Had a laboratory information management system that could create, send, and receive 
messages*3 (8/05 – 8/06) —
-  System complied with CDC information technology standards (PHIN)*3 (8/05 - 8/06) —
Had a rapid method to send urgent messages to frontline laboratories that perform 
initial screening of clinical specimens*3 (8/05 – 8/06) —
Crosscutting
Conducted bioterrorism exercise that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Conducted exercise to test chemical readiness that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
* Localities were not asked to respond to this question.
1 CDC, DBPR; 2007; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2007; 3 APHL, Public Health Laboratory Issues in Brief: Bioterrorism Capacity; May 2007; 4 CDC, DSLR; 2006
Response
Planning provides a framework for how a public health department will respond during an emergency. The plans can be 
tested through external reviews, exercises, and real events. After-action reports assess what worked well during an exercise or 
real event and how the department can improve. 
Control
Developed a public health response plan, including pandemic influenza response, crisis 
and emergency risk communication, and Strategic National Stockpile (SNS)1, 2 Yes
Los Angeles County SNS plan reviewed by CDC2 Yes
-  Score on CDC technical assistance review (1-100) 87
Participated in the Cities Readiness Initiative2 Yes
Crosscutting
Developed roles and responsibilities for a multi-jurisdictional response (ICS) with:1  (8/05 – 8/06)
-  Hospitals Yes
-  Local/regional emergency management agencies Yes
-  Federal emergency management agencies No
Public health department staff participated in training to support cooperative 
agreement activities3 Yes
Public health laboratories conducted training for first responders*4  (8/05 – 8/06) —
Activated public health emergency operations center as part of a drill, exercise, or real 
event†‡5 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
Conducted a drill or exercise for key response partners to test communications when 
power and land lines were unavailable‡5 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) No
Improve Finalized at least one after-action report with an improvement plan following an exercise or real event‡5 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
* Localities were not asked to respond to this question.
† Activation means rapidly staffing all eight core ICS functional roles in the public health emergency operations center with one person per position. This 
capability is critical to maintain in case of large-scale or complex incidents, even though not every incident requires full staffing of the ICS.
‡ Localities were expected to perform these activities from 9/1/2006 to 8/30/2007. These data represent results from the first half of this period only.






























The second annual Operation 
Prepare field deployment exercise 
occurred throughout Louisiana 
during the summer of 2007. 
Participating agencies included the Louisiana Department 
of Health and Hospitals, the Office of Public Health 
(OPH), and the Center for Community Preparedness. 
This community outreach effort focused on educating 
Hurricane Katrina- and Rita-affected communities and 
at-risk populations through crisis literature and surveys 
about preparation for evacuation and disasters. The 
event also tested the ability of public health agencies 
and partners to reach at-risk populations during an 
emergency, their knowledge and ability to operate within 
the National Incident Management System, and their 
communications plans and equipment. OPH teams also 
used the opportunity to provide free health screenings 
(with blood pressure checks, immunizations, and mental 
health consultations) via mobile clinics.  
The exercise was conducted in phases across the state. 
Educational efforts targeted housing development 
residents, the Vietnamese population of the New Orleans 
area, displaced Hurricane Katrina residents living in 
Baton Rouge, rural residents in low-lying marsh areas, 
and elderly residents in areas affected by Hurricane Rita. 
Dozens of emergency response and public health agencies, 
businesses, non-profit organizations, and churches 
partnered with OPH to make Operation Prepare a success.
Snapshot of Public Health Preparedness
Below are activities conducted by Louisiana in the area of public health preparedness. They support CDC preparedness 
goals in the areas of detection and reporting, control, and improvement; crosscutting activities help prepare for all stages 
of an event. These data are not comprehensive and do not cover all preparedness activities.
Disease Detection and Investigation
The sooner public health professionals can detect diseases or other health threats and investigate their causes and effects in 
the community, the more quickly they can minimize population exposure. 
Detect &
Report
Could receive and investigate urgent disease reports 24/7/3651 Yes
-  Primary method for receiving urgent disease reports*2 Telephone
Linked state and local health personnel to share information about disease outbreaks 
across state lines (through the CDC Epi-X system)3 Yes
Conducted year-round surveillance for seasonal influenza4 Yes
* Telephone, fax, and electronic reporting are all viable options for urgent disease reporting, as long as the public health department has someone assigned 
to receive the reports 24/7/365.
1 CDC, DSLR; 2005; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2006; 3 CDC, Epi-X; 2007; 4 HHS, OIG; 2007
Louisiana Deploys Staff Statewide during Operation Prepare 
Community outreach is critical in addressing the needs of at-risk populations.
Louisiana
http://www.dhh.louisiana.gov/office/?ID=276
According to the Louisiana Office of 
Public Health, the cooperative agreement 
is valuable because without the funding, the 
state would not have been able to coordinate 
emergency response activities, hire additional 
staff to coordinate emergency response 
activities, or provide proper training for its 
staff. The cooperative agreement also has 
provided for new equipment and supplies that 





obilizing State by State
Public Health Laboratories
Public health laboratories test and confirm agents that can threaten health. For example, advanced DNA “fingerprinting” 
techniques and subsequent reporting to the CDC database (PulseNet) are critical to recognize nationwide outbreaks from 
bacteria that can cause severe illness, such as E. coli O157:H7 and Listeria monocytogenes. 
Detect & Report
Number of Louisiana laboratories in the Laboratory Response Network1 1
Rapidly identified E. coli O157:H7 using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) None
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days  N/A
Rapidly identified Listeria monocytogenes using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) None
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days N/A
Had a laboratory information management system that could create, send, and receive 
messages3 (8/05 – 8/06) No
-  System complied with CDC information technology standards (PHIN)3 (8/05 – 8/06) N/A
Had a rapid method to send urgent messages to frontline laboratories that perform 
initial screening of clinical specimens3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Crosscutting
Conducted bioterrorism exercise that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) No
Conducted exercise to test chemical readiness that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) No
1 CDC, DBPR; 2007; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2007; 3 APHL, Public Health Laboratory Issues in Brief: Bioterrorism Capacity; May 2007; 4 CDC, DSLR; 2006
Response
Planning provides a framework for how a public health department will respond during an emergency. The plans can be 
tested through external reviews, exercises, and real events. After-action reports assess what worked well during an exercise or 
real event and how the department can improve. 
Control
Developed a public health response plan, including pandemic influenza response, crisis 
and emergency risk communication, and Strategic National Stockpile (SNS)1, 2 Yes
Louisiana SNS plan reviewed by CDC2 Yes
-  Score on CDC technical assistance review (1-100) 82
Number of Louisiana cities in the Cities Readiness Initiative3 2
Crosscutting
Developed roles and responsibilities for a multi-jurisdictional response (ICS) with:1  (8/05 – 8/06)
-  Hospitals Yes
-  Local/regional emergency management agencies Yes
-  Federal emergency management agencies Yes
Public health department staff participated in training to support cooperative 
agreement activities4 Yes
Public health laboratories conducted training for first responders5  (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Activated public health emergency operations center as part of a drill, exercise, or real 
event*†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
Conducted a drill or exercise for key response partners to test communications when 
power and land lines were unavailable†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
Improve Finalized at least one after-action report with an improvement plan following an exercise or real event†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) No
* Activation means rapidly staffing all eight core ICS functional roles in the public health emergency operations center with one person per position. This 
capability is critical to maintain in case of large-scale or complex incidents, even though not every incident requires full staffing of the ICS.
† States were expected to perform these activities from 9/1/2006 to 8/30/2007. These data represent results from the first half of this period only.






























The Maine Center for Disease 
Control and Prevention, Office 
of Public Health Emergency 
Preparedness (OPHEP), in 
coordination with key partners, has established a 
partnership for state pandemic influenza preparedness 
planning. The focus is in establishing practical, statewide, 
and community-based procedures that could prevent or 
delay the spread of pandemic influenza and help reduce 
the burden of illness communities would experience 
during an outbreak.  
 
Rather than the classic model of multiple sub-state 
departments, Maine’s public health infrastructure consists 
of a combination of state, community, and private 
agencies that have collaboratively established a public 
health network. Therefore, the development of county-
level plans was determined to be the most practical and 
operational approach to local planning. The planning 
networks merged community, emergency, and medical 
response while also employing comprehensive groups of 
local constituents.
Challenges and significant successes have been realized 
from the development of planning networks representing 
formerly divergent and culturally different professions. A 
statewide operational plan for Maine has been developed 
and will be updated by April 2008. The cooperation of 
the community, emergency, and medical response was 
contingent upon the success of this planning process.
Snapshot of Public Health Preparedness
Below are activities conducted by Maine in the area of public health preparedness. They support CDC preparedness goals 
in the areas of detection and reporting, control, and improvement; crosscutting activities help prepare for all stages of an 
event. These data are not comprehensive and do not cover all preparedness activities.
Disease Detection and Investigation
The sooner public health professionals can detect diseases or other health threats and investigate their causes and effects in 
the community, the more quickly they can minimize population exposure. 
Detect &
Report
Could receive and investigate urgent disease reports 24/7/3651 Yes
-  Primary method for receiving urgent disease reports*2 Telephone
Linked state and local health personnel to share information about disease outbreaks 
across state lines (through the CDC Epi-X system)3 Yes
Conducted year-round surveillance for seasonal influenza4 Yes
* Telephone, fax, and electronic reporting are all viable options for urgent disease reporting, as long as the public health department has someone assigned 
to receive the reports 24/7/365.
1 CDC, DSLR; 2005; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2006; 3 CDC, Epi-X; 2007; 4 HHS, OIG; 2007
Maine’s Partnership for Pandemic Influenza Increases Preparedness 
Comprehensive planning prepares communities before an actual emergency.
Maine
http://www.maine.gov/dhhs/boh
According to the Maine Department 
of Health and Human Services, the 
cooperative agreement is valuable because 
funds have improved Maine’s ability to detect, 
treat, and prevent injuries and diseases that 
threaten the health of its citizens as a result 
of natural or manmade events. In partnership 
with federal, state, and local agencies, a 
coordinated system will address natural 
disasters (e.g., floods and disease outbreaks), 
as well as terrorist acts (e.g., the release of 





obilizing State by State
Public Health Laboratories
Public health laboratories test and confirm agents that can threaten health. For example, advanced DNA “fingerprinting” 
techniques and subsequent reporting to the CDC database (PulseNet) are critical to recognize nationwide outbreaks from 
bacteria that can cause severe illness, such as E. coli O157:H7 and Listeria monocytogenes. 
Detect & Report
Number of Maine laboratories in the Laboratory Response Network1 1
Rapidly identified E. coli O157:H7 using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) 11
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days  18%
Rapidly identified Listeria monocytogenes using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) None
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days N/A
Had a laboratory information management system that could create, send, and receive 
messages3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
-  System complied with CDC information technology standards (PHIN)3 (8/05 – 8/06) No
Had a rapid method to send urgent messages to frontline laboratories that perform 
initial screening of clinical specimens3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Crosscutting
Conducted bioterrorism exercise that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Conducted exercise to test chemical readiness that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
1 CDC, DBPR; 2007; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2007; 3 APHL, Public Health Laboratory Issues in Brief: Bioterrorism Capacity; May 2007; 4 CDC, DSLR; 2006
Response
Planning provides a framework for how a public health department will respond during an emergency. The plans can be 
tested through external reviews, exercises, and real events. After-action reports assess what worked well during an exercise or 
real event and how the department can improve. 
Control
Developed a public health response plan, including pandemic influenza response, crisis 
and emergency risk communication, and Strategic National Stockpile (SNS)1, 2 Yes
Maine SNS plan reviewed by CDC2 Yes
-  Score on CDC technical assistance review (1-100) 51
Number of Maine cities in the Cities Readiness Initiative3 1
Crosscutting
Developed roles and responsibilities for a multi-jurisdictional response (ICS) with:1  (8/05 – 8/06)
-  Hospitals Yes
-  Local/regional emergency management agencies Yes
-  Federal emergency management agencies Yes
Public health department staff participated in training to support cooperative 
agreement activities4 Yes
Public health laboratories conducted training for first responders5  (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Activated public health emergency operations center as part of a drill, exercise, or real 
event*†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) No
Conducted a drill or exercise for key response partners to test communications when 
power and land lines were unavailable†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) No
Improve Finalized at least one after-action report with an improvement plan following an exercise or real event†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
* Activation means rapidly staffing all eight core ICS functional roles in the public health emergency operations center with one person per position. This 
capability is critical to maintain in case of large-scale or complex incidents, even though not every incident requires full staffing of the ICS.
† States were expected to perform these activities from 9/1/2006 to 8/30/2007. These data represent results from the first half of this period only.






























The daily work of epidemiologists in 
public health departments involves 
routine data collection about disease 
patterns and trends. However, in 
2005 a field epidemiologist at the Maryland Department 
of Health and Mental Hygiene (DHMH) emphasized the 
need for immediate response to potential health threats. 
In March, DHMH received a report from Maryland’s 
eastern shore about a letter containing white powder. The 
epidemiologist immediately initiated the DHMH white 
powder protocol and communication network, which 
had been established after the anthrax letter threats of 
2001. Within hours, another letter with white powder was 
reported from the far western region of the state. Again, 
the epidemiologist initiated the white powder protocol, 
with the additional recommendation that the situations 
across the state be linked and investigated further.  
DHMH leadership followed this recommendation and 
moved quickly to involve law enforcement officials in 
Maryland. Ultimately, the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
became involved due to related letters found in Kentucky 
and as far away as Alaska. Subsequent laboratory testing 
determined that the white powder was not anthrax. 
Further investigations led to one man as the source of 
all of the threatening letters and supported a criminal 
conviction. This response demonstrates the importance 
of having well-trained staff, relationships with law 
enforcement, and plans in place before a potential event 
occurs.
Snapshot of Public Health Preparedness
Below are activities conducted by Maryland in the area of public health preparedness. They support CDC preparedness 
goals in the areas of detection and reporting, control, and improvement; crosscutting activities help prepare for all stages 
of an event. These data are not comprehensive and do not cover all preparedness activities.
Disease Detection and Investigation
The sooner public health professionals can detect diseases or other health threats and investigate their causes and effects in 
the community, the more quickly they can minimize population exposure. 
Detect &
Report
Could receive and investigate urgent disease reports 24/7/3651 Yes
-  Primary method for receiving urgent disease reports*2 Telephone
Linked state and local health personnel to share information about disease outbreaks 
across state lines (through the CDC Epi-X system)3 Yes
Conducted year-round surveillance for seasonal influenza4 Yes
* Telephone, fax, and electronic reporting are all viable options for urgent disease reporting, as long as the public health department has someone assigned 
to receive the reports 24/7/365.
1 CDC, DSLR; 2005; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2006; 3 CDC, Epi-X; 2007; 4 HHS, OIG; 2007
Maryland Responds to Letters Containing White Powder
State and local surveillance helps identify emergencies at the national level.
Maryland
http://bioterrorism.dhmh.state.md.us
According to the Maryland Department 
of Health and Mental Hygiene, the 
cooperative agreement is valuable because 
funds have allowed Maryland to hire and 
train staff, purchase needed equipment, and 
conduct exercises. Public health preparedness 
accomplishments have included developing 
emergency plans, conducting drills to prepare 
for mass vaccinations, and implementing an 






obilizing State by State
Public Health Laboratories
Public health laboratories test and confirm agents that can threaten health. For example, advanced DNA “fingerprinting” 
techniques and subsequent reporting to the CDC database (PulseNet) are critical to recognize nationwide outbreaks from 
bacteria that can cause severe illness, such as E. coli O157:H7 and Listeria monocytogenes. 
Detect & Report
Number of Maryland laboratories in the Laboratory Response Network1 9
Rapidly identified E. coli O157:H7 using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) 22
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days  91%
Rapidly identified Listeria monocytogenes using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) 12
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days 75%
Had a laboratory information management system that could create, send, and receive 
messages3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
-  System complied with CDC information technology standards (PHIN)3 (8/05 – 8/06) No
Had a rapid method to send urgent messages to frontline laboratories that perform 
initial screening of clinical specimens3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Crosscutting
Conducted bioterrorism exercise that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Conducted exercise to test chemical readiness that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
1 CDC, DBPR; 2007; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2007; 3 APHL, Public Health Laboratory Issues in Brief: Bioterrorism Capacity; May 2007; 4 CDC, DSLR; 2006
Response
Planning provides a framework for how a public health department will respond during an emergency. The plans can be 
tested through external reviews, exercises, and real events. After-action reports assess what worked well during an exercise or 
real event and how the department can improve. 
Control
Developed a public health response plan, including pandemic influenza response, crisis 
and emergency risk communication, and Strategic National Stockpile (SNS)1, 2 Yes
Maryland SNS plan reviewed by CDC2 Yes
-  Score on CDC technical assistance review (1-100) 64
Number of Maryland cities in the Cities Readiness Initiative3 1
Crosscutting
Developed roles and responsibilities for a multi-jurisdictional response (ICS) with:1  (8/05 – 8/06)
-  Hospitals Yes
-  Local/regional emergency management agencies Yes
-  Federal emergency management agencies Yes
Public health department staff participated in training to support cooperative 
agreement activities4 Yes
Public health laboratories conducted training for first responders5  (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Activated public health emergency operations center as part of a drill, exercise, or real 
event*†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
Conducted a drill or exercise for key response partners to test communications when 
power and land lines were unavailable†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
Improve Finalized at least one after-action report with an improvement plan following an exercise or real event†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
* Activation means rapidly staffing all eight core ICS functional roles in the public health emergency operations center with one person per position. This 
capability is critical to maintain in case of large-scale or complex incidents, even though not every incident requires full staffing of the ICS.
† States were expected to perform these activities from 9/1/2006 to 8/30/2007. These data represent results from the first half of this period only.






























When measles broke out in Boston 
in 2006, the disease had not had a 
large-scale presence in the United 
States for over 5 years. The first case 
in this outbreak was an unvaccinated man from India 
who had arrived in Boston and was confirmed to have 
measles 2 weeks after his arrival. Boston Public Health 
Commission (BPHC) and Massachusetts Department 
of Public Health (MDPH) officials were immediately 
concerned about the potential of a larger outbreak.  
BPHC and MDPH identified people exposed to measles, 
located immunization histories, and determined the need 
for quarantine. BPHC used its syndromic surveillance 
system to help detect measles in emergency rooms. BPHC 
alerted healthcare providers via factsheets and podcasts 
and also interacted with the media to educate the public 
(in multiple languages) about symptoms, prevention 
strategies, and vaccination. BPHC also used the Incident 
Command System (ICS) to manage the response and 
share information throughout the outbreak. By the end of 
the outbreak, more than 2,500 doses of vaccines were 
administered. Over 800 doses of vaccines were 
administered by BPHC directly, and the remaining 
were administered through emergency preparedness 
partnerships with local health centers, occupational 
health providers, and other healthcare providers. These 
partnerships for vaccinations were created with support 
from the Cities Readiness Initiative (funded by the 
cooperative agreement).
Snapshot of Public Health Preparedness
Below are activities conducted by Massachusetts in the area of public health preparedness. They support CDC 
preparedness goals in the areas of detection and reporting, control, and improvement; crosscutting activities help prepare 
for all stages of an event. These data are not comprehensive and do not cover all preparedness activities.
Disease Detection and Investigation
The sooner public health professionals can detect diseases or other health threats and investigate their causes and effects in 
the community, the more quickly they can minimize population exposure. 
Detect &
Report
Could receive and investigate urgent disease reports 24/7/3651 Yes
-  Primary method for receiving urgent disease reports*2 Telephone
Linked state and local health personnel to share information about disease outbreaks 
across state lines (through the CDC Epi-X system)3 Yes
Conducted year-round surveillance for seasonal influenza4 Yes
* Telephone, fax, and electronic reporting are all viable options for urgent disease reporting, as long as the public health department has someone assigned 
to receive the reports 24/7/365.
1 CDC, DSLR; 2005; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2006; 3 CDC, Epi-X; 2007; 4 HHS, OIG; 2007
Massachusetts Responds to a Measles Outbreak 
Global travel may introduce new or unfamiliar diseases and increase the risk of disease outbreaks.
Massachusetts
http://www.mass.gov/dph/emergencyprep
According to the Massachusetts Department 
of Public Health, the cooperative 
agreement is valuable because prior to 
receiving cooperative agreement funding, the 
Department did not carry out initiatives to 
improve preparedness. These funds are critical 
for an enhanced state laboratory, disease 






obilizing State by State
Public Health Laboratories
Public health laboratories test and confirm agents that can threaten health. For example, advanced DNA “fingerprinting” 
techniques and subsequent reporting to the CDC database (PulseNet) are critical to recognize nationwide outbreaks from 
bacteria that can cause severe illness, such as E. coli O157:H7 and Listeria monocytogenes. 
Detect & Report
Number of Massachusetts laboratories in the Laboratory Response Network1 2
Rapidly identified E. coli O157:H7 using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) 22
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days  64%
Rapidly identified Listeria monocytogenes using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) 6
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days 0%
Had a laboratory information management system that could create, send, and receive 
messages3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
-  System complied with CDC information technology standards (PHIN)3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Had a rapid method to send urgent messages to frontline laboratories that perform 
initial screening of clinical specimens3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Crosscutting
Conducted bioterrorism exercise that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Conducted exercise to test chemical readiness that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
1 CDC, DBPR; 2007; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2007; 3 APHL, Public Health Laboratory Issues in Brief: Bioterrorism Capacity; May 2007; 4 CDC, DSLR; 2006
Response
Planning provides a framework for how a public health department will respond during an emergency. The plans can be 
tested through external reviews, exercises, and real events. After-action reports assess what worked well during an exercise or 
real event and how the department can improve. 
Control
Developed a public health response plan, including pandemic influenza response, crisis 
and emergency risk communication, and Strategic National Stockpile (SNS)1, 2 Yes
Massachusetts SNS plan reviewed by CDC2 Yes
-  Score on CDC technical assistance review (1-100) 63
Number of Massachusetts cities in the Cities Readiness Initiative3 1
Crosscutting
Developed roles and responsibilities for a multi-jurisdictional response (ICS) with:1  (8/05 – 8/06)
-  Hospitals Yes
-  Local/regional emergency management agencies Yes
-  Federal emergency management agencies No
Public health department staff participated in training to support cooperative 
agreement activities4 Yes
Public health laboratories conducted training for first responders5  (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Activated public health emergency operations center as part of a drill, exercise, or real 
event*†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) No
Conducted a drill or exercise for key response partners to test communications when 
power and land lines were unavailable†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) No
Improve Finalized at least one after-action report with an improvement plan following an exercise or real event†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
* Activation means rapidly staffing all eight core ICS functional roles in the public health emergency operations center with one person per position. This 
capability is critical to maintain in case of large-scale or complex incidents, even though not every incident requires full staffing of the ICS.
† States were expected to perform these activities from 9/1/2006 to 8/30/2007. These data represent results from the first half of this period only.






























In 2004, the Michigan Department 
of Community Health (MDCH) 
created the Michigan Emergency 
Drug Delivery and Resource 
Utilization Network (MEDDRUN) to bridge the gap 
between available medical resources through caches 
of medications, such as nerve agent antidotes and 
supplies pre-deployed around the state. These caches are 
strategically placed within immediate reach of helicopters 
and ground transportation for the rapid delivery of 
supplies to hospitals and other health care facilities during 
a disaster.  
By approaching this project using multi-disciplinary 
planning that included emergency management, law 
enforcement, public health, health care, and emergency 
medical services, MDCH created an innovative network. 
MEDDRUN received national recognition from the ASH 
Institute for Democratic Governance and Innovation 
at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of 
Government, receiving second place out of a pool of 
other innovative, homeland security-based programs. 
By drawing on resources from both the cooperative 
agreement and the HHS hospital preparedness program, 
MDCH promoted collaboration and coordination at all 
levels of government and the private sector to protect 
Michigan residents.
Snapshot of Public Health Preparedness
Below are activities conducted by Michigan in the area of public health preparedness. They support CDC preparedness 
goals in the areas of detection and reporting, control, and improvement; crosscutting activities help prepare for all stages 
of an event. These data are not comprehensive and do not cover all preparedness activities.
Disease Detection and Investigation
The sooner public health professionals can detect diseases or other health threats and investigate their causes and effects in 
the community, the more quickly they can minimize population exposure. 
Detect &
Report
Could receive and investigate urgent disease reports 24/7/3651 Yes
-  Primary method for receiving urgent disease reports*2 Telephone
Linked state and local health personnel to share information about disease outbreaks 
across state lines (through the CDC Epi-X system)3 Yes
Conducted year-round surveillance for seasonal influenza4 Yes
* Telephone, fax, and electronic reporting are all viable options for urgent disease reporting, as long as the public health department has someone assigned 
to receive the reports 24/7/365.
1 CDC, DSLR; 2005; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2006; 3 CDC, Epi-X; 2007; 4 HHS, OIG; 2007
Michigan Creates a Network to Rapidly Deliver Medications and Supplies  
Innovative programs at the state level can become models for other states to follow.
Michigan
http://www.michigan.gov/mdch
According to the Michigan Department 
of Community Health, the cooperative 
agreement is valuable because it has been 
critical to facilitate all public health and 
health care related activities. Significant 
upgrades to a previously deteriorating 
public health infrastructure have benefited 
the public’s health in many ways. Funding 
also has enhanced Michigan’s state and 
local ability to respond to non-bioterrorism 
related emergencies, such as influenza vaccine 





obilizing State by State
Public Health Laboratories
Public health laboratories test and confirm agents that can threaten health. For example, advanced DNA “fingerprinting” 
techniques and subsequent reporting to the CDC database (PulseNet) are critical to recognize nationwide outbreaks from 
bacteria that can cause severe illness, such as E. coli O157:H7 and Listeria monocytogenes. 
Detect & Report
Number of Michigan laboratories in the Laboratory Response Network1 9
Rapidly identified E. coli O157:H7 using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) 33
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days  100%
Rapidly identified Listeria monocytogenes using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) 5
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days 100%
Had a laboratory information management system that could create, send, and receive 
messages3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
-  System complied with CDC information technology standards (PHIN)3 (8/05 – 8/06) No
Had a rapid method to send urgent messages to frontline laboratories that perform 
initial screening of clinical specimens3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Crosscutting
Conducted bioterrorism exercise that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) No
Conducted exercise to test chemical readiness that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
1 CDC, DBPR; 2007; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2007; 3 APHL, Public Health Laboratory Issues in Brief: Bioterrorism Capacity; May 2007; 4 CDC, DSLR; 2006
Response
Planning provides a framework for how a public health department will respond during an emergency. The plans can be 
tested through external reviews, exercises, and real events. After-action reports assess what worked well during an exercise or 
real event and how the department can improve. 
Control
Developed a public health response plan, including pandemic influenza response, crisis 
and emergency risk communication, and Strategic National Stockpile (SNS)1, 2 Yes
Michigan SNS plan reviewed by CDC2 Yes
-  Score on CDC technical assistance review (1-100) 88
Number of Michigan cities in the Cities Readiness Initiative3 1
Crosscutting
Developed roles and responsibilities for a multi-jurisdictional response (ICS) with:1  (8/05 – 8/06)
-  Hospitals Yes
-  Local/regional emergency management agencies Yes
-  Federal emergency management agencies Yes
Public health department staff participated in training to support cooperative 
agreement activities4 Yes
Public health laboratories conducted training for first responders5  (8/05 – 8/06) No
Activated public health emergency operations center as part of a drill, exercise, or real 
event*†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
Conducted a drill or exercise for key response partners to test communications when 
power and land lines were unavailable†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
Improve Finalized at least one after-action report with an improvement plan following an exercise or real event†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
* Activation means rapidly staffing all eight core ICS functional roles in the public health emergency operations center with one person per position. This 
capability is critical to maintain in case of large-scale or complex incidents, even though not every incident requires full staffing of the ICS.
† States were expected to perform these activities from 9/1/2006 to 8/30/2007. These data represent results from the first half of this period only.






























In August 2007, the Interstate 35W 
bridge across the Mississippi River in 
Minneapolis, Minnesota collapsed, 
leaving 13 people dead and nearly 
100 injured. Hospitals, emergency medical services, and 
state public health staff were alerted within minutes of the 
incident and began monitoring real-time information on 
the patients, where they were transported, their condition, 
and the status of hospital availability. Within hours of the 
incident, most patients had been rescued, triaged, and 
transported to hospitals.
 
After the initial collapse, the Minnesota Department 
of Health and other state and federal agencies assisted 
the City of Minneapolis to find potentially harmful 
substances as a result of the bridge collapse, and also 
initiated public health protection measures during 
the cleanup and demolition that followed. Air, water, 
and bridge materials were sampled or monitored and 
no public health hazards were detected, providing 
critical information to responders and the surrounding 
community.
Multiple communication strategies led to effective 
information sharing among public health departments, 
the media, and the public. Local and state public health 
staff coordinated behavioral health and grief support 
services using the Medical Reserve Corps and a statewide 
network of registered and credentialed volunteers. In 
coordination with the American Red Cross, public 
health professionals supported families through the 
recovery phase and planned for long-term support. Prior 
regional planning and coordination had clarified specific 
responsibilities and means of communication during an 
emergency.
Snapshot of Public Health Preparedness
Below are activities conducted by Minnesota in the area of public health preparedness. They support CDC preparedness 
goals in the areas of detection and reporting, control, and improvement; crosscutting activities help prepare for all stages 
of an event. These data are not comprehensive and do not cover all preparedness activities.
Disease Detection and Investigation
The sooner public health professionals can detect diseases or other health threats and investigate their causes and effects in 
the community, the more quickly they can minimize population exposure. 
Detect &
Report
Could receive and investigate urgent disease reports 24/7/3651 Yes
-  Primary method for receiving urgent disease reports*2 Telephone
Linked state and local health personnel to share information about disease outbreaks 
across state lines (through the CDC Epi-X system)3 Yes
Conducted year-round surveillance for seasonal influenza4 Yes
* Telephone, fax, and electronic reporting are all viable options for urgent disease reporting, as long as the public health department has someone assigned 
to receive the reports 24/7/365.
1 CDC, DSLR; 2005; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2006; 3 CDC, Epi-X; 2007; 4 HHS, OIG; 2007
Minnesota Responds to Interstate Bridge Collapse 
Information sharing is critical to effective emergency response.
Minnesota
http://www.health.state.mn.us/oep
According to the Minnesota Department 
of Health, the cooperative agreement is 
valuable because it has allowed the state to 
implement systems and foster partnerships 
that otherwise would not have been possible. 
The dedicated funding has allowed Minnesota 
to develop additional emergency response and 





obilizing State by State
Public Health Laboratories
Public health laboratories test and confirm agents that can threaten health. For example, advanced DNA “fingerprinting” 
techniques and subsequent reporting to the CDC database (PulseNet) are critical to recognize nationwide outbreaks from 
bacteria that can cause severe illness, such as E. coli O157:H7 and Listeria monocytogenes. 
Detect & Report
Number of Minnesota laboratories in the Laboratory Response Network1 3
Rapidly identified E. coli O157:H7 using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) 87
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days  94%
Rapidly identified Listeria monocytogenes using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) 15
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days 93%
Had a laboratory information management system that could create, send, and receive 
messages3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
-  System complied with CDC information technology standards (PHIN)3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Had a rapid method to send urgent messages to frontline laboratories that perform 
initial screening of clinical specimens3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Crosscutting
Conducted bioterrorism exercise that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) No
Conducted exercise to test chemical readiness that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
1 CDC, DBPR; 2007; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2007; 3 APHL, Public Health Laboratory Issues in Brief: Bioterrorism Capacity; May 2007; 4 CDC, DSLR; 2006
Response
Planning provides a framework for how a public health department will respond during an emergency. The plans can be 
tested through external reviews, exercises, and real events. After-action reports assess what worked well during an exercise or 
real event and how the department can improve. 
Control
Developed a public health response plan, including pandemic influenza response, crisis 
and emergency risk communication, and Strategic National Stockpile (SNS)1, 2 Yes
Minnesota SNS plan reviewed by CDC2 Yes
-  Score on CDC technical assistance review (1-100) 81
Number of Minnesota cities in the Cities Readiness Initiative3 1
Crosscutting
Developed roles and responsibilities for a multi-jurisdictional response (ICS) with:1  (8/05 – 8/06)
-  Hospitals Yes
-  Local/regional emergency management agencies No
-  Federal emergency management agencies No
Public health department staff participated in training to support cooperative 
agreement activities4 Yes
Public health laboratories conducted training for first responders5  (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Activated public health emergency operations center as part of a drill, exercise, or real 
event*†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) No
Conducted a drill or exercise for key response partners to test communications when 
power and land lines were unavailable†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) No
Improve Finalized at least one after-action report with an improvement plan following an exercise or real event†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
* Activation means rapidly staffing all eight core ICS functional roles in the public health emergency operations center with one person per position. This 
capability is critical to maintain in case of large-scale or complex incidents, even though not every incident requires full staffing of the ICS.
† States were expected to perform these activities from 9/1/2006 to 8/30/2007. These data represent results from the first half of this period only.






























Mississippi used cooperative 
agreement funding to improve 
preparedness, specifically for 
communication and medical care 
for displaced individuals. Recently, the Mississippi State 
Department of Health (MSDH) used the Mississippi 
Health Alert Network (HAN) to notify the state’s 
healthcare system of a serious outbreak of pertussis 
(whooping cough). HAN allowed one person to notify 
every participating physician, every hospital, and many 
other medical providers (over 5,000 contacts) in about 
6 hours, with a verified delivery rate approaching 90%. 
Previously, this process was very labor intensive, taking a 
minimum of 12 to 14 hours with a 50% success rate. 
In addition, following Hurricane Katrina, MSDH realized 
that it did not have the medical surge capacity to care for 
the thousands of individuals with special medical needs 
displaced by the storm. The cooperative agreement is 
funding medical surge capacity enhancement that utilizes 
Mississippi’s community college system. Buildings on 
selected campuses are being equipped to act as special 
medical needs shelters for use in the event of storms, a 
pandemic outbreak, or other natural or man-made 
disaster. Enough hospital-grade equipment, medical 
supplies, and pharmaceuticals are being purchased to 
enable each surge capacity site to care for at least 100 
patients and 100 caregivers, plus staff. MSDH is also 
upgrading electrical power systems to enable climate 
control and life support systems to function in the event 
of power loss. Showers and bathrooms are being retro-
fitted for use by physically challenged individuals and to 
meet the Americans with Disabilities Act requirements. 
During the next disaster, Mississippi will be more 
prepared to care for displaced people who need ongoing 
medical care. 
Snapshot of Public Health Preparedness
Below are activities conducted by Mississippi in the area of public health preparedness. They support CDC preparedness 
goals in the areas of detection and reporting, control, and improvement; crosscutting activities help prepare for all stages 
of an event. These data are not comprehensive and do not cover all preparedness activities.
Disease Detection and Investigation
The sooner public health professionals can detect diseases or other health threats and investigate their causes and effects in 
the community, the more quickly they can minimize population exposure. 
Detect &
Report
Could receive and investigate urgent disease reports 24/7/3651 Yes
-  Primary method for receiving urgent disease reports*2 Telephone
Linked state and local health personnel to share information about disease outbreaks 
across state lines (through the CDC Epi-X system)3 Yes
Conducted year-round surveillance for seasonal influenza4 Yes
* Telephone, fax, and electronic reporting are all viable options for urgent disease reporting, as long as the public health department has someone assigned 
to receive the reports 24/7/365.
1 CDC, DSLR; 2005; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2006; 3 CDC, Epi-X; 2007; 4 HHS, OIG; 2007
Mississippi Improves Communication and Surge Capacity 
Identifying and filling gaps in the public health system improves emergency response.
Mississippi
http://www.msdh.state.ms.us
According to the Mississippi State 
Department of Health, the cooperative 
agreement is valuable because it has covered 
salaries for bioterrorism surveillance nurses 
in each of the nine public health districts. 
Mississippi also has been able to add a testing 
area with enhanced security within their 






obilizing State by State
Public Health Laboratories
Public health laboratories test and confirm agents that can threaten health. For example, advanced DNA “fingerprinting” 
techniques and subsequent reporting to the CDC database (PulseNet) are critical to recognize nationwide outbreaks from 
bacteria that can cause severe illness, such as E. coli O157:H7 and Listeria monocytogenes. 
Detect & Report
Number of Mississippi laboratories in the Laboratory Response Network1 1
Rapidly identified E. coli O157:H7 using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) 3
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days  33%
Rapidly identified Listeria monocytogenes using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) None
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days N/A
Had a laboratory information management system that could create, send, and receive 
messages3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
-  System complied with CDC information technology standards (PHIN)3 (8/05 – 8/06) No
Had a rapid method to send urgent messages to frontline laboratories that perform 
initial screening of clinical specimens3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Crosscutting
Conducted bioterrorism exercise that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Conducted exercise to test chemical readiness that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
1 CDC, DBPR; 2007; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2007; 3 APHL, Public Health Laboratory Issues in Brief: Bioterrorism Capacity; May 2007; 4 CDC, DSLR; 2006
Response
Planning provides a framework for how a public health department will respond during an emergency. The plans can be 
tested through external reviews, exercises, and real events. After-action reports assess what worked well during an exercise or 
real event and how the department can improve. 
Control
Developed a public health response plan, including pandemic influenza response, crisis 
and emergency risk communication, and Strategic National Stockpile (SNS)1, 2 Yes
Mississippi SNS plan reviewed by CDC2 Yes
-  Score on CDC technical assistance review (1-100) 96
Number of Mississippi cities in the Cities Readiness Initiative3 1
Crosscutting
Developed roles and responsibilities for a multi-jurisdictional response (ICS) with:1  (8/05 – 8/06)
-  Hospitals Yes
-  Local/regional emergency management agencies Yes
-  Federal emergency management agencies Yes
Public health department staff participated in training to support cooperative 
agreement activities4 Yes
Public health laboratories conducted training for first responders5  (8/05 – 8/06) No
Activated public health emergency operations center as part of a drill, exercise, or real 
event*†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
Conducted a drill or exercise for key response partners to test communications when 
power and land lines were unavailable†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) No
Improve Finalized at least one after-action report with an improvement plan following an exercise or real event†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
* Activation means rapidly staffing all eight core ICS functional roles in the public health emergency operations center with one person per position. This 
capability is critical to maintain in case of large-scale or complex incidents, even though not every incident requires full staffing of the ICS.
† States were expected to perform these activities from 9/1/2006 to 8/30/2007. These data represent results from the first half of this period only.






























Missouri contributed to the 
laboratory response in the 2006 
E. coli outbreak in spinach, the 
largest foodborne disease outbreak 
in the United States since 1993. Prior to the cooperative 
agreement, the Missouri State Public Health Laboratory 
(MSPHL) did not have adequate staff, equipment, or 
communication systems to rapidly respond to an event 
the size of the 2006 outbreak. Now, MSPHL provides a 
wide variety of testing 365 days per year.  
During the outbreak, trained staff were able to rapidly 
confirm the strain type of all E. coli specimens sent to 
the laboratory, determine if they matched the strains 
associated with the national spinach E. coli investigation, 
and establish that the E. coli strains in Missouri were 
not part of the national outbreak. MSPHL also received 
specimens quickly because of the new statewide 
courier service. Parallel laboratory and epidemiologic 
investigations were crucial in identifying the source of this 
outbreak. Concurrent collection of case information 
by epidemiologists in affected states and sharing of data 
between states and CDC led to rapid identification of the 
suspected food source and targeted public health action.
Snapshot of Public Health Preparedness
Below are activities conducted by Missouri in the area of public health preparedness. They support CDC preparedness 
goals in the areas of detection and reporting, control, and improvement; crosscutting activities help prepare for all stages 
of an event. These data are not comprehensive and do not cover all preparedness activities.
Disease Detection and Investigation
The sooner public health professionals can detect diseases or other health threats and investigate their causes and effects in 
the community, the more quickly they can minimize population exposure. 
Detect &
Report
Could receive and investigate urgent disease reports 24/7/3651 Yes
-  Primary method for receiving urgent disease reports*2 Telephone
Linked state and local health personnel to share information about disease outbreaks 
across state lines (through the CDC Epi-X system)3 Yes
Conducted year-round surveillance for seasonal influenza4 Yes
* Telephone, fax, and electronic reporting are all viable options for urgent disease reporting, as long as the public health department has someone assigned 
to receive the reports 24/7/365.
1 CDC, DSLR; 2005; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2006; 3 CDC, Epi-X; 2007; 4 HHS, OIG; 2007
Missouri Responds to Multi-State E. Coli Outbreak
Laboratory and epidemiologic investigations are crucial to rapidly identify the source of disease outbreaks.
Missouri
http://www.dhss.mo.gov/BT_Response
According to the Missouri Department of 
Health and Senior Services, the cooperative 
agreement is valuable because it has 
allowed the state to hire staff, purchase new 
equipment, draft guidances, and prepare 
training and educational opportunities for 
its workforce. Missouri has been able to 
create the Center for Emergency Response 
and Terrorism to work on issues related to 
preparedness caused by natural or deliberate 
events. Its staff have received invaluable 
training in disaster response that was put to 






obilizing State by State
Public Health Laboratories
Public health laboratories test and confirm agents that can threaten health. For example, advanced DNA “fingerprinting” 
techniques and subsequent reporting to the CDC database (PulseNet) are critical to recognize nationwide outbreaks from 
bacteria that can cause severe illness, such as E. coli O157:H7 and Listeria monocytogenes. 
Detect & Report
Number of Missouri laboratories in the Laboratory Response Network1 1
Rapidly identified E. coli O157:H7 using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) 29
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days  93%
Rapidly identified Listeria monocytogenes using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) None
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days N/A
Had a laboratory information management system that could create, send, and receive 
messages3 (8/05 – 8/06) No
-  System complied with CDC information technology standards (PHIN)3 (8/05 – 8/06) N/A
Had a rapid method to send urgent messages to frontline laboratories that perform 
initial screening of clinical specimens3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Crosscutting
Conducted bioterrorism exercise that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Conducted exercise to test chemical readiness that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
1 CDC, DBPR; 2007; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2007; 3 APHL, Public Health Laboratory Issues in Brief: Bioterrorism Capacity; May 2007; 4 CDC, DSLR; 2006
Response
Planning provides a framework for how a public health department will respond during an emergency. The plans can be 
tested through external reviews, exercises, and real events. After-action reports assess what worked well during an exercise or 
real event and how the department can improve. 
Control
Developed a public health response plan, including pandemic influenza response, crisis 
and emergency risk communication, and Strategic National Stockpile (SNS)1, 2 Yes
Missouri SNS plan reviewed by CDC2 Yes
-  Score on CDC technical assistance review (1-100) 85
Number of Missouri cities in the Cities Readiness Initiative3 2
Crosscutting
Developed roles and responsibilities for a multi-jurisdictional response (ICS) with:1  (8/05 – 8/06)
-  Hospitals Yes
-  Local/regional emergency management agencies Yes
-  Federal emergency management agencies Yes
Public health department staff participated in training to support cooperative 
agreement activities4 Yes
Public health laboratories conducted training for first responders5  (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Activated public health emergency operations center as part of a drill, exercise, or real 
event*†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
Conducted a drill or exercise for key response partners to test communications when 
power and land lines were unavailable†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) No
Improve Finalized at least one after-action report with an improvement plan following an exercise or real event†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
* Activation means rapidly staffing all eight core ICS functional roles in the public health emergency operations center with one person per position. This 
capability is critical to maintain in case of large-scale or complex incidents, even though not every incident requires full staffing of the ICS.
† States were expected to perform these activities from 9/1/2006 to 8/30/2007. These data represent results from the first half of this period only.






























When Montana state and local 
health departments learned of a 
multi-drug resistant tuberculosis 
(MDR TB) case in 2006, urban 
and rural counties worked seamlessly with the state 
health department TB program to prevent the spread of 
the disease. First, the local health department issued an 
isolation order restricting the infected patient’s travel. 
Because the infected patient had planned to travel 
internationally from an airport located in an adjacent, 
urban county, that county’s public health department 
also issued an order restricting flight from that airport. 
To restrict air travel from any other city, the regional 
CDC quarantine office and airline were notified. The 
infected patient was permitted to travel, within specified 
parameters, to a hospital for treatment. When no longer 
contagious, the patient was allowed to return home. 
After-hours communication and relationships among state 
and local laboratories facilitated the exchange of clinical 
testing results. In addition, a communicable disease nurse 
was dedicated to manage the complex public health and 
medical issues related to this case.
Cooperative agreement funds contributed to the 
successful response. Local health authorities could rapidly 
issue a county isolation order because Montana had 
reviewed and updated its public health statutes, including 
isolation and quarantine authorities, and local public 
health departments adopted and updated their protocols. 
Montana also updated its high-level biosafety laboratory 
with the infrastructure needed to protect staff from highly 
infectious samples, such as MDR TB.
Snapshot of Public Health Preparedness
Below are activities conducted by Montana in the area of public health preparedness. They support CDC preparedness 
goals in the areas of detection and reporting, control, and improvement; crosscutting activities help prepare for all stages 
of an event. These data are not comprehensive and do not cover all preparedness activities.
Disease Detection and Investigation
The sooner public health professionals can detect diseases or other health threats and investigate their causes and effects in 
the community, the more quickly they can minimize population exposure. 
Detect &
Report
Could receive and investigate urgent disease reports 24/7/3651 Yes
-  Primary method for receiving urgent disease reports*2 Telephone
Linked state and local health personnel to share information about disease outbreaks 
across state lines (through the CDC Epi-X system)3 Yes
Conducted year-round surveillance for seasonal influenza4 Yes
* Telephone, fax, and electronic reporting are all viable options for urgent disease reporting, as long as the public health department has someone assigned 
to receive the reports 24/7/365.
1 CDC, DSLR; 2005; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2006; 3 CDC, Epi-X; 2007; 4 HHS, OIG; 2007
Montana Responds to a Case of Multi-Drug Resistant Tuberculosis 
Clear isolation and quarantine statutes contribute to a more timely and authoritative response.
Montana
http://www.dphhs.mt.gov/PHSD
According to the Montana Department of 
Public Health and Human Services, the 
cooperative agreement is valuable because 
without funding, the completion of state, 
local, and tribal public health workforce 
assessments, as well as public health worker 
training in risk communication and other 
topics related to preparedness, would not have 
been possible. The cooperative agreement 
also has enabled the state to provide Incident 






obilizing State by State
Public Health Laboratories
Public health laboratories test and confirm agents that can threaten health. For example, advanced DNA “fingerprinting” 
techniques and subsequent reporting to the CDC database (PulseNet) are critical to recognize nationwide outbreaks from 
bacteria that can cause severe illness, such as E. coli O157:H7 and Listeria monocytogenes. 
Detect & Report
Number of Montana laboratories in the Laboratory Response Network1 1
Rapidly identified E. coli O157:H7 using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) 5
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days  100%
Rapidly identified Listeria monocytogenes using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) None
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days N/A
Had a laboratory information management system that could create, send, and receive 
messages3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
-  System complied with CDC information technology standards (PHIN)3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Had a rapid method to send urgent messages to frontline laboratories that perform 
initial screening of clinical specimens3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Crosscutting
Conducted bioterrorism exercise that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Conducted exercise to test chemical readiness that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) N/A
1 CDC, DBPR; 2007; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2007; 3 APHL, Public Health Laboratory Issues in Brief: Bioterrorism Capacity; May 2007; 4 CDC, DSLR; 2006
Response
Planning provides a framework for how a public health department will respond during an emergency. The plans can be 
tested through external reviews, exercises, and real events. After-action reports assess what worked well during an exercise or 
real event and how the department can improve. 
Control
Developed a public health response plan, including pandemic influenza response, crisis 
and emergency risk communication, and Strategic National Stockpile (SNS)1, 2 Yes
Montana SNS plan reviewed by CDC2 Yes
-  Score on CDC technical assistance review (1-100) 80
Number of Montana cities in the Cities Readiness Initiative3 1
Crosscutting
Developed roles and responsibilities for a multi-jurisdictional response (ICS) with:1  (8/05 – 8/06)
-  Hospitals Yes
-  Local/regional emergency management agencies Yes
-  Federal emergency management agencies No
Public health department staff participated in training to support cooperative 
agreement activities4 Yes
Public health laboratories conducted training for first responders5  (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Activated public health emergency operations center as part of a drill, exercise, or real 
event*†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) No
Conducted a drill or exercise for key response partners to test communications when 
power and land lines were unavailable†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) No
Improve Finalized at least one after-action report with an improvement plan following an exercise or real event†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
* Activation means rapidly staffing all eight core ICS functional roles in the public health emergency operations center with one person per position. This 
capability is critical to maintain in case of large-scale or complex incidents, even though not every incident requires full staffing of the ICS.
† States were expected to perform these activities from 9/1/2006 to 8/30/2007. These data represent results from the first half of this period only.






























In early January 2007, a major 
winter storm hit central Nebraska. 
Power lines failed and left parts 
or all of 59 counties without 
power. As part of the response and recovery efforts, the 
Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services 
(DHHS) activated the DHHS situation room and 
coordinated response actions. It also staffed the public 
health component of Nebraska Emergency Management 
Agency’s (NEMA) Emergency Operations Center 
and coordinated resources with local public health 
departments. DHHS provided field kits and supplies to 
NEMA and supported public information efforts from 
the period immediately following the disaster throughout 
initial recovery. Furthermore, DHHS issued news releases 
to the media and provided web content on relevant public 
health and safety topics. 
At the local level, DHHS assisted local water employees 
by providing support and copies of emergency plans 
and information about seasonal influenza to local public 
health departments. In addition, DHHS participated in 
weekly teleconferences with volunteer organizations that 
addressed issues such as food stamps and behavioral health 
needs. As a result, DHHS established additional food 
stamp assistance, arranged for behavioral health assistance 
to state and local employees, and promoted a crisis 
counseling hotline.
Snapshot of Public Health Preparedness
Below are activities conducted by Nebraska in the area of public health preparedness. They support CDC preparedness 
goals in the areas of detection and reporting, control, and improvement; crosscutting activities help prepare for all stages 
of an event. These data are not comprehensive and do not cover all preparedness activities.
Disease Detection and Investigation
The sooner public health professionals can detect diseases or other health threats and investigate their causes and effects in 
the community, the more quickly they can minimize population exposure. 
Detect &
Report
Could receive and investigate urgent disease reports 24/7/3651 Yes
-  Primary method for receiving urgent disease reports*2 Electronic Reporting
Linked state and local health personnel to share information about disease outbreaks 
across state lines (through the CDC Epi-X system)3 Yes
Conducted year-round surveillance for seasonal influenza4 Yes
* Telephone, fax, and electronic reporting are all viable options for urgent disease reporting, as long as the public health department has someone assigned 
to receive the reports 24/7/365.
1 CDC, DSLR; 2005; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2006; 3 CDC, Epi-X; 2007; 4 HHS, OIG; 2007
Nebraska Responds to a Major Winter Storm 
Multi-agency coordination and public health expertise improves emergency response.
Nebraska
http://www.dhhs.ne.gov/emergency_preparedness
According to the Nebraska Department 
of Health and Human Services, the 
cooperative agreement is valuable because 
it has greatly strengthened state, regional, and 
local preparedness and response capacities by 
providing financial support for activities that 





obilizing State by State
Public Health Laboratories
Public health laboratories test and confirm agents that can threaten health. For example, advanced DNA “fingerprinting” 
techniques and subsequent reporting to the CDC database (PulseNet) are critical to recognize nationwide outbreaks from 
bacteria that can cause severe illness, such as E. coli O157:H7 and Listeria monocytogenes. 
Detect & Report
Number of Nebraska laboratories in the Laboratory Response Network1 1
Rapidly identified E. coli O157:H7 using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) 28
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days  54%
Rapidly identified Listeria monocytogenes using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) None
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days N/A
Had a laboratory information management system that could create, send, and receive 
messages3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
-  System complied with CDC information technology standards (PHIN)3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Had a rapid method to send urgent messages to frontline laboratories that perform 
initial screening of clinical specimens3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Crosscutting
Conducted bioterrorism exercise that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Conducted exercise to test chemical readiness that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
1 CDC, DBPR; 2007; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2007; 3 APHL, Public Health Laboratory Issues in Brief: Bioterrorism Capacity; May 2007; 4 CDC, DSLR; 2006
Response
Planning provides a framework for how a public health department will respond during an emergency. The plans can be 
tested through external reviews, exercises, and real events. After-action reports assess what worked well during an exercise or 
real event and how the department can improve. 
Control
Developed a public health response plan, including pandemic influenza response, crisis 
and emergency risk communication, and Strategic National Stockpile (SNS)1, 2 Yes
Nebraska SNS plan reviewed by CDC2 Yes
-  Score on CDC technical assistance review (1-100) 66
Number of Nebraska cities in the Cities Readiness Initiative3 1
Crosscutting
Developed roles and responsibilities for a multi-jurisdictional response (ICS) with:1  (8/05 – 8/06)
-  Hospitals Yes
-  Local/regional emergency management agencies Yes
-  Federal emergency management agencies Yes
Public health department staff participated in training to support cooperative 
agreement activities4 Yes
Public health laboratories conducted training for first responders5  (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Activated public health emergency operations center as part of a drill, exercise, or real 
event*†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
Conducted a drill or exercise for key response partners to test communications when 
power and land lines were unavailable†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) No
Improve Finalized at least one after-action report with an improvement plan following an exercise or real event†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
* Activation means rapidly staffing all eight core ICS functional roles in the public health emergency operations center with one person per position. This 
capability is critical to maintain in case of large-scale or complex incidents, even though not every incident requires full staffing of the ICS.
† States were expected to perform these activities from 9/1/2006 to 8/30/2007. These data represent results from the first half of this period only.






























The Public Health Coordinating 
Center (PHCC) is the operational 
coordinating center for the Nevada 
State Health Division (NSHD) and 
includes the Health Emergency Operations Center. Public 
health emergencies occurring in Nevada may require 
NSHD to assist local public health authorities, other state 
and federal agencies, multiple jurisdictions, and border 
states in coordinating public health actions. To coordinate 
these activities, PHCC is compliant with the National 
Incident Management System and compatible with the 
Incident Command System (ICS) that is used by state and 
local responders in a unified command structure.  
The PHCC can receive, analyze, and display information 
about a specific incident to enable timely decision-making 
and coordinate resources. NSHD has exercised the 
PHCC following the guidelines of the Homeland Security 
Exercise and Evaluation Program, which utilizes a cycle of 
progressively complex exercises. The most recent exercise 
involved a pandemic influenza scenario that quickly 
overwhelmed the resources of local medical facilities. ICS 
was practiced as each functional group (finance, logistics, 
operations and planning) was given the opportunity 
to share information about how their roles and their 
decisions during this type of public health emergency 
affect other areas of command.
Snapshot of Public Health Preparedness
Below are activities conducted by Nevada in the area of public health preparedness. They support CDC preparedness 
goals in the areas of detection and reporting, control, and improvement; crosscutting activities help prepare for all stages 
of an event. These data are not comprehensive and do not cover all preparedness activities.
Disease Detection and Investigation
The sooner public health professionals can detect diseases or other health threats and investigate their causes and effects in 
the community, the more quickly they can minimize population exposure. 
Detect &
Report
Could receive and investigate urgent disease reports 24/7/3651 Yes
-  Primary method for receiving urgent disease reports*2 Electronic Reporting
Linked state and local health personnel to share information about disease outbreaks 
across state lines (through the CDC Epi-X system)3 Yes
Conducted year-round surveillance for seasonal influenza4 Yes
* Telephone, fax, and electronic reporting are all viable options for urgent disease reporting, as long as the public health department has someone assigned 
to receive the reports 24/7/365.
1 CDC, DSLR; 2005; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2006; 3 CDC, Epi-X; 2007; 4 HHS, OIG; 2007
Nevada Exercises its Unified Command Structure 
Operational coordinating centers organize activities during the course of an emergency.
Nevada
http://health.nv.gov
According to the Nevada State Health 
Division, the cooperative agreement is 
valuable because the state has developed 
a critical statewide infrastructure that 
allowed for the purchase of essential systems 
and equipment. For example, redundant 
communication systems have been developed 
through the purchase of a network system in 
Las Vegas. Funding has also covered personnel 
costs at both the state and local levels to hire 






obilizing State by State
Public Health Laboratories
Public health laboratories test and confirm agents that can threaten health. For example, advanced DNA “fingerprinting” 
techniques and subsequent reporting to the CDC database (PulseNet) are critical to recognize nationwide outbreaks from 
bacteria that can cause severe illness, such as E. coli O157:H7 and Listeria monocytogenes. 
Detect & Report
Number of Nevada laboratories in the Laboratory Response Network1 2
Rapidly identified E. coli O157:H7 using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) 7
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days  86%
Rapidly identified Listeria monocytogenes using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) None
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days N/A
Had a laboratory information management system that could create, send, and receive 
messages3 (8/05 – 8/06) No
-  System complied with CDC information technology standards (PHIN)3 (8/05 – 8/06) N/A
Had a rapid method to send urgent messages to frontline laboratories that perform 
initial screening of clinical specimens3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Crosscutting
Conducted bioterrorism exercise that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Conducted exercise to test chemical readiness that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
1 CDC, DBPR; 2007; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2007; 3 APHL, Public Health Laboratory Issues in Brief: Bioterrorism Capacity; May 2007; 4 CDC, DSLR; 2006
Response
Planning provides a framework for how a public health department will respond during an emergency. The plans can be 
tested through external reviews, exercises, and real events. After-action reports assess what worked well during an exercise or 
real event and how the department can improve. 
Control
Developed a public health response plan, including pandemic influenza response, crisis 
and emergency risk communication, and Strategic National Stockpile (SNS)1, 2 Yes
Nevada SNS plan reviewed by CDC2 Yes
-  Score on CDC technical assistance review (1-100) 34
Number of Nevada cities in the Cities Readiness Initiative3 1
Crosscutting
Developed roles and responsibilities for a multi-jurisdictional response (ICS) with:1  (8/05 – 8/06)
-  Hospitals Yes
-  Local/regional emergency management agencies Yes
-  Federal emergency management agencies Yes
Public health department staff participated in training to support cooperative 
agreement activities4 Yes
Public health laboratories conducted training for first responders5  (8/05 – 8/06) No Response
Activated public health emergency operations center as part of a drill, exercise, or real 
event*†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
Conducted a drill or exercise for key response partners to test communications when 
power and land lines were unavailable†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
Improve Finalized at least one after-action report with an improvement plan following an exercise or real event†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
* Activation means rapidly staffing all eight core ICS functional roles in the public health emergency operations center with one person per position. This 
capability is critical to maintain in case of large-scale or complex incidents, even though not every incident requires full staffing of the ICS.
† States were expected to perform these activities from 9/1/2006 to 8/30/2007. These data represent results from the first half of this period only.






























Over the past 4 years, the New 
Hampshire Department of Health 
and Human Services, Division of 
Public Health Services (DPHS) and 
the New Hampshire Department of Safety, Homeland 
Security and Emergency Management (HSEM) have 
worked together on a daily basis in an all-hazards 
approach to prepare New Hampshire for potential public 
health emergencies. Some specific areas of focus include 
disaster behavioral health response, Strategic National 
Stockpile coordination, hospital preparedness, volunteer 
coordination, and pandemic planning, training, and 
exercises.  
A pandemic would require a coordinated regional 
approach to response. Therefore, 19 All-Health Hazards 
Regions (AHHR) were formed to include all 234 New 
Hampshire communities. As of late summer 2007, 14 
AHHRs had completed a pandemic influenza supplement 
to their all-hazards public health plan, with the remaining 
five in progress. All 19 AHHRs have conducted tabletop 
exercises of their all-health hazards plan for public health 
response. Pandemic influenza funds from the cooperative 
agreement were distributed to AHHRs to support 
enhanced regional response plans, including community 
medical surge. These efforts have increased the capacities 
of the public health and health care systems within these 
regions to respond to public health emergencies.
Snapshot of Public Health Preparedness
Below are activities conducted by New Hampshire in the area of public health preparedness. They support CDC 
preparedness goals in the areas of detection and reporting, control, and improvement; crosscutting activities help prepare 
for all stages of an event. These data are not comprehensive and do not cover all preparedness activities.
Disease Detection and Investigation
The sooner public health professionals can detect diseases or other health threats and investigate their causes and effects in 
the community, the more quickly they can minimize population exposure. 
Detect &
Report
Could receive and investigate urgent disease reports 24/7/3651 Yes
-  Primary method for receiving urgent disease reports*2 Telephone
Linked state and local health personnel to share information about disease outbreaks 
across state lines (through the CDC Epi-X system)3 Yes
Conducted year-round surveillance for seasonal influenza4 Yes
* Telephone, fax, and electronic reporting are all viable options for urgent disease reporting, as long as the public health department has someone assigned 
to receive the reports 24/7/365.
1 CDC, DSLR; 2005; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2006; 3 CDC, Epi-X; 2007; 4 HHS, OIG; 2007
Regional All-Hazards Planning and Exercising Implemented
A regional approach to preparedness increases the response capacity of all communities.
New Hampshire
http://www.dhhs.state.nh.us/dhhs/cdcs/ppcc.htm
According to the New Hampshire 
Department of Health and Human Services, 
the cooperative agreement is valuable 
because it led to a functional partnership 
between DPHS and Homeland Security 
and Emergency Management. Through this 
partnership the state has been able to develop 
a strong public health emergency planning 
and response team, develop the appropriate 
plans, and create a regional, community 
partnership preparedness mentality that will 
be key to a successful response and recovery. 
Success stories have included the development 
of a chemistry lab, the All-Health Hazard 






obilizing State by State
Public Health Laboratories
Public health laboratories test and confirm agents that can threaten health. For example, advanced DNA “fingerprinting” 
techniques and subsequent reporting to the CDC database (PulseNet) are critical to recognize nationwide outbreaks from 
bacteria that can cause severe illness, such as E. coli O157:H7 and Listeria monocytogenes. 
Detect & Report
Number of New Hampshire laboratories in the Laboratory Response Network1 1
Rapidly identified E. coli O157:H7 using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) 8
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days  50%
Rapidly identified Listeria monocytogenes using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) 1
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days 0%
Had a laboratory information management system that could create, send, and receive 
messages3 (8/05 – 8/06) No
-  System complied with CDC information technology standards (PHIN)3 (8/05 – 8/06) N/A
Had a rapid method to send urgent messages to frontline laboratories that perform 
initial screening of clinical specimens3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Crosscutting
Conducted bioterrorism exercise that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Conducted exercise to test chemical readiness that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
1 CDC, DBPR; 2007; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2007; 3 APHL, Public Health Laboratory Issues in Brief: Bioterrorism Capacity; May 2007; 4 CDC, DSLR; 2006
Response
Planning provides a framework for how a public health department will respond during an emergency. The plans can be 
tested through external reviews, exercises, and real events. After-action reports assess what worked well during an exercise or 
real event and how the department can improve. 
Control
Developed a public health response plan, including pandemic influenza response, crisis 
and emergency risk communication, and Strategic National Stockpile (SNS)1, 2 Yes
New Hampshire SNS plan reviewed by CDC2 Yes
-  Score on CDC technical assistance review (1-100) 69
Number of New Hampshire cities in the Cities Readiness Initiative3 1
Crosscutting
Developed roles and responsibilities for a multi-jurisdictional response (ICS) with:1  (8/05 – 8/06)
-  Hospitals No
-  Local/regional emergency management agencies No
-  Federal emergency management agencies No
Public health department staff participated in training to support cooperative 
agreement activities4 Yes
Public health laboratories conducted training for first responders5  (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Activated public health emergency operations center as part of a drill, exercise, or real 
event*†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) No
Conducted a drill or exercise for key response partners to test communications when 
power and land lines were unavailable†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) No
Improve Finalized at least one after-action report with an improvement plan following an exercise or real event†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
* Activation means rapidly staffing all eight core ICS functional roles in the public health emergency operations center with one person per position. This 
capability is critical to maintain in case of large-scale or complex incidents, even though not every incident requires full staffing of the ICS.
† States were expected to perform these activities from 9/1/2006 to 8/30/2007. These data represent results from the first half of this period only.






























In June 2006, the Middlesex 
County Public Health Department 
in New Jersey, in cooperation with 
the United States Postal Service 
(USPS) in Edison, New Jersey, conducted a multi-agency 
emergency public health exercise with an alarm activation 
of a postal facility’s Biohazard Detection System (BDS) for 
the presence of anthrax spores within the mail handling 
machinery. Planning began for this exercise in December 
2005 and involved a number of tabletop exercises that 
brought together federal, state, and local agencies. 
The plans emphasized agency goal coordination, role 
assignment among the agencies, and multi-agency task 
assignment along a single timeline. This exercise was the 
first of its type conducted on the east coast and the second 
conducted nationwide.
Several major strengths were identified during the exercise. 
Each of the participating agencies understood its mission 
and executed their respective responsibilities. Incident 
Command System (ICS) roles and responsibilities were 
quickly established and executed. The participating USPS 
employees yielded positive feedback to the exercise. 
Lessons learned from this exercise will be used in future 
planning for BDS exercises nationwide. Areas which 
need improvement were also identified. More planning is 
needed for a long-term response as these efforts will likely 
take place over several days, if not longer. The hospital 
emergency response personnel required additional training 
in the ICS and National Incident Management System.
Snapshot of Public Health Preparedness
Below are activities conducted by New Jersey in the area of public health preparedness. They support CDC preparedness 
goals in the areas of detection and reporting, control, and improvement; crosscutting activities help prepare for all stages 
of an event. These data are not comprehensive and do not cover all preparedness activities.
Disease Detection and Investigation
The sooner public health professionals can detect diseases or other health threats and investigate their causes and effects in 
the community, the more quickly they can minimize population exposure. 
Detect &
Report
Could receive and investigate urgent disease reports 24/7/3651 Yes
-  Primary method for receiving urgent disease reports*2 Telephone
Linked state and local health personnel to share information about disease outbreaks 
across state lines (through the CDC Epi-X system)3 Yes
Conducted year-round surveillance for seasonal influenza4 Yes
* Telephone, fax, and electronic reporting are all viable options for urgent disease reporting, as long as the public health department has someone assigned 
to receive the reports 24/7/365.
1 CDC, DSLR; 2005; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2006; 3 CDC, Epi-X; 2007; 4 HHS, OIG; 2007
New Jersey Conducts the First Anthrax Drill on the East Coast 
Multi-agency exercises strengthen a locality’s ability to respond to a public health emergency.
New Jersey
http://www.state.nj.us/health/er
According to the New Jersey Department of 
Health and Senior Services, the cooperative 
agreement is valuable because it has enabled 
New Jersey to increase the capability of public 
health and environmental laboratories to 
rapidly and accurately screen for and confirm 
biological and chemical agents; establish an 
electronic Communicable Disease Reporting 
& Surveillance System; enhance real-time 
reporting and investigation relationships 
among state and local partners; create a state 
Health Alert Network system for emergency 
notification and alerting; develop a statewide 
capability to receive, distribute, and manage 
the Strategic National Stockpile; develop a 
statewide public health emergency planner 






obilizing State by State
Public Health Laboratories
Public health laboratories test and confirm agents that can threaten health. For example, advanced DNA “fingerprinting” 
techniques and subsequent reporting to the CDC database (PulseNet) are critical to recognize nationwide outbreaks from 
bacteria that can cause severe illness, such as E. coli O157:H7 and Listeria monocytogenes. 
Detect & Report
Number of New Jersey laboratories in the Laboratory Response Network1 1
Rapidly identified E. coli O157:H7 using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) 83
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days  96%
Rapidly identified Listeria monocytogenes using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) None
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days N/A
Had a laboratory information management system that could create, send, and receive 
messages3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
-  System complied with CDC information technology standards (PHIN)3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Had a rapid method to send urgent messages to frontline laboratories that perform 
initial screening of clinical specimens3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Crosscutting
Conducted bioterrorism exercise that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Conducted exercise to test chemical readiness that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) No
1 CDC, DBPR; 2007; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2007; 3 APHL, Public Health Laboratory Issues in Brief: Bioterrorism Capacity; May 2007; 4 CDC, DSLR; 2006
Response
Planning provides a framework for how a public health department will respond during an emergency. The plans can be 
tested through external reviews, exercises, and real events. After-action reports assess what worked well during an exercise or 
real event and how the department can improve. 
Control
Developed a public health response plan, including pandemic influenza response, crisis 
and emergency risk communication, and Strategic National Stockpile (SNS)1, 2 Yes
New Jersey SNS plan reviewed by CDC2 Yes
-  Score on CDC technical assistance review (1-100) 92
Number of New Jersey cities in the Cities Readiness Initiative3 1
Crosscutting
Developed roles and responsibilities for a multi-jurisdictional response (ICS) with:1  (8/05 – 8/06)
-  Hospitals No
-  Local/regional emergency management agencies Yes
-  Federal emergency management agencies No
Public health department staff participated in training to support cooperative 
agreement activities4 Yes
Public health laboratories conducted training for first responders5  (8/05 – 8/06) No
Activated public health emergency operations center as part of a drill, exercise, or real 
event*†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
Conducted a drill or exercise for key response partners to test communications when 
power and land lines were unavailable†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
Improve Finalized at least one after-action report with an improvement plan following an exercise or real event†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
* Activation means rapidly staffing all eight core ICS functional roles in the public health emergency operations center with one person per position. This 
capability is critical to maintain in case of large-scale or complex incidents, even though not every incident requires full staffing of the ICS.
† States were expected to perform these activities from 9/1/2006 to 8/30/2007. These data represent results from the first half of this period only.






























An international participant at a 
2007 science and engineering fair 
in New Mexico was hospitalized 
with symptoms of measles, later 
confirmed by the state public health laboratory. Measles, 
though eradicated in the United States and other 
countries, still exists in many parts of the world. The 
teenage girl was likely infectious while traveling and at the 
science and engineering fair. Since the teenage girl had 
traveled from India to Atlanta and then to Albuquerque, 
the New Mexico Department of Health (NMDOH) 
was concerned about possible exposure at airports, hotels 
where the teenage girl stayed, and at the science and 
engineering fair which had approximately 5,000 attendees 
and 1,200 judges. 
NMDOH immediately began working with CDC to 
identify people who might have been exposed during 
plane flights or at airports. NMDOH also held a 
vaccination clinic for fair attendees and a separate clinic 
for other members of the public who thought they 
might have been exposed. Effective risk communication 
managed the public perception of the measles case, 
educated the public about the disease, and encouraged 
people to get vaccinated. These rapid responses by state 
public health officials and epidemiologists and the use of 
quick communication strategies helped reduce the chance 
that measles would spread in the communities.
Snapshot of Public Health Preparedness
Below are activities conducted by New Mexico in the area of public health preparedness. They support CDC 
preparedness goals in the areas of detection and reporting, control, and improvement; crosscutting activities help prepare 
for all stages of an event. These data are not comprehensive and do not cover all preparedness activities.
Disease Detection and Investigation
The sooner public health professionals can detect diseases or other health threats and investigate their causes and effects in 
the community, the more quickly they can minimize population exposure. 
Detect &
Report
Could receive and investigate urgent disease reports 24/7/3651 Yes
-  Primary method for receiving urgent disease reports*2 Telephone
Linked state and local health personnel to share information about disease outbreaks 
across state lines (through the CDC Epi-X system)3 Yes
Conducted year-round surveillance for seasonal influenza4 Yes
* Telephone, fax, and electronic reporting are all viable options for urgent disease reporting, as long as the public health department has someone assigned 
to receive the reports 24/7/365.
1 CDC, DSLR; 2005; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2006; 3 CDC, Epi-X; 2007; 4 HHS, OIG; 2007
New Mexico Responds to an Imported Measles Case 
Epidemiological investigations and public information campaigns are key to disease outbreak response.
New Mexico
http://www.health.state.nm.us/ohem
According to the New Mexico Department 
of Public Health, the cooperative agreement 
is valuable because it has contributed to 
overall improvements in New Mexico’s public 
health system by allowing the state to increase 
its planning and exercise capabilities as well as 





obilizing State by State
Public Health Laboratories
Public health laboratories test and confirm agents that can threaten health. For example, advanced DNA “fingerprinting” 
techniques and subsequent reporting to the CDC database (PulseNet) are critical to recognize nationwide outbreaks from 
bacteria that can cause severe illness, such as E. coli O157:H7 and Listeria monocytogenes. 
Detect & Report
Number of New Mexico laboratories in the Laboratory Response Network1 1
Rapidly identified E. coli O157:H7 using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) 9
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days  0%
Rapidly identified Listeria monocytogenes using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) None
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days N/A
Had a laboratory information management system that could create, send, and receive 
messages3 (8/05 – 8/06) No
-  System complied with CDC information technology standards (PHIN)3 (8/05 – 8/06) N/A
Had a rapid method to send urgent messages to frontline laboratories that perform 
initial screening of clinical specimens3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Crosscutting
Conducted bioterrorism exercise that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) No
Conducted exercise to test chemical readiness that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
1 CDC, DBPR; 2007; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2007; 3 APHL, Public Health Laboratory Issues in Brief: Bioterrorism Capacity; May 2007; 4 CDC, DSLR; 2006
Response
Planning provides a framework for how a public health department will respond during an emergency. The plans can be 
tested through external reviews, exercises, and real events. After-action reports assess what worked well during an exercise or 
real event and how the department can improve. 
Control
Developed a public health response plan, including pandemic influenza response, crisis 
and emergency risk communication, and Strategic National Stockpile (SNS)1, 2 Yes
New Mexico SNS plan reviewed by CDC2 Yes
-  Score on CDC technical assistance review (1-100) 67
Number of New Mexico cities in the Cities Readiness Initiative3 1
Crosscutting
Developed roles and responsibilities for a multi-jurisdictional response (ICS) with:1  (8/05 – 8/06)
-  Hospitals Yes
-  Local/regional emergency management agencies Yes
-  Federal emergency management agencies Yes
Public health department staff participated in training to support cooperative 
agreement activities4 Yes
Public health laboratories conducted training for first responders5  (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Activated public health emergency operations center as part of a drill, exercise, or real 
event*†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) No
Conducted a drill or exercise for key response partners to test communications when 
power and land lines were unavailable†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) No
Improve Finalized at least one after-action report with an improvement plan following an exercise or real event†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
* Activation means rapidly staffing all eight core ICS functional roles in the public health emergency operations center with one person per position. This 
capability is critical to maintain in case of large-scale or complex incidents, even though not every incident requires full staffing of the ICS.
† States were expected to perform these activities from 9/1/2006 to 8/30/2007. These data represent results from the first half of this period only.






























In February 2006, the New York 
City Department of Health and 
Mental Hygiene (NYC DOHMH) 
investigated a case of naturally 
occurring inhalation anthrax, the first case in the United 
States in 30 years. A New York City resident, a dancer and 
drummer, collapsed after a performance in Pennsylvania, 
and Pennsylvania authorities contacted New York City 
officials. Through telephone interviews and laboratory 
testing, NYC DOHMH epidemiologists confirmed that 
the inhalation anthrax case was contracted while the man 
was working with untreated animal hides used to make 
drums.
NYC DOHMH immediately contacted all potentially 
exposed individuals to determine if others were at risk for 
inhalation anthrax, arranged for preventive medication as 
necessary, conducted laboratory tests on collected samples, 
and collaborated with local, state, and federal agencies to 
design initial sampling plans. NYC DOHMH proactively 
alerted hospitals through its Health Alert Network and 
automated mass notification software. In addition, NYC 
DOHMH hosted citywide hospital teleconferences 
to address questions and concerns from providers. In 
collaboration with the Environmental Protection Agency 
and other agencies, NYC DOHMH coordinated efforts 
to examine and clear residences, workplaces, and vehicles 
associated with the anthrax case for re-occupancy.
NYC DOHMH also helped to effectively communicate 
public messages to schools and residents through 
community meetings, fact sheets, and media updates. 
Crisis counseling was available at all community meetings 
and provided to those who received preventive treatment. 
During this response, NYC DOHMH demonstrated its 
ability to coordinate response across regional and agency 
lines.
Snapshot of Public Health Preparedness
Below are activities conducted by New York City in the area of public health preparedness. They support CDC 
preparedness goals in the areas of detection and reporting, control, and improvement; crosscutting activities help prepare 
for all stages of an event. These data are not comprehensive and do not cover all preparedness activities.
Disease Detection and Investigation
The sooner public health professionals can detect diseases or other health threats and investigate their causes and effects in 
the community, the more quickly they can minimize population exposure. 
Detect &
Report
Could receive and investigate urgent disease reports 24/7/3651 Yes
-  Primary method for receiving urgent disease reports*2 Telephone
Linked state and local health personnel to share information about disease outbreaks 
across state lines (through the CDC Epi-X system)3 Yes
Conducted year-round surveillance for seasonal influenza†4 —
* Telephone, fax, and electronic reporting are all viable options for urgent disease reporting, as long as the public health department has someone assigned 
to receive the reports 24/7/365.
† Localities were not asked to respond to this question.
New York City Responds to a Case of Inhalation Anthrax
Coordinated recovery efforts help communities return to normal after an emergency.
New York City
http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/html/bt/bt.shtml
According to the New York City 
Department of Health and Mental 
Hygiene, the cooperative agreement is 
valuable because it has provided the city 
with resources to fund staff, equipment, 
and supplies (or contracts with vendors) 
to perform its preparedness activities. This 
funding stream has been critical in allowing 






obilizing State by State
Public Health Laboratories
Public health laboratories test and confirm agents that can threaten health. For example, advanced DNA “fingerprinting” 
techniques and subsequent reporting to the CDC database (PulseNet) are critical to recognize nationwide outbreaks from 
bacteria that can cause severe illness, such as E. coli O157:H7 and Listeria monocytogenes. 
Detect & Report
Number of New York City laboratories in the Laboratory Response Network1 1
Rapidly identified E. coli O157:H7 using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):*2
Rapidly identified Listeria monocytogenes using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):*2
Had a laboratory information management system that could create, send, and receive 
messages*3 (8/05 – 8/06) —
- System complied with CDC information technology standards (PHIN)*3 (8/05 – 8/06) —
Had a rapid method to send urgent messages to frontline laboratories that perform 
initial screening of clinical specimens*3 (8/05 – 8/06) —
Crosscutting
Conducted bioterrorism exercise that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Conducted exercise to test chemical readiness that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) N/A
* Localities were not asked to respond to this question.
1 CDC, DBPR; 2007; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2007; 3 APHL, Public Health Laboratory Issues in Brief: Bioterrorism Capacity; May 2007; 4 CDC, DSLR; 2006
Response
Planning provides a framework for how a public health department will respond during an emergency. The plans can be 
tested through external reviews, exercises, and real events. After-action reports assess what worked well during an exercise or 
real event and how the department can improve. 
Control
Developed a public health response plan, including pandemic influenza response, crisis 
and emergency risk communication, and Strategic National Stockpile (SNS)1, 2 Yes
New York City SNS plan reviewed by CDC2 Yes
-  Score on CDC technical assistance review (1-100) 97
Participated in the Cities Readiness Initiative2 Yes
Crosscutting
Developed roles and responsibilities for a multi-jurisdictional response (ICS) with:1  (8/05 – 8/06)
-  Hospitals Yes
-  Local/regional emergency management agencies Yes
-  Federal emergency management agencies Yes
Public health department staff participated in training to support cooperative 
agreement activities3 Yes
Public health laboratories conducted training for first responders*4  (8/05 – 8/06) —
Activated public health emergency operations center as part of a drill, exercise, or real 
event†‡5 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
Conducted a drill or exercise for key response partners to test communications when 
power and land lines were unavailable‡5 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) No
Improve Finalized at least one after-action report with an improvement plan following an exercise or real event‡5 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
* Localities were not asked to respond to this question.
† Activation means rapidly staffing all eight core ICS functional roles in the public health emergency operations center with one person per position. This 
capability is critical to maintain in case of large-scale or complex incidents, even though not every incident requires full staffing of the ICS.
‡ Localities were expected to perform these activities from 9/1/2006 to 8/30/2007. These data represent results from the first half of this period only.






























When dozens of people in 
two neighboring counties 
began reporting symptoms of 
gastrointestinal illness in August 
2005, the New York State Department of Health (DOH) 
and local public health departments quickly mounted an 
outbreak investigation. Case findings soon suggested the 
source of illness to be an upstate New York water spray 
park. Tests by the state public health laboratory quickly 
identified the cause as Cryptosporidium, a microscopic 
parasite which may cause profuse diarrhea, anorexia, and 
vomiting. The spray park voluntarily closed after tests 
confirmed the presence of the microorganism in the park’s 
recirculating water system.
Statewide notification to health care providers and a 
coordinated public information campaign resulted in 
over 2,300 reported cases from 36 counties. The timely 
and comprehensive response prevented further spread of 
the infection into the community. The investigation also 
resulted in many public health improvements, including 
“healthy swimming” public awareness campaigns, training 
of spray park operators to reduce the risk of future 
outbreaks, and new regulations requiring spray parks to 
use proper sterilization and health promotion measures. 
This case illustrates how good public health emergency 
planning can enhance disease surveillance, laboratory 
testing, risk communication, and environmental 
mitigation. Thorough evaluation and follow-up to identify 
an outbreak improves response and reduces the effect that 
a communicable disease can have on a community.
Snapshot of Public Health Preparedness
Below are activities conducted by New York in the area of public health preparedness. They support CDC preparedness 
goals in the areas of detection and reporting, control, and improvement; crosscutting activities help prepare for all stages 
of an event. These data are not comprehensive and do not cover all preparedness activities.
Disease Detection and Investigation
The sooner public health professionals can detect diseases or other health threats and investigate their causes and effects in 
the community, the more quickly they can minimize population exposure. 
Detect &
Report
Could receive and investigate urgent disease reports 24/7/3651 Yes
-  Primary method for receiving urgent disease reports*2 Telephone
Linked state and local health personnel to share information about disease outbreaks 
across state lines (through the CDC Epi-X system)3 Yes
Conducted year-round surveillance for seasonal influenza4 Yes
* Telephone, fax, and electronic reporting are all viable options for urgent disease reporting, as long as the public health department has someone assigned 
to receive the reports 24/7/365.
1 CDC, DSLR; 2005; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2006; 3 CDC, Epi-X; 2007; 4 HHS, OIG; 2007
New York Responds to an Outbreak of Gastrointestinal Illness 
Clear and coordinated communication is critical for timely and comprehensive response.
New York
http://www.health.state.ny.us/environmental/emergency
According to the New York State 
Department of Health, the cooperative 
agreement is valuable because it has 
contributed greatly in advancing the state’s 
readiness to respond to health emergencies. 
The state has been able to build a system and 
structure to develop, maintain, and manage 
capacities that support health emergency 
preparedness and response activities. 
Resources have been placed into existing 
systems at state and local public health 





obilizing State by State
Public Health Laboratories
Public health laboratories test and confirm agents that can threaten health. For example, advanced DNA “fingerprinting” 
techniques and subsequent reporting to the CDC database (PulseNet) are critical to recognize nationwide outbreaks from 
bacteria that can cause severe illness, such as E. coli O157:H7 and Listeria monocytogenes. 
Detect & Report
Number of New York laboratories in the Laboratory Response Network1 5
Rapidly identified E. coli O157:H7 using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) 71
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days  83%
Rapidly identified Listeria monocytogenes using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) 40
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days 85%
Had a laboratory information management system that could create, send, and receive 
messages3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
-  System complied with CDC information technology standards (PHIN)3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Had a rapid method to send urgent messages to frontline laboratories that perform 
initial screening of clinical specimens3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Crosscutting
Conducted bioterrorism exercise that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Conducted exercise to test chemical readiness that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
1 CDC, DBPR; 2007; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2007; 3 APHL, Public Health Laboratory Issues in Brief: Bioterrorism Capacity; May 2007; 4 CDC, DSLR; 2006
Response
Planning provides a framework for how a public health department will respond during an emergency. The plans can be 
tested through external reviews, exercises, and real events. After-action reports assess what worked well during an exercise or 
real event and how the department can improve. 
Control
Developed a public health response plan, including pandemic influenza response, crisis 
and emergency risk communication, and Strategic National Stockpile (SNS)1, 2 Yes
New York SNS plan reviewed by CDC2 Yes
-  Score on CDC technical assistance review (1-100) 95
Number of New York cities in the Cities Readiness Initiative3 3
Crosscutting
Developed roles and responsibilities for a multi-jurisdictional response (ICS) with:1  (8/05 – 8/06)
-  Hospitals Yes
-  Local/regional emergency management agencies Yes
-  Federal emergency management agencies Yes
Public health department staff participated in training to support cooperative 
agreement activities4 Yes
Public health laboratories conducted training for first responders5  (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Activated public health emergency operations center as part of a drill, exercise, or real 
event*†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
Conducted a drill or exercise for key response partners to test communications when 
power and land lines were unavailable†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) No
Improve Finalized at least one after-action report with an improvement plan following an exercise or real event†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
* Activation means rapidly staffing all eight core ICS functional roles in the public health emergency operations center with one person per position. This 
capability is critical to maintain in case of large-scale or complex incidents, even though not every incident requires full staffing of the ICS.
† States were expected to perform these activities from 9/1/2006 to 8/30/2007. These data represent results from the first half of this period only.






























The most significant innovation to 
enhance North Carolina’s response 
ability to public health crises was the 
creation of the seven Public Health 
Regional Surveillance Teams (PHRSTs). These regional 
offices cover all 100 counties across the state to give the 
North Carolina Office of Public Health Preparedness and 
Response the capability to work closely with local public 
health departments and first responders in all aspects of 
preparedness planning, training, and exercise. In addition, 
these seven regional teams act as highly trained and 
organized epidemiology strike teams. 
Each PHRST team includes an epidemiologist, an 
industrial hygienist, a nurse consultant, a pharmacist, a 
veterinarian, and an administrative support technician. 
These teams are essential in providing training to state 
and local health care providers, responding to hurricanes, 
supporting disease investigations, and assisting local 
health directors in public health emergencies. Together 
these teams provide a layered, scaleable response for local, 
regional, state, and national resources to protect and serve 
the residents of North Carolina.
Snapshot of Public Health Preparedness
Below are activities conducted by North Carolina in the area of public health preparedness. They support CDC 
preparedness goals in the areas of detection and reporting, control, and improvement; crosscutting activities help prepare 
for all stages of an event. These data are not comprehensive and do not cover all preparedness activities.
Disease Detection and Investigation
The sooner public health professionals can detect diseases or other health threats and investigate their causes and effects in 
the community, the more quickly they can minimize population exposure. 
Detect &
Report
Could receive and investigate urgent disease reports 24/7/3651 Yes
-  Primary method for receiving urgent disease reports*2 Telephone
Linked state and local health personnel to share information about disease outbreaks 
across state lines (through the CDC Epi-X system)3 Yes
Conducted year-round surveillance for seasonal influenza4 Yes
* Telephone, fax, and electronic reporting are all viable options for urgent disease reporting, as long as the public health department has someone assigned 
to receive the reports 24/7/365.
1 CDC, DSLR; 2005; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2006; 3 CDC, Epi-X; 2007; 4 HHS, OIG; 2007
North Carolina Develops Regional Surveillance Teams 
Highly trained public health responders support preparedness functions across the state.
North Carolina
http://www.epi.state.nc.us/epi/phpr
According to the North Carolina Office 
of Public Health Preparedness and 
Response, the cooperative agreement is 
valuable because it has supported local and 
regional public health laboratory capacities, 
epidemiological capacity, and education and 
training of public health responders locally, 
regionally, and at the state level. Funding 
from the cooperative agreement also has 
allowed North Carolina to form a dedicated 






obilizing State by State
Public Health Laboratories
Public health laboratories test and confirm agents that can threaten health. For example, advanced DNA “fingerprinting” 
techniques and subsequent reporting to the CDC database (PulseNet) are critical to recognize nationwide outbreaks from 
bacteria that can cause severe illness, such as E. coli O157:H7 and Listeria monocytogenes. 
Detect & Report
Number of North Carolina laboratories in the Laboratory Response Network1 5
Rapidly identified E. coli O157:H7 using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) 24
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days  96%
Rapidly identified Listeria monocytogenes using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) 2
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days 50%
Had a laboratory information management system that could create, send, and receive 
messages3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
-  System complied with CDC information technology standards (PHIN)3 (8/05 – 8/06) No
Had a rapid method to send urgent messages to frontline laboratories that perform 
initial screening of clinical specimens3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Crosscutting
Conducted bioterrorism exercise that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) No
Conducted exercise to test chemical readiness that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
1 CDC, DBPR; 2007; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2007; 3 APHL, Public Health Laboratory Issues in Brief: Bioterrorism Capacity; May 2007; 4 CDC, DSLR; 2006
Response
Planning provides a framework for how a public health department will respond during an emergency. The plans can be 
tested through external reviews, exercises, and real events. After-action reports assess what worked well during an exercise or 
real event and how the department can improve. 
Control
Developed a public health response plan, including pandemic influenza response, crisis 
and emergency risk communication, and Strategic National Stockpile (SNS)1, 2 Yes
North Carolina SNS plan reviewed by CDC2 In Progress
-  Score on CDC technical assistance review (1-100) N/A
Number of North Carolina cities in the Cities Readiness Initiative3 1
Crosscutting
Developed roles and responsibilities for a multi-jurisdictional response (ICS) with:1  (8/05 – 8/06)
-  Hospitals Yes
-  Local/regional emergency management agencies Yes
-  Federal emergency management agencies Yes
Public health department staff participated in training to support cooperative 
agreement activities4 Yes
Public health laboratories conducted training for first responders5  (8/05 – 8/06) No
Activated public health emergency operations center as part of a drill, exercise, or real 
event*†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
Conducted a drill or exercise for key response partners to test communications when 
power and land lines were unavailable†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
Improve Finalized at least one after-action report with an improvement plan following an exercise or real event†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
* Activation means rapidly staffing all eight core ICS functional roles in the public health emergency operations center with one person per position. This 
capability is critical to maintain in case of large-scale or complex incidents, even though not every incident requires full staffing of the ICS.
† States were expected to perform these activities from 9/1/2006 to 8/30/2007. These data represent results from the first half of this period only.






























In August 2007, the town of 
Northwood, North Dakota was hit 
by a tornado with sustained winds 
ranging from 165 to 200 miles per 
hour. Nearly every building was damaged in the town 
of about 1,000 people. The tornado’s path was five miles 
long and nearly one mile in width. One person was killed 
and eighteen others were injured.
In the early morning after the tornado struck, the North 
Dakota Department of Health (NDDoH) emergency 
operations center (EOC) was activated and in contact 
with both the state EOC and Grand Forks Public Health 
Department. Throughout the week, the NDDoH 
responded to requests for assistance from the city of 
Northwood, Grand Forks Public Health Departments, 
and the North Dakota Division of Emergency Services. 
One system that proved useful during the response was 
the WebEOC, which linked local and state EOCs and 
allowed others to keep abreast of the latest activities.  
The utilization of the Incident Command System (ICS) 
to organize public health and medical response under 
state emergency operations procedures allowed for a 
coordinated and effective response. Many divisions and 
NDDoH employees contributed to the response efforts. 
The ICS enabled multiple agencies and individuals to 
participate in the coordinated efforts at state and local 
levels.
Snapshot of Public Health Preparedness
Below are activities conducted by North Dakota in the area of public health preparedness. They support CDC 
preparedness goals in the areas of detection and reporting, control, and improvement; crosscutting activities help prepare 
for all stages of an event. These data are not comprehensive and do not cover all preparedness activities.
Disease Detection and Investigation
The sooner public health professionals can detect diseases or other health threats and investigate their causes and effects in 
the community, the more quickly they can minimize population exposure. 
Detect &
Report
Could receive and investigate urgent disease reports 24/7/3651 Yes
-  Primary method for receiving urgent disease reports*2 Electronic Reporting
Linked state and local health personnel to share information about disease outbreaks 
across state lines (through the CDC Epi-X system)3 Yes
Conducted year-round surveillance for seasonal influenza4 Yes
* Telephone, fax, and electronic reporting are all viable options for urgent disease reporting, as long as the public health department has someone assigned 
to receive the reports 24/7/365.
1 CDC, DSLR; 2005; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2006; 3 CDC, Epi-X; 2007; 4 HHS, OIG; 2007
North Dakota Responds to Northwood Tornado 
Incident Command System ensures a well-coordinated and effective response.
North Dakota
http://www.ndhealth.gov/epr
According to the North Dakota Department 
of Health, the cooperative agreement 
is valuable because it has enabled North 
Dakota to build a substantial public health 
and preparedness response capacity that 
would not have existed through any other 
means. A public health response system 
has been built at state and local levels and 





obilizing State by State
Public Health Laboratories
Public health laboratories test and confirm agents that can threaten health. For example, advanced DNA “fingerprinting” 
techniques and subsequent reporting to the CDC database (PulseNet) are critical to recognize nationwide outbreaks from 
bacteria that can cause severe illness, such as E. coli O157:H7 and Listeria monocytogenes. 
Detect & Report
Number of North Dakota laboratories in the Laboratory Response Network1 1
Rapidly identified E. coli O157:H7 using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) 7
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days  100%
Rapidly identified Listeria monocytogenes using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) None
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days N/A
Had a laboratory information management system that could create, send, and receive 
messages3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
-  System complied with CDC information technology standards (PHIN)3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Had a rapid method to send urgent messages to frontline laboratories that perform 
initial screening of clinical specimens3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Crosscutting
Conducted bioterrorism exercise that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Conducted exercise to test chemical readiness that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
1 CDC, DBPR; 2007; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2007; 3 APHL, Public Health Laboratory Issues in Brief: Bioterrorism Capacity; May 2007; 4 CDC, DSLR; 2006
Response
Planning provides a framework for how a public health department will respond during an emergency. The plans can be 
tested through external reviews, exercises, and real events. After-action reports assess what worked well during an exercise or 
real event and how the department can improve. 
Control
Developed a public health response plan, including pandemic influenza response, crisis 
and emergency risk communication, and Strategic National Stockpile (SNS)1, 2 Yes
North Dakota SNS plan reviewed by CDC2 Yes
-  Score on CDC technical assistance review (1-100) 77
Number of North Dakota cities in the Cities Readiness Initiative3 1
Crosscutting
Developed roles and responsibilities for a multi-jurisdictional response (ICS) with:1  (8/05 – 8/06)
-  Hospitals Yes
-  Local/regional emergency management agencies Yes
-  Federal emergency management agencies Yes
Public health department staff participated in training to support cooperative 
agreement activities4 Yes
Public health laboratories conducted training for first responders5  (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Activated public health emergency operations center as part of a drill, exercise, or real 
event*†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
Conducted a drill or exercise for key response partners to test communications when 
power and land lines were unavailable†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
Improve Finalized at least one after-action report with an improvement plan following an exercise or real event†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
* Activation means rapidly staffing all eight core ICS functional roles in the public health emergency operations center with one person per position. This 
capability is critical to maintain in case of large-scale or complex incidents, even though not every incident requires full staffing of the ICS.
† States were expected to perform these activities from 9/1/2006 to 8/30/2007. These data represent results from the first half of this period only.






























Since 2001, the Ohio Department 
of Health (ODH) has conducted, 
observed, or participated in more 
than three dozen exercises testing 
plans for pandemic influenza, bioterrorism response, 
nuclear power plant events, joint information center 
operation, and multi-agency emergency response. 
Leveraging existing approaches across Ohio, ODH 
operates a regional strategy for seven areas in the state. 
This method ensures everyone from a small township 
to a major metropolitan area have the baseline ability to 
respond to a public health emergency. The strategy also 
promotes cost-effective surge and systems reliability for 
communities within each region.
Using federal guidance, ODH and its partners are 
developing recommendations for medical standards of 
care during an emergency. The goal of these protocols is 
to save the greatest number of lives when resources are 
scarce. While planning is directly connected to preparing 
for an influenza pandemic, the protocols are applicable 
to other significant public health emergencies. Another 
important component being utilized by ODH is the 
Incident Command System (ICS). ODH has used ICS for 
public health emergencies since 1997. ICS operates with a 
strategy to ensure adequate and redundant staffing during 
a prolonged event. Several thousand key staff from state 
and local public health agencies have been trained and 
their agencies attained National Incident Management 
System compliance. ODH continues to provide or fund 
training in ICS.
Snapshot of Public Health Preparedness
Below are activities conducted by Ohio in the area of public health preparedness. They support CDC preparedness goals 
in the areas of detection and reporting, control, and improvement; crosscutting activities help prepare for all stages of an 
event. These data are not comprehensive and do not cover all preparedness activities.
Disease Detection and Investigation
The sooner public health professionals can detect diseases or other health threats and investigate their causes and effects in 
the community, the more quickly they can minimize population exposure. 
Detect &
Report
Could receive and investigate urgent disease reports 24/7/3651 Yes
-  Primary method for receiving urgent disease reports*2 Telephone
Linked state and local health personnel to share information about disease outbreaks 
across state lines (through the CDC Epi-X system)3 Yes
Conducted year-round surveillance for seasonal influenza4 Yes
* Telephone, fax, and electronic reporting are all viable options for urgent disease reporting, as long as the public health department has someone assigned 
to receive the reports 24/7/365.
1 CDC, DSLR; 2005; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2006; 3 CDC, Epi-X; 2007; 4 HHS, OIG; 2007
Ohio Develops Robust Plans for Public Health Emergency Preparedness 
Strong all-hazards plans enable greater response capabilities.
Ohio
http://www.prepareohio.com
According to the Ohio Department of 
Health, the cooperative agreement is 
valuable because it has allowed Ohio to build 
a critical planning and response personnel 
infrastructure for most preparedness 
initiatives. A robust and redundant 
communication system which is interoperable 
with other state response partners, hospitals, 
and local health departments has been 






obilizing State by State
Public Health Laboratories
Public health laboratories test and confirm agents that can threaten health. For example, advanced DNA “fingerprinting” 
techniques and subsequent reporting to the CDC database (PulseNet) are critical to recognize nationwide outbreaks from 
bacteria that can cause severe illness, such as E. coli O157:H7 and Listeria monocytogenes. 
Detect & Report
Number of Ohio laboratories in the Laboratory Response Network1 2
Rapidly identified E. coli O157:H7 using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) 99
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days  95%
Rapidly identified Listeria monocytogenes using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) 12
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days 92%
Had a laboratory information management system that could create, send, and receive 
messages3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
-  System complied with CDC information technology standards (PHIN)3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Had a rapid method to send urgent messages to frontline laboratories that perform 
initial screening of clinical specimens3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Crosscutting
Conducted bioterrorism exercise that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Conducted exercise to test chemical readiness that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) N/A
1 CDC, DBPR; 2007; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2007; 3 APHL, Public Health Laboratory Issues in Brief: Bioterrorism Capacity; May 2007; 4 CDC, DSLR; 2006
Response
Planning provides a framework for how a public health department will respond during an emergency. The plans can be 
tested through external reviews, exercises, and real events. After-action reports assess what worked well during an exercise or 
real event and how the department can improve. 
Control
Developed a public health response plan, including pandemic influenza response, crisis 
and emergency risk communication, and Strategic National Stockpile (SNS)1, 2 Yes
Ohio SNS plan reviewed by CDC2 Yes
-  Score on CDC technical assistance review (1-100) 94
Number of Ohio cities in the Cities Readiness Initiative3 3
Crosscutting
Developed roles and responsibilities for a multi-jurisdictional response (ICS) with:1  (8/05 – 8/06)
-  Hospitals No
-  Local/regional emergency management agencies Yes
-  Federal emergency management agencies No
Public health department staff participated in training to support cooperative 
agreement activities4 Yes
Public health laboratories conducted training for first responders5  (8/05 – 8/06) No
Activated public health emergency operations center as part of a drill, exercise, or real 
event*†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) No
Conducted a drill or exercise for key response partners to test communications when 
power and land lines were unavailable†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
Improve Finalized at least one after-action report with an improvement plan following an exercise or real event†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
* Activation means rapidly staffing all eight core ICS functional roles in the public health emergency operations center with one person per position. This 
capability is critical to maintain in case of large-scale or complex incidents, even though not every incident requires full staffing of the ICS.
† States were expected to perform these activities from 9/1/2006 to 8/30/2007. These data represent results from the first half of this period only.






























The ice storms that swept across 
Oklahoma in early 2007 provided a 
real-world test of public health and 
medical emergency preparedness. 
Leadership of the Oklahoma State Department of Health 
(OSDH) fully activated the OSDH Situation Room 
and established an Incident Command System (ICS) to 
coordinate the agency’s statewide response activities. 
The Oklahoma Health Alert Network and EMSystem, 
a real-time communications and resource management 
tool, provided emergency communications to hospital 
and medical system partners. Emergency radio networks 
also were used for messaging, particularly to those areas 
where no electricity was available. In addition, during 
the ice storms, the Commissioner of Health mandated 
carbon monoxide exposure/poisoning to be a reportable 
condition and urged rapid distribution of flyers and 
written warnings about the dangers of carbon monoxide 
poisoning in affected communities. 
The OSDH chose to build upon the state’s existing, well-
established all-hazards emergency management backbone 
rather than develop new, stand-alone programs for 
preparedness and response. Public health emergencies are 
now routinely handled through the establishment of ICS. 
OSDH is recognized by other lead response organizations, 
such as the Oklahoma Department of Emergency 
Management and the Oklahoma Office of Homeland 
Security, as a key partner in statewide initiatives that 
ensure coordinated and effective planning for all types of 
emergency responses.
Snapshot of Public Health Preparedness
Below are activities conducted by Oklahoma in the area of public health preparedness. They support CDC preparedness 
goals in the areas of detection and reporting, control, and improvement; crosscutting activities help prepare for all stages 
of an event. These data are not comprehensive and do not cover all preparedness activities.
Disease Detection and Investigation
The sooner public health professionals can detect diseases or other health threats and investigate their causes and effects in 
the community, the more quickly they can minimize population exposure. 
Detect &
Report
Could receive and investigate urgent disease reports 24/7/3651 Yes
-  Primary method for receiving urgent disease reports*2 Electronic Reporting
Linked state and local health personnel to share information about disease outbreaks 
across state lines (through the CDC Epi-X system)3 Yes
Conducted year-round surveillance for seasonal influenza4 Yes
* Telephone, fax, and electronic reporting are all viable options for urgent disease reporting, as long as the public health department has someone assigned 
to receive the reports 24/7/365.
1 CDC, DSLR; 2005; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2006; 3 CDC, Epi-X; 2007; 4 HHS, OIG; 2007
Oklahoma Responds to Statewide Ice Storms 
All-hazards emergency response planning promotes effective use of resources and infrastructure.
Oklahoma
http://www.health.ok.gov/bt
According to the Oklahoma State 
Department of Health, the cooperative 
agreement is valuable because it has been 
fundamental to developing and sustaining 
the enhanced infrastructure that did not 
previously exist. Funding has allowed for 
additional personnel who have dedicated their 
efforts to the program and have successfully 
completed training pursuant to cooperative 
agreement guidelines. The funding has 






obilizing State by State
Public Health Laboratories
Public health laboratories test and confirm agents that can threaten health. For example, advanced DNA “fingerprinting” 
techniques and subsequent reporting to the CDC database (PulseNet) are critical to recognize nationwide outbreaks from 
bacteria that can cause severe illness, such as E. coli O157:H7 and Listeria monocytogenes. 
Detect & Report
Number of Oklahoma laboratories in the Laboratory Response Network1 1
Rapidly identified E. coli O157:H7 using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) 9
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days  100%
Rapidly identified Listeria monocytogenes using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) 1
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days 100%
Had a laboratory information management system that could create, send, and receive 
messages3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
-  System complied with CDC information technology standards (PHIN)3 (8/05 – 8/06) No
Had a rapid method to send urgent messages to frontline laboratories that perform 
initial screening of clinical specimens3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Crosscutting
Conducted bioterrorism exercise that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Conducted exercise to test chemical readiness that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) N/A
1 CDC, DBPR; 2007; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2007; 3 APHL, Public Health Laboratory Issues in Brief: Bioterrorism Capacity; May 2007; 4 CDC, DSLR; 2006
Response
Planning provides a framework for how a public health department will respond during an emergency. The plans can be 
tested through external reviews, exercises, and real events. After-action reports assess what worked well during an exercise or 
real event and how the department can improve. 
Control
Developed a public health response plan, including pandemic influenza response, crisis 
and emergency risk communication, and Strategic National Stockpile (SNS)1, 2 Yes
Oklahoma SNS plan reviewed by CDC2 Yes
-  Score on CDC technical assistance review (1-100) 91
Number of Oklahoma cities in the Cities Readiness Initiative3 1
Crosscutting
Developed roles and responsibilities for a multi-jurisdictional response (ICS) with:1  (8/05 – 8/06)
-  Hospitals Yes
-  Local/regional emergency management agencies Yes
-  Federal emergency management agencies Yes
Public health department staff participated in training to support cooperative 
agreement activities4 Yes
Public health laboratories conducted training for first responders5  (8/05 – 8/06) No Response
Activated public health emergency operations center as part of a drill, exercise, or real 
event*†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
Conducted a drill or exercise for key response partners to test communications when 
power and land lines were unavailable†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
Improve Finalized at least one after-action report with an improvement plan following an exercise or real event†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
* Activation means rapidly staffing all eight core ICS functional roles in the public health emergency operations center with one person per position. This 
capability is critical to maintain in case of large-scale or complex incidents, even though not every incident requires full staffing of the ICS.
† States were expected to perform these activities from 9/1/2006 to 8/30/2007. These data represent results from the first half of this period only.






























In 2006, the Oregon Public Health 
Division (OPHD) completed 
the PandORa (Pandemic Oregon 
Activity) full-scale exercise. The 
exercise involved the scenario of a widespread outbreak 
of a new influenza virus that resulted in hundreds of 
victims falling ill in communities throughout the state. 
Participating organizations included OPHD, more than 
30 local public health departments, 50 hospitals, two 
tribal health departments, the Oregon Board of Pharmacy, 
Oregon National Guard, and state agencies of emergency 
management, administrative services, education, 
transportation, and the fire marshal. 
Key successes and best practices identified during 
the exercise included collaboration between the Joint 
Information Center and the Operations Section, 
teamwork among staff experts in epidemiology and 
immunizations, strong knowledge and practical 
application of the Incident Command System, and 
frequent monitoring and correction of inaccurate media 
reports. OPHD also identified key opportunities for 
improvement that are essential to successfully managing 
the pandemic influenza threat and apply directly to other 
potential disasters. These improvements included the 
need for a larger agency operations center, clarification 
of the public health-based resource request and filing 
process between public health and the State Emergency 
Coordination Center, incorporation of a formal 
documentation management system, and additional 
training in emergency management software applications. 
The lessons learned from this exercise will help OPHD 
improve response to future emergencies.
Snapshot of Public Health Preparedness
Below are activities conducted by Oregon in the area of public health preparedness. They support CDC preparedness 
goals in the areas of detection and reporting, control, and improvement; crosscutting activities help prepare for all stages 
of an event. These data are not comprehensive and do not cover all preparedness activities.
Disease Detection and Investigation
The sooner public health professionals can detect diseases or other health threats and investigate their causes and effects in 
the community, the more quickly they can minimize population exposure. 
Detect &
Report
Could receive and investigate urgent disease reports 24/7/3651 Yes
-  Primary method for receiving urgent disease reports*2 Telephone
Linked state and local health personnel to share information about disease outbreaks 
across state lines (through the CDC Epi-X system)3 Yes
Conducted year-round surveillance for seasonal influenza4 Yes
* Telephone, fax, and electronic reporting are all viable options for urgent disease reporting, as long as the public health department has someone assigned 
to receive the reports 24/7/365.
1 CDC, DSLR; 2005; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2006; 3 CDC, Epi-X; 2007; 4 HHS, OIG; 2007
Oregon Completes Pandemic Influenza Full-Scale Exercise 
Exercises allow states and localities to test their abilities to respond to potential disasters.
Oregon
http://www.oregon.gov/DHS/ph/preparedness
According to the Oregon Public Health 
Division, the cooperative agreement 
is valuable because it has dramatically 
increased the capacity, expertise, and 
integration of public health with emergency 
response agencies within the state. The state 
has been able to hire and train staff in areas 
of communicable diseases, epidemiology, and 
information systems, and they have proven 
critical for local public health departments 






obilizing State by State
Public Health Laboratories
Public health laboratories test and confirm agents that can threaten health. For example, advanced DNA “fingerprinting” 
techniques and subsequent reporting to the CDC database (PulseNet) are critical to recognize nationwide outbreaks from 
bacteria that can cause severe illness, such as E. coli O157:H7 and Listeria monocytogenes. 
Detect & Report
Number of Oregon laboratories in the Laboratory Response Network1 1
Rapidly identified E. coli O157:H7 using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) 12
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days  100%
Rapidly identified Listeria monocytogenes using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) N/A
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days N/A
Had a laboratory information management system that could create, send, and receive 
messages3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
-  System complied with CDC information technology standards (PHIN)3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Had a rapid method to send urgent messages to frontline laboratories that perform 
initial screening of clinical specimens3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Crosscutting
Conducted bioterrorism exercise that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Conducted exercise to test chemical readiness that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) N/A
1 CDC, DBPR; 2007; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2007; 3 APHL, Public Health Laboratory Issues in Brief: Bioterrorism Capacity; May 2007; 4 CDC, DSLR; 2006
Response
Planning provides a framework for how a public health department will respond during an emergency. The plans can be 
tested through external reviews, exercises, and real events. After-action reports assess what worked well during an exercise or 
real event and how the department can improve. 
Control
Developed a public health response plan, including pandemic influenza response, crisis 
and emergency risk communication, and Strategic National Stockpile (SNS)1, 2 Yes
Oregon SNS plan reviewed by CDC2 Yes
-  Score on CDC technical assistance review (1-100) 68
Number of Oregon cities in the Cities Readiness Initiative3 1
Crosscutting
Developed roles and responsibilities for a multi-jurisdictional response (ICS) with:1  (8/05 – 8/06)
-  Hospitals Yes
-  Local/regional emergency management agencies Yes
-  Federal emergency management agencies Yes
Public health department staff participated in training to support cooperative 
agreement activities4 Yes
Public health laboratories conducted training for first responders5  (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Activated public health emergency operations center as part of a drill, exercise, or real 
event*†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
Conducted a drill or exercise for key response partners to test communications when 
power and land lines were unavailable†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) No
Improve Finalized at least one after-action report with an improvement plan following an exercise or real event†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
* Activation means rapidly staffing all eight core ICS functional roles in the public health emergency operations center with one person per position. This 
capability is critical to maintain in case of large-scale or complex incidents, even though not every incident requires full staffing of the ICS.
† States were expected to perform these activities from 9/1/2006 to 8/30/2007. These data represent results from the first half of this period only.






























In February 2006, a New York City 
resident fell seriously ill while visiting 
Pennsylvania and was quickly rushed 
to a hospital. When the bioterrorism 
agent Bacillus anthracis, or anthrax, was suspected, the 
hospital laboratory contacted public health officials to 
transport a blood sample to the Pennsylvania Department 
of Health (PA DoH) laboratory that confirmed the 
presence of anthrax bacteria. Despite the fact that it was 
a holiday, the PA DoH lab quickly tested the specimen 
and provided the necessary information to the appropriate 
officials, including officials in New York City and at the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation.
This response benefited from cooperative agreement 
funding because it allowed for additional epidemiologic 
and laboratory capacity at the PA DoH. In addition, 
forensic epidemiology training developed and promoted 
by CDC and the U.S. Department of Justice enhanced 
the joint forensic epidemiological investigation effort 
between public health and law enforcement partners. 
To respond to the incident, PA DoH used handheld 
communication devices and employed the Health Alert 
Network to advise health care providers of emergencies, 
strengthen relationships with law enforcement officials 
and other responders in different jurisdictions, and risk 
communications.
Snapshot of Public Health Preparedness
Below are activities conducted by Pennsylvania in the area of public health preparedness. They support CDC 
preparedness goals in the areas of detection and reporting, control, and improvement; crosscutting activities help prepare 
for all stages of an event. These data are not comprehensive and do not cover all preparedness activities.
Disease Detection and Investigation
The sooner public health professionals can detect diseases or other health threats and investigate their causes and effects in 
the community, the more quickly they can minimize population exposure. 
Detect &
Report
Could receive and investigate urgent disease reports 24/7/3651 Yes
-  Primary method for receiving urgent disease reports*2 Telephone
Linked state and local health personnel to share information about disease outbreaks 
across state lines (through the CDC Epi-X system)3 Yes
Conducted year-round surveillance for seasonal influenza4 Yes
* Telephone, fax, and electronic reporting are all viable options for urgent disease reporting, as long as the public health department has someone assigned 
to receive the reports 24/7/365.
1 CDC, DSLR; 2005; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2006; 3 CDC, Epi-X; 2007; 4 HHS, OIG; 2007
Pennsylvania Responds to a Case of Anthrax 
Joint investigation capacity promotes rapid and coordinated emergency response.
Pennsylvania
http://www.dsf.health.state.pa.us
According to the Pennsylvania Department 
of Health, the cooperative agreement is 
valuable because it has provided critically 
needed funding to purchase equipment and 
services such as the Learning Management 
System, personal protective equipment, 
as well as funded space renovations and 
equipment for an expanded high security 





obilizing State by State
Public Health Laboratories
Public health laboratories test and confirm agents that can threaten health. For example, advanced DNA “fingerprinting” 
techniques and subsequent reporting to the CDC database (PulseNet) are critical to recognize nationwide outbreaks from 
bacteria that can cause severe illness, such as E. coli O157:H7 and Listeria monocytogenes. 
Detect & Report
Number of Pennsylvania laboratories in the Laboratory Response Network1 1
Rapidly identified E. coli O157:H7 using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) 60
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days  83%
Rapidly identified Listeria monocytogenes using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) 4
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days 100%
Had a laboratory information management system that could create, send, and receive 
messages3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
-  System complied with CDC information technology standards (PHIN)3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Had a rapid method to send urgent messages to frontline laboratories that perform 
initial screening of clinical specimens3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Crosscutting
Conducted bioterrorism exercise that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Conducted exercise to test chemical readiness that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
1 CDC, DBPR; 2007; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2007; 3 APHL, Public Health Laboratory Issues in Brief: Bioterrorism Capacity; May 2007; 4 CDC, DSLR; 2006
Response
Planning provides a framework for how a public health department will respond during an emergency. The plans can be 
tested through external reviews, exercises, and real events. After-action reports assess what worked well during an exercise or 
real event and how the department can improve. 
Control
Developed a public health response plan, including pandemic influenza response, crisis 
and emergency risk communication, and Strategic National Stockpile (SNS)1, 2 Yes
Pennsylvania SNS plan reviewed by CDC2 Yes
-  Score on CDC technical assistance review (1-100) 60
Number of Pennsylvania cities in the Cities Readiness Initiative3 2
Crosscutting
Developed roles and responsibilities for a multi-jurisdictional response (ICS) with:1  (8/05 – 8/06)
-  Hospitals Yes
-  Local/regional emergency management agencies Yes
-  Federal emergency management agencies Yes
Public health department staff participated in training to support cooperative 
agreement activities4 Yes
Public health laboratories conducted training for first responders5  (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Activated public health emergency operations center as part of a drill, exercise, or real 
event*†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) No
Conducted a drill or exercise for key response partners to test communications when 
power and land lines were unavailable†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) No
Improve Finalized at least one after-action report with an improvement plan following an exercise or real event†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
* Activation means rapidly staffing all eight core ICS functional roles in the public health emergency operations center with one person per position. This 
capability is critical to maintain in case of large-scale or complex incidents, even though not every incident requires full staffing of the ICS.
† States were expected to perform these activities from 9/1/2006 to 8/30/2007. These data represent results from the first half of this period only.






























In December 2006, an elementary 
school student died from 
encephalitis, an inflammation of 
the brain. When two additional 
cases in school-aged children followed, a cooperative 
epidemiologic investigation between CDC and the Rhode 
Island Department of Health (RIDOH) determined that 
all three cases were linked to the bacteria Mycoplasma 
pneumoniae. School districts were reporting higher 
than normal rates of absenteeism because of respiratory 
illness and pneumonia, the most common result of 
M. pneumoniae infection. The state emergency operations 
center was activated at the request of RIDOH. In 
addition, RIDOH activated a unified command structure, 
which included RIDOH, the Rhode Island Department 
of Education (RIDE), and the Rhode Island Emergency 
Management Agency. 
RIDOH communicated the risk of infection to healthcare 
providers, elected officials, and the public. RIDOH also 
distributed hand sanitizers and educational materials 
related to hand hygiene and cough etiquette to all schools 
in the state. A 3-day antibiotic distribution clinic with 
voluntary laboratory testing was established at one 
elementary school, and school nurses helped to institute 
a short-term active surveillance system for possible cases 
of pneumonia. RIDOH also worked with RIDE to draft 
and implement school policies and recommend school 
closures where appropriate. As a result, in the elementary 
school community in which two cases of neurological 
illness occurred, 100% of the community members were 
offered protective antibiotics and 97% accepted them. 
This was accomplished over the New Year’s holiday 
weekend. A significant portion of the affected families 
participated in testing for M. pneumoniae in collaboration 
with CDC epidemiologists, who helped track infections. 
A prospective surveillance system also was instituted to 
monitor for possible clusters of M. pneumoniae and its 
serious complications.
Snapshot of Public Health Preparedness
Below are activities conducted by Rhode Island in the area of public health preparedness. They support CDC 
preparedness goals in the areas of detection and reporting, control, and improvement; crosscutting activities help prepare 
for all stages of an event. These data are not comprehensive and do not cover all preparedness activities.
Disease Detection and Investigation
The sooner public health professionals can detect diseases or other health threats and investigate their causes and effects in 
the community, the more quickly they can minimize population exposure. 
Detect &
Report
Could receive and investigate urgent disease reports 24/7/3651 Yes
-  Primary method for receiving urgent disease reports*2 Telephone
Linked state and local health personnel to share information about disease outbreaks 
across state lines (through the CDC Epi-X system)3 Yes
Conducted year-round surveillance for seasonal influenza4 Yes
* Telephone, fax, and electronic reporting are all viable options for urgent disease reporting, as long as the public health department has someone assigned 
to receive the reports 24/7/365.
1 CDC, DSLR; 2005; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2006; 3 CDC, Epi-X; 2007; 4 HHS, OIG; 2007
Rhode Island Responds to a Mycoplasma Outbreak 
Community involvement and outreach are critical for successful public health emergency response.
Rhode Island
http://www.health.state.ri.us/environment/biot
According to the Rhode Island Department 
of Health, the cooperative agreement is 
valuable because it has enabled Rhode Island 
to hire staff, purchase laboratory instruments 
and field monitoring equipment, build an 
information technology infrastructure, and 






obilizing State by State
Public Health Laboratories
Public health laboratories test and confirm agents that can threaten health. For example, advanced DNA “fingerprinting” 
techniques and subsequent reporting to the CDC database (PulseNet) are critical to recognize nationwide outbreaks from 
bacteria that can cause severe illness, such as E. coli O157:H7 and Listeria monocytogenes. 
Detect & Report
Number of Rhode Island laboratories in the Laboratory Response Network1 1
Rapidly identified E. coli O157:H7 using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) 5
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days  80%
Rapidly identified Listeria monocytogenes using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) None
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days N/A
Had a laboratory information management system that could create, send, and receive 
messages3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
-  System complied with CDC information technology standards (PHIN)3 (8/05 – 8/06) No
Had a rapid method to send urgent messages to frontline laboratories that perform 
initial screening of clinical specimens3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Crosscutting
Conducted bioterrorism exercise that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) No
Conducted exercise to test chemical readiness that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
1 CDC, DBPR; 2007; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2007; 3 APHL, Public Health Laboratory Issues in Brief: Bioterrorism Capacity; May 2007; 4 CDC, DSLR; 2006
Response
Planning provides a framework for how a public health department will respond during an emergency. The plans can be 
tested through external reviews, exercises, and real events. After-action reports assess what worked well during an exercise or 
real event and how the department can improve. 
Control
Developed a public health response plan, including pandemic influenza response, crisis 
and emergency risk communication, and Strategic National Stockpile (SNS)1, 2 Yes
Rhode Island SNS plan reviewed by CDC2 Yes
-  Score on CDC technical assistance review (1-100) 83
Number of Rhode Island cities in the Cities Readiness Initiative3 1
Crosscutting
Developed roles and responsibilities for a multi-jurisdictional response (ICS) with:1  (8/05 – 8/06)
-  Hospitals Yes
-  Local/regional emergency management agencies Yes
-  Federal emergency management agencies Yes
Public health department staff participated in training to support cooperative 
agreement activities4 Yes
Public health laboratories conducted training for first responders5  (8/05 – 8/06) No
Activated public health emergency operations center as part of a drill, exercise, or real 
event*†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
Conducted a drill or exercise for key response partners to test communications when 
power and land lines were unavailable†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) No
Improve Finalized at least one after-action report with an improvement plan following an exercise or real event†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
* Activation means rapidly staffing all eight core ICS functional roles in the public health emergency operations center with one person per position. This 
capability is critical to maintain in case of large-scale or complex incidents, even though not every incident requires full staffing of the ICS.
† States were expected to perform these activities from 9/1/2006 to 8/30/2007. These data represent results from the first half of this period only.






























In January 2005, an industrial 
freight train collision resulted in a 
release of 63 tons of liquid chlorine 
near residential, commercial and 
industrial districts in the small town of Graniteville, South 
Carolina. Nearly 5,500 residents were forced to evacuate. 
More than 500 people needed medical attention for 
possible chlorine exposure, which can result in corrosive 
damage to the eyes, skin, and lungs and lead to eventual 
respiratory failure and even death. 
Diverse response teams were critical to address the wide 
range of needs for a successful response. Responders 
conducted environmental testing in homes, schools and 
factories and decontaminated the area for safe return. 
Public health workers coordinated emergency medical 
services, monitored hospital care, assessed the number 
of casualties, and supported disaster mortuary services. 
Epidemiologists and environmental health scientists 
monitored the chemical exposures and their long-term 
effects on the residents. 
Funding from the cooperative agreement had helped to 
develop South Carolina’s preparedness plans. Local 
emergency management and public health departments 
already had an all-hazard response plan in place because 
of the nuclear facilities, industrial facilities, and numerous 
rail lines in the area. Coordination among agencies was 
also a priority in planning. These established emergency 
response plans and partnerships helped South Carolina 
respond quickly and effectively to this incident.
Snapshot of Public Health Preparedness
Below are activities conducted by South Carolina in the area of public health preparedness. They support CDC 
preparedness goals in the areas of detection and reporting, control, and improvement; crosscutting activities help prepare 
for all stages of an event. These data are not comprehensive and do not cover all preparedness activities.
Disease Detection and Investigation
The sooner public health professionals can detect diseases or other health threats and investigate their causes and effects in 
the community, the more quickly they can minimize population exposure. 
Detect &
Report
Could receive and investigate urgent disease reports 24/7/3651 Yes
-  Primary method for receiving urgent disease reports*2 Fax
Linked state and local health personnel to share information about disease outbreaks 
across state lines (through the CDC Epi-X system)3 Yes
Conducted year-round surveillance for seasonal influenza4 Yes
* Telephone, fax, and electronic reporting are all viable options for urgent disease reporting, as long as the public health department has someone assigned 
to receive the reports 24/7/365.
1 CDC, DSLR; 2005; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2006; 3 CDC, Epi-X; 2007; 4 HHS, OIG; 2007
South Carolina Responds to a Train Collision and Toxic Spill 
All-hazard approach in planning improves preparedness for emergencies.
South Carolina
http://www.scdhec.net/administration/ophp
According to the South Carolina 
Department of Health and Environmental 
Control, the cooperative agreement is 
valuable because with this funding, the 
department has been able to begin an 
ambitious program to strengthen the public 
health infrastructure. South Carolina has 
been able to make tremendous progress in 
improving public health and community 
preparedness for responding to bioterrorism, 
weapons of mass destruction, disease 
outbreaks, natural and technological hazards, 





obilizing State by State
Public Health Laboratories
Public health laboratories test and confirm agents that can threaten health. For example, advanced DNA “fingerprinting” 
techniques and subsequent reporting to the CDC database (PulseNet) are critical to recognize nationwide outbreaks from 
bacteria that can cause severe illness, such as E. coli O157:H7 and Listeria monocytogenes. 
Detect & Report
Number of South Carolina laboratories in the Laboratory Response Network1 1
Rapidly identified E. coli O157:H7 using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) 5
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days  80%
Rapidly identified Listeria monocytogenes using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) 4
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days 0%
Had a laboratory information management system that could create, send, and receive 
messages3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
-  System complied with CDC information technology standards (PHIN)3 (8/05 – 8/06) No
Had a rapid method to send urgent messages to frontline laboratories that perform 
initial screening of clinical specimens3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Crosscutting
Conducted bioterrorism exercise that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) No
Conducted exercise to test chemical readiness that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
1 CDC, DBPR; 2007; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2007; 3 APHL, Public Health Laboratory Issues in Brief: Bioterrorism Capacity; May 2007; 4 CDC, DSLR; 2006
Response
Planning provides a framework for how a public health department will respond during an emergency. The plans can be 
tested through external reviews, exercises, and real events. After-action reports assess what worked well during an exercise or 
real event and how the department can improve. 
Control
Developed a public health response plan, including pandemic influenza response, crisis 
and emergency risk communication, and Strategic National Stockpile (SNS)1, 2 Yes
South Carolina SNS plan reviewed by CDC2 Yes
-  Score on CDC technical assistance review (1-100) 58
Number of South Carolina cities in the Cities Readiness Initiative3 1
Crosscutting
Developed roles and responsibilities for a multi-jurisdictional response (ICS) with:1  (8/05 – 8/06)
-  Hospitals Yes
-  Local/regional emergency management agencies Yes
-  Federal emergency management agencies Yes
Public health department staff participated in training to support cooperative 
agreement activities4 Yes
Public health laboratories conducted training for first responders5  (8/05 – 8/06) No
Activated public health emergency operations center as part of a drill, exercise, or real 
event*†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) No
Conducted a drill or exercise for key response partners to test communications when 
power and land lines were unavailable†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
Improve Finalized at least one after-action report with an improvement plan following an exercise or real event†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
* Activation means rapidly staffing all eight core ICS functional roles in the public health emergency operations center with one person per position. This 
capability is critical to maintain in case of large-scale or complex incidents, even though not every incident requires full staffing of the ICS.
† States were expected to perform these activities from 9/1/2006 to 8/30/2007. These data represent results from the first half of this period only.






























The South Dakota pandemic 
influenza tabletop exercise was held 
in November 2006. The primary 
purpose of the exercise was to test 
the execution of the state’s pandemic influenza plan 
during all phases of a simulated pandemic influenza 
event. Fifty participants and observers represented South 
Dakota state public health, emergency management, 
transportation, education, human services, and 
information agencies. The exercise scenario simulated 
the spread of avian influenza virus from Southeast Asia 
to North American cities and, eventually, to the state of 
South Dakota.
Participants reviewed state and local plans for isolation 
and quarantine, laboratory capacity to identify influenza 
virus types, means to distribute resources, communication 
plans with the public and between state and local 
emergency operations, and the state unified command 
structure. Key findings from this exercise identified both 
areas in which South Dakota was well-prepared for this 
type of public health emergency and improvements 
that could be made in preparation for future events. 
Improvements or clarification could be made in resource 
allocation/tracking, definition of state/local roles, policies 
for personnel, school closures, antiviral release, and travel 
restriction.
Snapshot of Public Health Preparedness
Below are activities conducted by South Dakota in the area of public health preparedness. They support CDC 
preparedness goals in the areas of detection and reporting, control, and improvement; crosscutting activities help prepare 
for all stages of an event. These data are not comprehensive and do not cover all preparedness activities.
Disease Detection and Investigation
The sooner public health professionals can detect diseases or other health threats and investigate their causes and effects in 
the community, the more quickly they can minimize population exposure. 
Detect &
Report
Could receive and investigate urgent disease reports 24/7/3651 Yes
-  Primary method for receiving urgent disease reports*2 Telephone
Linked state and local health personnel to share information about disease outbreaks 
across state lines (through the CDC Epi-X system)3 Yes
Conducted year-round surveillance for seasonal influenza4 Yes
* Telephone, fax, and electronic reporting are all viable options for urgent disease reporting, as long as the public health department has someone assigned 
to receive the reports 24/7/365.
1 CDC, DSLR; 2005; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2006; 3 CDC, Epi-X; 2007; 4 HHS, OIG; 2007
South Dakota Learns from a Pandemic Influenza Exercise 
Exercising prepares states to effectively manage partners’ responses during an emergency.
South Dakota
http://www.doh.sd.gov
According to the South Dakota Department 
of Health, the cooperative agreement is 
valuable because the state has been able 
to develop relationships and expertise that 
have enabled the development of planning 
and response to emerging health threats in a 
much more coordinated and effective manner. 
Cooperative agreement funding has also 
enabled South Dakota to increase activities 
related to planning, training, and building 





obilizing State by State
Public Health Laboratories
Public health laboratories test and confirm agents that can threaten health. For example, advanced DNA “fingerprinting” 
techniques and subsequent reporting to the CDC database (PulseNet) are critical to recognize nationwide outbreaks from 
bacteria that can cause severe illness, such as E. coli O157:H7 and Listeria monocytogenes. 
Detect & Report
Number of South Dakota laboratories in the Laboratory Response Network1 1
Rapidly identified E. coli O157:H7 using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) 22
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days  86%
Rapidly identified Listeria monocytogenes using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) None
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days N/A
Had a laboratory information management system that could create, send, and receive 
messages3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
-  System complied with CDC information technology standards (PHIN)3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Had a rapid method to send urgent messages to frontline laboratories that perform 
initial screening of clinical specimens3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Crosscutting
Conducted bioterrorism exercise that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) No
Conducted exercise to test chemical readiness that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) No
1 CDC, DBPR; 2007; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2007; 3 APHL, Public Health Laboratory Issues in Brief: Bioterrorism Capacity; May 2007; 4 CDC, DSLR; 2006
Response
Planning provides a framework for how a public health department will respond during an emergency. The plans can be 
tested through external reviews, exercises, and real events. After-action reports assess what worked well during an exercise or 
real event and how the department can improve. 
Control
Developed a public health response plan, including pandemic influenza response, crisis 
and emergency risk communication, and Strategic National Stockpile (SNS)1, 2 Yes
South Dakota SNS plan reviewed by CDC2 Yes
-  Score on CDC technical assistance review (1-100) 52
Number of South Dakota cities in the Cities Readiness Initiative3 1
Crosscutting
Developed roles and responsibilities for a multi-jurisdictional response (ICS) with:1  (8/05 – 8/06)
-  Hospitals Yes
-  Local/regional emergency management agencies Yes
-  Federal emergency management agencies No
Public health department staff participated in training to support cooperative 
agreement activities4 Yes
Public health laboratories conducted training for first responders5  (8/05 – 8/06) No
Activated public health emergency operations center as part of a drill, exercise, or real 
event*†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
Conducted a drill or exercise for key response partners to test communications when 
power and land lines were unavailable†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
Improve Finalized at least one after-action report with an improvement plan following an exercise or real event†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
* Activation means rapidly staffing all eight core ICS functional roles in the public health emergency operations center with one person per position. This 
capability is critical to maintain in case of large-scale or complex incidents, even though not every incident requires full staffing of the ICS.
† States were expected to perform these activities from 9/1/2006 to 8/30/2007. These data represent results from the first half of this period only.






























In August 2006, approximately 
150,000 people attended the 
Tennessee Walking Horse National 
Celebration in Shelbyville, 
Tennessee. One of the horses was confirmed to have 
rabies. Because horses may transmit the rabies virus to 
people, the Tennessee Department of Health (TDH) 
responded rapidly to assess public health risks for rabies 
among people who reportedly had contact with the horse. 
Coordination with local, regional, state, and federal 
public health officials contributed to quick notification 
of the public regarding rabies transmission risk. TDH 
immediately initiated an extensive public messaging 
campaign via print and television to communicate the 
risks associated with attending the event and contact with 
the rabid horse. The Tennessee Health Alert Network, 
CDC Health Alert Network, and Epi-X were used to 
quickly correspond with regional and local public health 
departments, emergency departments, and CDC about 
assessment and treatment for people exposed to the horse. 
In addition to media communications, 4,200 attendees 
were contacted by letter. TDH consulted with 53 people 
who were exposed to the rabid horse and recommended 
boosters or post-exposure treatment as appropriate. The 
cooperative agreement supported TDH’s preparedness 
infrastructure to effectively mobilize communication 
networks, including the Public Information Line and 
the Public Health Emergency Preparedness Program 
Universal Call Distribution Support Line to handle high 
call volume.
Snapshot of Public Health Preparedness
Below are activities conducted by Tennessee in the area of public health preparedness. They support CDC preparedness 
goals in the areas of detection and reporting, control, and improvement; crosscutting activities help prepare for all stages 
of an event. These data are not comprehensive and do not cover all preparedness activities.
Disease Detection and Investigation
The sooner public health professionals can detect diseases or other health threats and investigate their causes and effects in 
the community, the more quickly they can minimize population exposure. 
Detect &
Report
Could receive and investigate urgent disease reports 24/7/3651 Yes
-  Primary method for receiving urgent disease reports*2 Telephone
Linked state and local health personnel to share information about disease outbreaks 
across state lines (through the CDC Epi-X system)3 Yes
Conducted year-round surveillance for seasonal influenza4 Yes
* Telephone, fax, and electronic reporting are all viable options for urgent disease reporting, as long as the public health department has someone assigned 
to receive the reports 24/7/365.
1 CDC, DSLR; 2005; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2006; 3 CDC, Epi-X; 2007; 4 HHS, OIG; 2007
Tennessee Responds to a Rabies Exposure at a Mass Gathering 
Broad range communications networks are critical to inform the public about disease risks.
Tennessee
http://health.state.tn.us/ceds/bioterrorism.htm
According to the Tennessee Department 
of Health, the cooperative agreement is 
valuable because it has funded salaries, 
travel, trainings, equipment, and exercises 
to support public health preparedness. Had 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita occurred prior to 
the cooperative agreement, certain safeguards 
would not have been in place to aid in 
those particular responses. Preparedness for 
threats and emergencies has been enhanced 
through awareness, training, knowledge, 
and establishment of a laboratory dedicated 






obilizing State by State
Public Health Laboratories
Public health laboratories test and confirm agents that can threaten health. For example, advanced DNA “fingerprinting” 
techniques and subsequent reporting to the CDC database (PulseNet) are critical to recognize nationwide outbreaks from 
bacteria that can cause severe illness, such as E. coli O157:H7 and Listeria monocytogenes. 
Detect & Report
Number of Tennessee laboratories in the Laboratory Response Network1 4
Rapidly identified E. coli O157:H7 using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) 16
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days  81%
Rapidly identified Listeria monocytogenes using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) 7
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days 86%
Had a laboratory information management system that could create, send, and receive 
messages3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
-  System complied with CDC information technology standards (PHIN)3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Had a rapid method to send urgent messages to frontline laboratories that perform 
initial screening of clinical specimens3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Crosscutting
Conducted bioterrorism exercise that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Conducted exercise to test chemical readiness that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
1 CDC, DBPR; 2007; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2007; 3 APHL, Public Health Laboratory Issues in Brief: Bioterrorism Capacity; May 2007; 4 CDC, DSLR; 2006
Response
Planning provides a framework for how a public health department will respond during an emergency. The plans can be 
tested through external reviews, exercises, and real events. After-action reports assess what worked well during an exercise or 
real event and how the department can improve. 
Control
Developed a public health response plan, including pandemic influenza response, crisis 
and emergency risk communication, and Strategic National Stockpile (SNS)1, 2 Yes
Tennessee SNS plan reviewed by CDC2 Yes
-  Score on CDC technical assistance review (1-100) 85
Number of Tennessee cities in the Cities Readiness Initiative3 2
Crosscutting
Developed roles and responsibilities for a multi-jurisdictional response (ICS) with:1  (8/05 – 8/06)
-  Hospitals Yes
-  Local/regional emergency management agencies Yes
-  Federal emergency management agencies Yes
Public health department staff participated in training to support cooperative 
agreement activities4 Yes
Public health laboratories conducted training for first responders5  (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Activated public health emergency operations center as part of a drill, exercise, or real 
event*†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
Conducted a drill or exercise for key response partners to test communications when 
power and land lines were unavailable†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
Improve Finalized at least one after-action report with an improvement plan following an exercise or real event†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
* Activation means rapidly staffing all eight core ICS functional roles in the public health emergency operations center with one person per position. This 
capability is critical to maintain in case of large-scale or complex incidents, even though not every incident requires full staffing of the ICS.
† States were expected to perform these activities from 9/1/2006 to 8/30/2007. These data represent results from the first half of this period only.






























Over 425,000 evacuees came to 
Texas within days of Hurricane 
Katrina’s landfall, in need of help and 
services from federal, state, and local 
agencies. Many areas throughout the state provided shelter 
to approximately 140,000 people who had no place to 
live. The city of San Antonio alone provided shelter for 
37,500 at an old factory, shopping mall, and KellyUSA, a 
civilian business park and former military base. 
Public health staff were on hand to help with evacuees’ 
immediate medical needs. The San Antonio Metropolitan 
Health District coordinated counseling services and 
suppliers for the most common medications for diabetes, 
hypertension, and heart disease. Pharmacists filled 3,000 
prescriptions for evacuees at KellyUSA alone, and those 
with more urgent needs were transported to area hospitals. 
A network of agencies and professionals set up a 24-hour 
mental health clinic at KellyUSA to identify and treat 
people who needed psychiatric medications. The Texas 
Health and Human Service Commission also extended 
office hours to help people access benefits for Medicaid, 
food stamps, and prescriptions.
San Antonio community partners, including nonprofits, 
businesses, the faith community, and the public, all 
contributed greatly to the community’s response. For 
example, businesses provided food and discounted hotel 
rates for evacuees and also provided communications 
services and equipment for shelters. Public health 
professionals in cooperation with these and other partners 
worked to ensure a coordinated response that protected 
the health of thousands of evacuees.
Snapshot of Public Health Preparedness
Below are activities conducted by Texas in the area of public health preparedness. They support CDC preparedness goals 
in the areas of detection and reporting, control, and improvement; crosscutting activities help prepare for all stages of an 
event. These data are not comprehensive and do not cover all preparedness activities.
Disease Detection and Investigation
The sooner public health professionals can detect diseases or other health threats and investigate their causes and effects in 
the community, the more quickly they can minimize population exposure. 
Detect &
Report
Could receive and investigate urgent disease reports 24/7/3651 Yes
-  Primary method for receiving urgent disease reports*2 Telephone
Linked state and local health personnel to share information about disease outbreaks 
across state lines (through the CDC Epi-X system)3 Yes
Conducted year-round surveillance for seasonal influenza4 Yes
* Telephone, fax, and electronic reporting are all viable options for urgent disease reporting, as long as the public health department has someone assigned 
to receive the reports 24/7/365.
1 CDC, DSLR; 2005; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2006; 3 CDC, Epi-X; 2007; 4 HHS, OIG; 2007
Texas Responds to an Influx of Hurricane Katrina Evacuees 
Community partnerships are critical during public health emergencies.
Texas
http://www.dshs.state.tx.us/preparedness
According to the Texas Department of State 
Health Services, the cooperative agreement 
is valuable because it has strengthened 
the state’s ability to conduct public health 
surveillance and epidemiological studies 
through Epidemiology Response Teams. 
Funding has allowed Texas to hire and train 
staff and purchase needed communication 
systems, computers, and other equipment. 
Texas’s response to Hurricanes Katrina and 
Rita showed the readiness level achieved 





obilizing State by State
Public Health Laboratories
Public health laboratories test and confirm agents that can threaten health. For example, advanced DNA “fingerprinting” 
techniques and subsequent reporting to the CDC database (PulseNet) are critical to recognize nationwide outbreaks from 
bacteria that can cause severe illness, such as E. coli O157:H7 and Listeria monocytogenes. 
Detect & Report
Number of Texas laboratories in the Laboratory Response Network1 16
Rapidly identified E. coli O157:H7 using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) 32
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days  94%
Rapidly identified Listeria monocytogenes using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) 16
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days 69%
Had a laboratory information management system that could create, send, and receive 
messages3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
-  System complied with CDC information technology standards (PHIN)3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Had a rapid method to send urgent messages to frontline laboratories that perform 
initial screening of clinical specimens3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Crosscutting
Conducted bioterrorism exercise that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Conducted exercise to test chemical readiness that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
1 CDC, DBPR; 2007; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2007; 3 APHL, Public Health Laboratory Issues in Brief: Bioterrorism Capacity; May 2007; 4 CDC, DSLR; 2006
Response
Planning provides a framework for how a public health department will respond during an emergency. The plans can be 
tested through external reviews, exercises, and real events. After-action reports assess what worked well during an exercise or 
real event and how the department can improve. 
Control
Developed a public health response plan, including pandemic influenza response, crisis 
and emergency risk communication, and Strategic National Stockpile (SNS)1, 2 Yes
Texas SNS plan reviewed by CDC2 Yes
-  Score on CDC technical assistance review (1-100) 97
Number of Texas cities in the Cities Readiness Initiative3 3
Crosscutting
Developed roles and responsibilities for a multi-jurisdictional response (ICS) with:1  (8/05 – 8/06)
-  Hospitals Yes
-  Local/regional emergency management agencies Yes
-  Federal emergency management agencies Yes
Public health department staff participated in training to support cooperative 
agreement activities4 Yes
Public health laboratories conducted training for first responders5  (8/05 – 8/06) No
Activated public health emergency operations center as part of a drill, exercise, or real 
event*†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) No
Conducted a drill or exercise for key response partners to test communications when 
power and land lines were unavailable†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) No
Improve Finalized at least one after-action report with an improvement plan following an exercise or real event†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
* Activation means rapidly staffing all eight core ICS functional roles in the public health emergency operations center with one person per position. This 
capability is critical to maintain in case of large-scale or complex incidents, even though not every incident requires full staffing of the ICS.
† States were expected to perform these activities from 9/1/2006 to 8/30/2007. These data represent results from the first half of this period only.






























In 2006, a long-haul truck driver 
who had just arrived in Salt 
Lake City, Utah, from Seattle, 
Washington, showed up at an 
emergency room with skin lesions and a fever. The 
attending physician in the emergency room determined 
that the appearance of the lesions was compatible with the 
symptoms of smallpox infection. Immediately recognizing 
the complexity of the situation, the physician notified 
the Salt Lake Valley Health Department. The emergency 
room was immediately closed and anyone present at the 
time the truck driver arrived was not allowed to leave. 
After consulting with the Utah Department of Health 
(UDOH) and CDC, a sample was taken to the UDOH 
laboratory for testing. It was quickly determined that the 
man fortunately did not have smallpox, but instead had 
atypical chicken pox. 
Quick response and resolution occurred because 
individuals involved in this response were trained to 
communicate with both the local and state public health 
departments. The state laboratory was equipped with the 
technology to quickly confirm whether the truck driver 
had smallpox. Utah has the capability to complete rapid 
testing, which takes only a matter of hours, whereas 
before the cooperative agreement, the sample would have 
required transportation to CDC in Atlanta, Georgia, 
for confirmation. All select bioterrorism agents can 
now be tested within the state. Also, local public health 
departments have working relationships with the hospitals 
in their area, which were fostered due to cooperative 
agreement funds.
Snapshot of Public Health Preparedness
Below are activities conducted by Utah in the area of public health preparedness. They support CDC preparedness goals 
in the areas of detection and reporting, control, and improvement; crosscutting activities help prepare for all stages of an 
event. These data are not comprehensive and do not cover all preparedness activities.
Disease Detection and Investigation
The sooner public health professionals can detect diseases or other health threats and investigate their causes and effects in 
the community, the more quickly they can minimize population exposure. 
Detect &
Report
Could receive and investigate urgent disease reports 24/7/3651 Yes
-  Primary method for receiving urgent disease reports*2 Telephone
Linked state and local health personnel to share information about disease outbreaks 
across state lines (through the CDC Epi-X system)3 Yes
Conducted year-round surveillance for seasonal influenza4 Yes
* Telephone, fax, and electronic reporting are all viable options for urgent disease reporting, as long as the public health department has someone assigned 
to receive the reports 24/7/365.
1 CDC, DSLR; 2005; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2006; 3 CDC, Epi-X; 2007; 4 HHS, OIG; 2007
Utah Responds to Potential Smallpox Case 
Localized laboratory testing capabilities ensure the rapid confirmation of potential diseases.
Utah
http://health.utah.gov/bt
According to the Utah Department of 
Health, the cooperative agreement is 
valuable because it has allowed Utah 
to develop an all-hazard response plan, 
implement systems for surveillance and 






obilizing State by State
Public Health Laboratories
Public health laboratories test and confirm agents that can threaten health. For example, advanced DNA “fingerprinting” 
techniques and subsequent reporting to the CDC database (PulseNet) are critical to recognize nationwide outbreaks from 
bacteria that can cause severe illness, such as E. coli O157:H7 and Listeria monocytogenes. 
Detect & Report
Number of Utah laboratories in the Laboratory Response Network1 1
Rapidly identified E. coli O157:H7 using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) 35
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days  94%
Rapidly identified Listeria monocytogenes using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) 4
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days 100%
Had a laboratory information management system that could create, send, and receive 
messages3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
-  System complied with CDC information technology standards (PHIN)3 (8/05 – 8/06) No
Had a rapid method to send urgent messages to frontline laboratories that perform 
initial screening of clinical specimens3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Crosscutting
Conducted bioterrorism exercise that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Conducted exercise to test chemical readiness that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) No Response
1 CDC, DBPR; 2007; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2007; 3 APHL, Public Health Laboratory Issues in Brief: Bioterrorism Capacity; May 2007; 4 CDC, DSLR; 2006
Response
Planning provides a framework for how a public health department will respond during an emergency. The plans can be 
tested through external reviews, exercises, and real events. After-action reports assess what worked well during an exercise or 
real event and how the department can improve. 
Control
Developed a public health response plan, including pandemic influenza response, crisis 
and emergency risk communication, and Strategic National Stockpile (SNS)1, 2 Yes
Utah SNS plan reviewed by CDC2 Yes
-  Score on CDC technical assistance review (1-100) 66
Number of Utah cities in the Cities Readiness Initiative3 1
Crosscutting
Developed roles and responsibilities for a multi-jurisdictional response (ICS) with:1  (8/05 – 8/06)
-  Hospitals Yes
-  Local/regional emergency management agencies Yes
-  Federal emergency management agencies No
Public health department staff participated in training to support cooperative 
agreement activities4 Yes
Public health laboratories conducted training for first responders5  (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Activated public health emergency operations center as part of a drill, exercise, or real 
event*†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
Conducted a drill or exercise for key response partners to test communications when 
power and land lines were unavailable†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
Improve Finalized at least one after-action report with an improvement plan following an exercise or real event†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
* Activation means rapidly staffing all eight core ICS functional roles in the public health emergency operations center with one person per position. This 
capability is critical to maintain in case of large-scale or complex incidents, even though not every incident requires full staffing of the ICS.
† States were expected to perform these activities from 9/1/2006 to 8/30/2007. These data represent results from the first half of this period only.






























Vermont conducted Operation 
Pandemic Influenza, a full-scale, 
2-week exercise in July 2007, to 
evaluate a multi-faceted, statewide 
response to a pandemic avian influenza outbreak. The 
emergency scenario included the discovery of avian 
influenza on a poultry farm in southern Vermont and the 
quarantine of students at two Vermont colleges.
 
The exercise provided an opportunity for state 
departments of health and agriculture, hospitals, 
universities, emergency management, and the National 
Guard to practice critical skills required should the state 
need to activate public health emergency plans. Partners 
tested disease surveillance, epidemiologic investigation, 
and response to detect and control the spread of pandemic 
influenza, as well as laboratory capacity to test and 
confirm clinical samples. The exercise also simulated the 
request, receipt, storage, and dispensation of Strategic 
National Stockpile assets from CDC. Delivery of 
influenza vaccine by community clinics and the system 
to monitor distribution and use of influenza vaccine were 
also tested.
The Health Alert Network was tested to rapidly exchange 
information among health professionals. The state 
emergency operations centers also were activated. The 
new emergency management system, DisasterLAN, was 
effectively used to keep key state support roles updated 
on critical information. Information also was provided to 
the public through activation of the Crisis and Emergency 
Risk Communication plan.
Snapshot of Public Health Preparedness
Below are activities conducted by Vermont in the area of public health preparedness. They support CDC preparedness 
goals in the areas of detection and reporting, control, and improvement; crosscutting activities help prepare for all stages 
of an event. These data are not comprehensive and do not cover all preparedness activities.
Disease Detection and Investigation
The sooner public health professionals can detect diseases or other health threats and investigate their causes and effects in 
the community, the more quickly they can minimize population exposure. 
Detect &
Report
Could receive and investigate urgent disease reports 24/7/3651 Yes
-  Primary method for receiving urgent disease reports*2 Telephone
Linked state and local health personnel to share information about disease outbreaks 
across state lines (through the CDC Epi-X system)3 Yes
Conducted year-round surveillance for seasonal influenza4 Yes
* Telephone, fax, and electronic reporting are all viable options for urgent disease reporting, as long as the public health department has someone assigned 
to receive the reports 24/7/365.
1 CDC, DSLR; 2005; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2006; 3 CDC, Epi-X; 2007; 4 HHS, OIG; 2007
Vermont’s Full-scale Exercise of Operation Pandemic Influenza 
Extensive exercising is important to test the readiness of all components of an emergency response plan.
Vermont
http://healthvermont.gov/e_ready.aspx
According to the Vermont Department 
of Health, the cooperative agreement 
is valuable because the state now has 
a dedicated Office of Public Health 
Preparedness & Emergency Medical 
Services that coordinates all work in this 
area. Laboratory abilities to test numerous 
chemical and biological agents have increased 
substantially, and the necessary staff are in 





obilizing State by State
Public Health Laboratories
Public health laboratories test and confirm agents that can threaten health. For example, advanced DNA “fingerprinting” 
techniques and subsequent reporting to the CDC database (PulseNet) are critical to recognize nationwide outbreaks from 
bacteria that can cause severe illness, such as E. coli O157:H7 and Listeria monocytogenes. 
Detect & Report
Number of Vermont laboratories in the Laboratory Response Network1 1
Rapidly identified E. coli O157:H7 using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) 3
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days  100%
Rapidly identified Listeria monocytogenes using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) None
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days N/A
Had a laboratory information management system that could create, send, and receive 
messages3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
-  System complied with CDC information technology standards (PHIN)3 (8/05 – 8/06) No
Had a rapid method to send urgent messages to frontline laboratories that perform 
initial screening of clinical specimens3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Crosscutting
Conducted bioterrorism exercise that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) No
Conducted exercise to test chemical readiness that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) No
1 CDC, DBPR; 2007; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2007; 3 APHL, Public Health Laboratory Issues in Brief: Bioterrorism Capacity; May 2007; 4 CDC, DSLR; 2006
Response
Planning provides a framework for how a public health department will respond during an emergency. The plans can be 
tested through external reviews, exercises, and real events. After-action reports assess what worked well during an exercise or 
real event and how the department can improve. 
Control
Developed a public health response plan, including pandemic influenza response, crisis 
and emergency risk communication, and Strategic National Stockpile (SNS)1, 2 Yes
Vermont SNS plan reviewed by CDC2 Yes
-  Score on CDC technical assistance review (1-100) 90
Number of Vermont cities in the Cities Readiness Initiative3 1
Crosscutting
Developed roles and responsibilities for a multi-jurisdictional response (ICS) with:1  (8/05 – 8/06)
-  Hospitals No
-  Local/regional emergency management agencies Yes
-  Federal emergency management agencies Yes
Public health department staff participated in training to support cooperative 
agreement activities4 Yes
Public health laboratories conducted training for first responders5  (8/05 – 8/06) No
Activated public health emergency operations center as part of a drill, exercise, or real 
event*†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
Conducted a drill or exercise for key response partners to test communications when 
power and land lines were unavailable†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) No
Improve Finalized at least one after-action report with an improvement plan following an exercise or real event†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
* Activation means rapidly staffing all eight core ICS functional roles in the public health emergency operations center with one person per position. This 
capability is critical to maintain in case of large-scale or complex incidents, even though not every incident requires full staffing of the ICS.
† States were expected to perform these activities from 9/1/2006 to 8/30/2007. These data represent results from the first half of this period only.






























In April 2007, a mass shooting 
occurred on the college campus of 
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and 
State University, commonly known 
as Virginia Tech. The shooting left 34 people dead and 
26 others injured. The collaborative effort of regional 
hospitals, emergency medical services, and state and local 
public health departments resulted in a quick response. 
Before the shootings, the events of September 11 had 
increased attention to mass casualty preparedness and 
response, and federal funding helped establish a regional 
health system model ready for such a response. For 
example, regional collaborative planning, training, and 
exercising resulted in increased experience, improved 
communications, and closer relationships among 
responders. During the Virginia Tech shootings, the 
close relationship between state and local public health 
and the Virginia healthcare system led to improved 
communications and a better response overall. The low 
overall mortality rate of victims, despite limitations given 
the rural health care system, was evidence of a successful 
response.
 
A key lesson learned was that mass casualty situations can 
occur anywhere, including rural areas with limited to no 
access to trauma centers. Organization and leadership, 
possible alterations in care standards, education, 
communications, transportation, triage and legal issues 
all emerged as important issues. Lessons learned from 
the Virginia Tech incident will assist Virginia healthcare 
and public health systems to improve planning for future 
emergencies.
Snapshot of Public Health Preparedness
Below are activities conducted by Virginia in the area of public health preparedness. They support CDC preparedness 
goals in the areas of detection and reporting, control, and improvement; crosscutting activities help prepare for all stages 
of an event. These data are not comprehensive and do not cover all preparedness activities.
Disease Detection and Investigation
The sooner public health professionals can detect diseases or other health threats and investigate their causes and effects in 
the community, the more quickly they can minimize population exposure. 
Detect &
Report
Could receive and investigate urgent disease reports 24/7/3651 Yes
-  Primary method for receiving urgent disease reports*2 Telephone
Linked state and local health personnel to share information about disease outbreaks 
across state lines (through the CDC Epi-X system)3 Yes
Conducted year-round surveillance for seasonal influenza4 Yes
* Telephone, fax, and electronic reporting are all viable options for urgent disease reporting, as long as the public health department has someone assigned 
to receive the reports 24/7/365.
1 CDC, DSLR; 2005; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2006; 3 CDC, Epi-X; 2007; 4 HHS, OIG; 2007
Virginia Responds to the Shootings at Virginia Tech 
Partnerships are critical for cohesive response to mass casualty incidents.
Virginia
http://www.vdh.state.va.us/epr
According to the Virginia Department 
of Health, the cooperative agreement is 
valuable because it has allowed for many 
improvements that contribute to the state’s 
overall emergency and preparedness response 
capabilities, including additional staff at local, 
regional, and state levels within the health 
department and state laboratory. In addition, 
Virginia has been able to build an incident 
and unified command structure that did not 
exist before 2002, as well as build redundant 
communications systems within public health 





obilizing State by State
Public Health Laboratories
Public health laboratories test and confirm agents that can threaten health. For example, advanced DNA “fingerprinting” 
techniques and subsequent reporting to the CDC database (PulseNet) are critical to recognize nationwide outbreaks from 
bacteria that can cause severe illness, such as E. coli O157:H7 and Listeria monocytogenes. 
Detect & Report
Number of Virginia laboratories in the Laboratory Response Network1 2
Rapidly identified E. coli O157:H7 using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) 29
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days  86%
Rapidly identified Listeria monocytogenes using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) 6
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days 100%
Had a laboratory information management system that could create, send, and receive 
messages3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
-  System complied with CDC information technology standards (PHIN)3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Had a rapid method to send urgent messages to frontline laboratories that perform 
initial screening of clinical specimens3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Crosscutting
Conducted bioterrorism exercise that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Conducted exercise to test chemical readiness that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
1 CDC, DBPR; 2007; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2007; 3 APHL, Public Health Laboratory Issues in Brief: Bioterrorism Capacity; May 2007; 4 CDC, DSLR; 2006
Response
Planning provides a framework for how a public health department will respond during an emergency. The plans can be 
tested through external reviews, exercises, and real events. After-action reports assess what worked well during an exercise or 
real event and how the department can improve. 
Control
Developed a public health response plan, including pandemic influenza response, crisis 
and emergency risk communication, and Strategic National Stockpile (SNS)1, 2 Yes
Virginia SNS plan reviewed by CDC2 Yes
-  Score on CDC technical assistance review (1-100) 97
Number of Virginia cities in the Cities Readiness Initiative3 2
Crosscutting
Developed roles and responsibilities for a multi-jurisdictional response (ICS) with:1  (8/05 – 8/06)
-  Hospitals Yes
-  Local/regional emergency management agencies Yes
-  Federal emergency management agencies Yes
Public health department staff participated in training to support cooperative 
agreement activities4 Yes
Public health laboratories conducted training for first responders5  (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Activated public health emergency operations center as part of a drill, exercise, or real 
event*†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
Conducted a drill or exercise for key response partners to test communications when 
power and land lines were unavailable†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
Improve Finalized at least one after-action report with an improvement plan following an exercise or real event†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
* Activation means rapidly staffing all eight core ICS functional roles in the public health emergency operations center with one person per position. This 
capability is critical to maintain in case of large-scale or complex incidents, even though not every incident requires full staffing of the ICS.
† States were expected to perform these activities from 9/1/2006 to 8/30/2007. These data represent results from the first half of this period only.






























The Washington State Department 
of Health co-sponsored the fourth 
annual Pacific Northwest Cross 
Border Workshop with the British 
Columbia Ministry of Health in May 2007. Partnerships 
among the border states have led to successful responses 
to incidents such as SARS and a Salmonella pet food 
outbreak. Over 200 public health and emergency 
management professionals represented the Canadian 
western provinces, the northwest United States, the Native 
American and First Nations tribes, and the two federal 
governments.  
Expert presentations and group discussions were 
conducted on epidemiology, surveillance, public health 
laboratories, emergency management, communications, 
and public health law. The meeting also covered special 
topics in cross-border initiatives, tribal preparedness, 
pandemic influenza planning, and similarities and 
differences in planning betweefn the United States and 
Canada.
Effective cross-border response in a public health 
emergency will require planned, coordinated activities by 
multiple agencies. Barriers to effectiveness include lack 
of familiarity with the roles and identities of appropriate 
responders, lack of established lines of intra- and 
interagency communications and data sharing, lack of 
planning and agreements for sharing scarce resources, and 
failure to address legal or jurisdictional issues that may 
restrict international cooperation. The workshops have 
been successful in identifying areas in which cooperation 
can be strengthened as well as partners’ ability to 
respond to both national and international public health 
emergencies.
Snapshot of Public Health Preparedness
Below are activities conducted by Washington in the area of public health preparedness. They support CDC preparedness 
goals in the areas of detection and reporting, control, and improvement; crosscutting activities help prepare for all stages 
of an event. These data are not comprehensive and do not cover all preparedness activities.
Disease Detection and Investigation
The sooner public health professionals can detect diseases or other health threats and investigate their causes and effects in 
the community, the more quickly they can minimize population exposure. 
Detect &
Report
Could receive and investigate urgent disease reports 24/7/3651 Yes
-  Primary method for receiving urgent disease reports*2 Telephone
Linked state and local health personnel to share information about disease outbreaks 
across state lines (through the CDC Epi-X system)3 Yes
Conducted year-round surveillance for seasonal influenza4 Yes
* Telephone, fax, and electronic reporting are all viable options for urgent disease reporting, as long as the public health department has someone assigned 
to receive the reports 24/7/365.
1 CDC, DSLR; 2005; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2006; 3 CDC, Epi-X; 2007; 4 HHS, OIG; 2007
Washington Co-Sponsors Public Health Initiatives 
Cross-border collaboration bolsters disease surveillance and response during an emergency.
Washington
http://www.doh.wa.gov/phepr
According to the Washington State 
Department of Health, the cooperative 
agreement is valuable because state and local 
public health jurisdictions have been able to 
build critical programs and infrastructure to 
support preparedness and response activities. 
Funds have been used to hire staff in all 
program areas, purchase vital equipment and 






obilizing State by State
Public Health Laboratories
Public health laboratories test and confirm agents that can threaten health. For example, advanced DNA “fingerprinting” 
techniques and subsequent reporting to the CDC database (PulseNet) are critical to recognize nationwide outbreaks from 
bacteria that can cause severe illness, such as E. coli O157:H7 and Listeria monocytogenes. 
Detect & Report
Number of Washington laboratories in the Laboratory Response Network1 6
Rapidly identified E. coli O157:H7 using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) 101
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days  97%
Rapidly identified Listeria monocytogenes using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) 10
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days 100%
Had a laboratory information management system that could create, send, and receive 
messages3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
-  System complied with CDC information technology standards (PHIN)3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Had a rapid method to send urgent messages to frontline laboratories that perform 
initial screening of clinical specimens3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Crosscutting
Conducted bioterrorism exercise that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) No
Conducted exercise to test chemical readiness that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
1 CDC, DBPR; 2007; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2007; 3 APHL, Public Health Laboratory Issues in Brief: Bioterrorism Capacity; May 2007; 4 CDC, DSLR; 2006
Response
Planning provides a framework for how a public health department will respond during an emergency. The plans can be 
tested through external reviews, exercises, and real events. After-action reports assess what worked well during an exercise or 
real event and how the department can improve. 
Control
Developed a public health response plan, including pandemic influenza response, crisis 
and emergency risk communication, and Strategic National Stockpile (SNS)1, 2 Yes
Washington SNS plan reviewed by CDC2 Yes
-  Score on CDC technical assistance review (1-100) 90
Number of Washington cities in the Cities Readiness Initiative3 1
Crosscutting
Developed roles and responsibilities for a multi-jurisdictional response (ICS) with:1  (8/05 – 8/06)
-  Hospitals Yes
-  Local/regional emergency management agencies Yes
-  Federal emergency management agencies Yes
Public health department staff participated in training to support cooperative 
agreement activities4 Yes
Public health laboratories conducted training for first responders5  (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Activated public health emergency operations center as part of a drill, exercise, or real 
event*†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
Conducted a drill or exercise for key response partners to test communications when 
power and land lines were unavailable†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) No
Improve Finalized at least one after-action report with an improvement plan following an exercise or real event†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
* Activation means rapidly staffing all eight core ICS functional roles in the public health emergency operations center with one person per position. This 
capability is critical to maintain in case of large-scale or complex incidents, even though not every incident requires full staffing of the ICS.
† States were expected to perform these activities from 9/1/2006 to 8/30/2007. These data represent results from the first half of this period only.






























In September 2005, the 
Governor of West Virginia 
requested that the state receive, 
temporarily house, and support 
Hurricane Katrina evacuees. Within 24 hours, state 
agencies and their partners developed and implemented a 
plan for the anticipated arrival of the evacuees. The state 
received approximately 300 Hurricane Katrina evacuees 
from New Orleans at the Charleston, West Virginia 
airport, where registration, clothing, food, and initial 
medical screening and treatment were provided. Evacuees 
then were moved to an Army National Guard base as 
part of Operation Safe Haven, where they were housed, 
linked to both short- and long-term service needs, and 
reconnected with friends and family. This month-long 
operation was managed by the West Virginia Department 
of Health and Human Resources (WVDHHR). 
Operation Safe Haven was a multi-agency operation that 
coordinated activities through the National Incident 
Management System. The WVDHHR provided 
command and control for the overall operation in 
addition to coordinating medical care, providing 
behavioral health services, public health services, 
social services, case management, and community 
communications. The American Red Cross coordinated 
the provision of food and staffed housing units. The 
National Guard provided facility support, transportation, 
staff support, and security. Universities and the private 
sector generously provided resources otherwise not 
available to support the operation. Coordination and 
partnership among state agencies, private sector agencies, 
and the volunteer community demonstrated that 
preparedness in unaffected states enables rapid response to 
incidents in neighboring states and nationwide.
Snapshot of Public Health Preparedness
Below are activities conducted by West Virginia in the area of public health preparedness. They support CDC 
preparedness goals in the areas of detection and reporting, control, and improvement; crosscutting activities help prepare 
for all stages of an event. These data are not comprehensive and do not cover all preparedness activities.
Disease Detection and Investigation
The sooner public health professionals can detect diseases or other health threats and investigate their causes and effects in 
the community, the more quickly they can minimize population exposure. 
Detect &
Report
Could receive and investigate urgent disease reports 24/7/3651 Yes
-  Primary method for receiving urgent disease reports*2 Telephone
Linked state and local health personnel to share information about disease outbreaks 
across state lines (through the CDC Epi-X system)3 Yes
Conducted year-round surveillance for seasonal influenza4 Yes
* Telephone, fax, and electronic reporting are all viable options for urgent disease reporting, as long as the public health department has someone assigned 
to receive the reports 24/7/365.
1 CDC, DSLR; 2005; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2006; 3 CDC, Epi-X; 2007; 4 HHS, OIG; 2007
West Virginia Responds to Hurricane Katrina – Operation Safe Haven 
Capability of unaffected states enables strong support for national incidents.
West Virginia
http://www.wvdhhr.org/healthprep
According to the West Virginia Department 
of Health and Human Resources, the 
cooperative agreement is valuable because 
it has allowed for the development of 
an All-Hazard Public Health Emergency 
Response Plan and increased communication 
capabilities statewide. Almost no comparison 
can be made between the previous system and 





obilizing State by State
Public Health Laboratories
Public health laboratories test and confirm agents that can threaten health. For example, advanced DNA “fingerprinting” 
techniques and subsequent reporting to the CDC database (PulseNet) are critical to recognize nationwide outbreaks from 
bacteria that can cause severe illness, such as E. coli O157:H7 and Listeria monocytogenes. 
Detect & Report
Number of West Virginia laboratories in the Laboratory Response Network1 1
Rapidly identified E. coli O157:H7 using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) None
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days  N/A
Rapidly identified Listeria monocytogenes using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) None
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days N/A
Had a laboratory information management system that could create, send, and receive 
messages3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
-  System complied with CDC information technology standards (PHIN)3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Had a rapid method to send urgent messages to frontline laboratories that perform 
initial screening of clinical specimens3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Crosscutting
Conducted bioterrorism exercise that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) No
Conducted exercise to test chemical readiness that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
1 CDC, DBPR; 2007; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2007; 3 APHL, Public Health Laboratory Issues in Brief: Bioterrorism Capacity; May 2007; 4 CDC, DSLR; 2006
Response
Planning provides a framework for how a public health department will respond during an emergency. The plans can be 
tested through external reviews, exercises, and real events. After-action reports assess what worked well during an exercise or 
real event and how the department can improve. 
Control
Developed a public health response plan, including pandemic influenza response, crisis 
and emergency risk communication, and Strategic National Stockpile (SNS)1, 2 Yes
West Virginia SNS plan reviewed by CDC2 Yes
-  Score on CDC technical assistance review (1-100) 61
Number of West Virginia cities in the Cities Readiness Initiative3 1
Crosscutting
Developed roles and responsibilities for a multi-jurisdictional response (ICS) with:1  (8/05 – 8/06)
-  Hospitals Yes
-  Local/regional emergency management agencies Yes
-  Federal emergency management agencies No
Public health department staff participated in training to support cooperative 
agreement activities4 Yes
Public health laboratories conducted training for first responders5  (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Activated public health emergency operations center as part of a drill, exercise, or real 
event*†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) No
Conducted a drill or exercise for key response partners to test communications when 
power and land lines were unavailable†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) No
Improve Finalized at least one after-action report with an improvement plan following an exercise or real event†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
* Activation means rapidly staffing all eight core ICS functional roles in the public health emergency operations center with one person per position. This 
capability is critical to maintain in case of large-scale or complex incidents, even though not every incident requires full staffing of the ICS.
† States were expected to perform these activities from 9/1/2006 to 8/30/2007. These data represent results from the first half of this period only.






























In September 2006, Wisconsin 
public health officials reported a 
cluster of E. coli O157:H7 infections 
to CDC. Through the use of an 
advanced “DNA fingerprinting” technique called pulsed-
field gel electrophoresis (PFGE), staff at the Wisconsin 
State Laboratory of Hygiene (WSLH) were the first in 
the nation to identify the bacterial strain that sickened 
hundreds and caused three deaths in the spinach E. coli 
O157:H7 outbreak. By comparing PFGE patterns, or 
“DNA fingerprints,” in the Pulsenet national database, 
CDC determined that within 1 month, 183 people across 
26 states had been infected by the same strain. Joint 
epidemiology and laboratory investigations were critical in 
identifying the source of this outbreak.
The WSLH staff received the 2007 PulseNet PulseStar 
award from CDC and the Association of Public 
Health Laboratories for their efforts. Funding from the 
cooperative agreement was critical in providing WSLH 
with the laboratory capacity to successfully identify the 
bacterial strain that swept across the nation. Both the 
bacterial strain and outbreak source were identified 
rapidly, and public health communications regarding 
food safety, E. coli infection, and product recall were 
quickly developed to protect people from further spread 
of infection. Individual states can have a significant 
role in stemming nationwide disease outbreaks through 
well-equipped and staffed laboratories and epidemiology 
divisions.
Snapshot of Public Health Preparedness
Below are activities conducted by Wisconsin in the area of public health preparedness. They support CDC preparedness 
goals in the areas of detection and reporting, control, and improvement; crosscutting activities help prepare for all stages 
of an event. These data are not comprehensive and do not cover all preparedness activities.
Disease Detection and Investigation
The sooner public health professionals can detect diseases or other health threats and investigate their causes and effects in 
the community, the more quickly they can minimize population exposure. 
Detect &
Report
Could receive and investigate urgent disease reports 24/7/3651 Yes
-  Primary method for receiving urgent disease reports*2 Telephone
Linked state and local health personnel to share information about disease outbreaks 
across state lines (through the CDC Epi-X system)3 Yes
Conducted year-round surveillance for seasonal influenza4 Yes
* Telephone, fax, and electronic reporting are all viable options for urgent disease reporting, as long as the public health department has someone assigned 
to receive the reports 24/7/365.
1 CDC, DSLR; 2005; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2006; 3 CDC, Epi-X; 2007; 4 HHS, OIG; 2007
Wisconsin Identifies E. coli in Spinach during 2006 Nationwide Outbreak 
Laboratory and epidemiology capacity is critical for rapid response to national disease outbreaks.
Wisconsin
http://dhfs.wisconsin.gov/preparedness
According to the Wisconsin Department of 
Health and Family Services, the cooperative 
agreement is valuable because it has led to 
a dramatic increase in Wisconsin’s capacity to 
conduct disease surveillance, epidemiological 
investigations, laboratory testing, and rapid/
secure communications through the Health 
Alert Network. The state also has established 
and operated 12 local public health 
departments and tribal preparedness consortia 






obilizing State by State
Public Health Laboratories
Public health laboratories test and confirm agents that can threaten health. For example, advanced DNA “fingerprinting” 
techniques and subsequent reporting to the CDC database (PulseNet) are critical to recognize nationwide outbreaks from 
bacteria that can cause severe illness, such as E. coli O157:H7 and Listeria monocytogenes. 
Detect & Report
Number of Wisconsin laboratories in the Laboratory Response Network1 3
Rapidly identified E. coli O157:H7 using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) 117
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days  89%
Rapidly identified Listeria monocytogenes using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) 8
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days 88%
Had a laboratory information management system that could create, send, and receive 
messages3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
-  System complied with CDC information technology standards (PHIN)3 (8/05 – 8/06) No
Had a rapid method to send urgent messages to frontline laboratories that perform 
initial screening of clinical specimens3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Crosscutting
Conducted bioterrorism exercise that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Conducted exercise to test chemical readiness that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
1 CDC, DBPR; 2007; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2007; 3 APHL, Public Health Laboratory Issues in Brief: Bioterrorism Capacity; May 2007; 4 CDC, DSLR; 2006
Response
Planning provides a framework for how a public health department will respond during an emergency. The plans can be 
tested through external reviews, exercises, and real events. After-action reports assess what worked well during an exercise or 
real event and how the department can improve. 
Control
Developed a public health response plan, including pandemic influenza response, crisis 
and emergency risk communication, and Strategic National Stockpile (SNS)1, 2 Yes
Wisconsin SNS plan reviewed by CDC2 Yes
-  Score on CDC technical assistance review (1-100) 86
Number of Wisconsin cities in the Cities Readiness Initiative3 1
Crosscutting
Developed roles and responsibilities for a multi-jurisdictional response (ICS) with:1  (8/05 – 8/06)
-  Hospitals Yes
-  Local/regional emergency management agencies Yes
-  Federal emergency management agencies Yes
Public health department staff participated in training to support cooperative 
agreement activities4 Yes
Public health laboratories conducted training for first responders5  (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Activated public health emergency operations center as part of a drill, exercise, or real 
event*†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) No
Conducted a drill or exercise for key response partners to test communications when 
power and land lines were unavailable†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) No
Improve Finalized at least one after-action report with an improvement plan following an exercise or real event†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
* Activation means rapidly staffing all eight core ICS functional roles in the public health emergency operations center with one person per position. This 
capability is critical to maintain in case of large-scale or complex incidents, even though not every incident requires full staffing of the ICS.
† States were expected to perform these activities from 9/1/2006 to 8/30/2007. These data represent results from the first half of this period only.






























In 2006, Wyoming participated in 
a multi-state pandemic influenza 
tabletop exercise, Operation Wide 
Open Spaces, that focused on 
strategies to mitigate the spread of disease and to assess 
the availability of local resources should a pandemic occur. 
Video conferencing technology brought together 31 
bordering counties in Wyoming, Colorado, Kansas, and 
Nebraska, covering a population size of approximately 
850,000. The exercise included representatives from 
four state, six regional, and ten local public health 
departments; the Indian Health Service; and other state 
and local agencies.
The exercise scenario involved avian influenza cases 
identified in airline passengers arriving in the United 
States from Asia. Participants discussed effective and 
timely cross-border and public communication strategies, 
cross-jurisdictional and multi-level information sharing, 
isolation and quarantine measures, and use of non-
traditional partnerships. The Incident Command System 
was also exercised, enabling people from different agencies 
and jurisdictions to work together. In addition, the 
Wyoming Department of Health conducted drills leading 
up to and during the exercise to test communication 
systems, such as the Health Alert Network, the new 
emergency communication management system, 
two-way radios, satellite phones, and remote video/
teleconferencing. Wyoming identified areas of strength 
which served the state well during this tabletop exercise, 
as well as areas for improvement. This allowed the state to 
strengthen its response capabilities should a real influenza 
pandemic occur in the future.
Snapshot of Public Health Preparedness
Below are activities conducted by Wyoming in the area of public health preparedness. They support CDC preparedness 
goals in the areas of detection and reporting, control, and improvement; crosscutting activities help prepare for all stages 
of an event. These data are not comprehensive and do not cover all preparedness activities.
Disease Detection and Investigation
The sooner public health professionals can detect diseases or other health threats and investigate their causes and effects in 
the community, the more quickly they can minimize population exposure. 
Detect &
Report
Could receive and investigate urgent disease reports 24/7/3651 Yes
-  Primary method for receiving urgent disease reports*2 Telephone
Linked state and local health personnel to share information about disease outbreaks 
across state lines (through the CDC Epi-X system)3 Yes
Conducted year-round surveillance for seasonal influenza4 Yes
* Telephone, fax, and electronic reporting are all viable options for urgent disease reporting, as long as the public health department has someone assigned 
to receive the reports 24/7/365.
1 CDC, DSLR; 2005; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2006; 3 CDC, Epi-X; 2007; 4 HHS, OIG; 2007
Wyoming Participates in a Multi-state Pandemic Influenza Exercise 
Exercises highlight strengths and enhance response during a real incident.
Wyoming
http://wdh.state.wy.us/sho/hazards
According to the Wyoming Department 
of Health, the cooperative agreement 
is valuable because it has allowed the 
department to hire staff to improve disease 
surveillance and laboratory testing, working 
relationships with the Eastern Shoshone and 
Northern Arapaho tribes, and preparedness 
at the county level; enhance laboratory 
capabilities by implementing rapid testing 
methods, training clinical laboratory 
staff, and establishing a courier system to 
rapidly transport samples to public health 
laboratories; and implement a communication 





obilizing State by State
Public Health Laboratories
Public health laboratories test and confirm agents that can threaten health. For example, advanced DNA “fingerprinting” 
techniques and subsequent reporting to the CDC database (PulseNet) are critical to recognize nationwide outbreaks from 
bacteria that can cause severe illness, such as E. coli O157:H7 and Listeria monocytogenes. 
Detect & Report
Number of Wyoming laboratories in the Laboratory Response Network1 1
Rapidly identified E. coli O157:H7 using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) 4
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days  100%
Rapidly identified Listeria monocytogenes using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2
-  Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) None
-  Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days N/A
Had a laboratory information management system that could create, send, and receive 
messages3 (8/05 – 8/06) No
-  System complied with CDC information technology standards (PHIN)3 (8/05 – 8/06) N/A
Had a rapid method to send urgent messages to frontline laboratories that perform 
initial screening of clinical specimens3 (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Crosscutting
Conducted bioterrorism exercise that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) No
Conducted exercise to test chemical readiness that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) N/A
1 CDC, DBPR; 2007; 2 CDC, DSLR; 2007; 3 APHL, Public Health Laboratory Issues in Brief: Bioterrorism Capacity; May 2007; 4 CDC, DSLR; 2006
Response
Planning provides a framework for how a public health department will respond during an emergency. The plans can be 
tested through external reviews, exercises, and real events. After-action reports assess what worked well during an exercise or 
real event and how the department can improve. 
Control
Developed a public health response plan, including pandemic influenza response, crisis 
and emergency risk communication, and Strategic National Stockpile (SNS)1, 2 Yes
Wyoming SNS plan reviewed by CDC2 Yes
-  Score on CDC technical assistance review (1-100) 72
Number of Wyoming cities in the Cities Readiness Initiative3 1
Crosscutting
Developed roles and responsibilities for a multi-jurisdictional response (ICS) with:1  (8/05 – 8/06)
-  Hospitals Yes
-  Local/regional emergency management agencies No
-  Federal emergency management agencies No
Public health department staff participated in training to support cooperative 
agreement activities4 Yes
Public health laboratories conducted training for first responders5  (8/05 – 8/06) Yes
Activated public health emergency operations center as part of a drill, exercise, or real 
event*†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
Conducted a drill or exercise for key response partners to test communications when 
power and land lines were unavailable†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
Improve Finalized at least one after-action report with an improvement plan following an exercise or real event†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) Yes
* Activation means rapidly staffing all eight core ICS functional roles in the public health emergency operations center with one person per position. This 
capability is critical to maintain in case of large-scale or complex incidents, even though not every incident requires full staffing of the ICS.
† States were expected to perform these activities from 9/1/2006 to 8/30/2007. These data represent results from the first half of this period only.


































obilizing State by State
Table 1: Cooperative Agreement Funding Allocation, FY 2002-2007
Jurisdiction FY 20021 FY 2003*1 FY 20042 FY 2005†2 FY 2006‡2 FY 2007§2
Total FY 
2002-2007
Alabama $14,900,443 $15,598,792 $12,910,651 $14,405,196 $14,813,276 $12,951,863 $85,580,221
Alaska $6,395,720 $6,502,762 $5,205,459 $5,868,019 $6,110,696 $5,838,752 $35,921,408
American 
Samoa $544,481 $576,463 $444,499 $561,855 $621,074 $547,830 $3,296,202
Arizona $16,422,170 $17,586,381 $16,470,314 $18,924,112 $19,853,184 $17,681,799 $106,937,960
Arkansas $10,951,709 $11,390,938 $9,339,265 $10,465,767 $10,831,516 $9,389,729 $62,368,924
California $60,816,245 $64,203,968 $59,319,441 $68,062,495 $72,029,121 $65,303,030 $389,734,300
Chicago $11,447,312 $11,378,246 $12,563,491 $14,014,304 $14,057,525 $15,703,041 $79,163,919
Colorado $14,575,766 $15,508,850 $13,654,314 $15,543,448 $15,894,493 $14,009,943 $89,186,814
Connecticut $12,581,705 $13,145,748 $10,828,647 $12,149,799 $12,668,280 $11,324,491 $72,698,670
Delaware $6,744,505 $6,889,271 $5,518,506 $6,295,104 $6,563,586 $5,911,495 $37,922,467
District of 
Columbia $11,273,558 $11,360,917 $11,985,069 $12,566,917 $7,562,416 $9,898,128 $64,647,005
Florida $40,581,081 $43,832,162 $37,583,527 $43,854,875 $47,080,106 $42,467,776 $255,399,527
Georgia $23,225,251 $24,935,506 $21,575,121 $24,931,530 $25,990,548 $23,156,267 $143,814,223
Guam $777,788 $679,585 $515,976 $690,478 $868,854 $771,758 $4,304,439
Hawaii $7,697,208 $7,910,098 $6,384,925 $7,184,997 $7,464,696 $6,418,428 $43,060,352
Idaho $7,880,688 $8,131,994 $6,588,258 $7,462,364 $7,824,227 $6,637,005 $44,524,536
Illinois $26,201,381 $28,315,621 $23,718,971 $26,922,367 $27,588,405 $24,575,584 $157,322,329
Indiana $18,536,799 $19,530,623 $16,262,765 $18,468,758 $19,103,844 $16,965,990 $108,868,779
Iowa $11,514,786 $11,953,663 $9,816,873 $10,940,911 $11,250,544 $9,779,223 $65,256,000
Kansas $10,985,143 $11,408,553 $9,354,215 $10,459,139 $11,019,457 $9,548,745 $62,775,252
Kentucky $13,998,067 $14,649,896 $12,105,282 $13,549,995 $14,090,005 $12,441,275 $80,834,520
Los Angeles
County $24,591,171 $27,856,971 $27,069,695 $30,833,561 $31,178,436 $30,712,150 $172,241,984
Louisiana $14,949,145 $15,602,245 $12,913,581 $14,382,879 $14,936,760 $13,243,220 $86,027,830
Maine $7,838,322 $8,046,341 $6,600,682 $7,424,912 $7,685,678 $6,526,615 $44,122,550
Marshall 
Islands $306,025 $561,544 $434,158 $560,134 $623,738 $550,238 $3,035,837
Cooperative Agreement Funding
Appendix 1
Table 1 presents cooperative agreement funding for states, localities, territories, and freely associated states from FY 2002–2007.





























Jurisdiction FY 20021 FY 2003*1 FY 20042 FY 2005†2 FY 2006‡2 FY 2007§2
Total FY 
2002-2007
Maryland $16,791,405 $17,774,011 $14,756,853 $17,131,387 $18,133,509 $16,047,435 $100,634,600
Massachusetts $19,134,801 $20,181,459 $17,640,158 $19,933,739 $20,197,272 $18,039,563 $115,126,992
Michigan $27,125,655 $28,731,577 $26,896,854 $30,057,553 $30,340,068 $26,992,552 $170,144,259
Micronesia $446,522 $653,415 $497,837 $623,034 $733,508 $649,441 $3,603,757
Minnesota $15,952,086 $16,821,680 $14,701,780 $16,735,319 $16,990,908 $15,591,574 $96,793,347
Mississippi $11,332,975 $11,782,347 $9,671,470 $10,809,190 $11,149,255 $9,722,248 $64,467,485
Missouri $17,456,448 $18,369,845 $15,952,563 $18,212,581 $18,695,498 $16,566,343 $105,253,278
Montana $7,008,529 $7,147,269 $5,775,627 $6,475,076 $6,728,463 $5,982,933 $39,117,897
Nebraska $8,809,733 $9,079,368 $7,377,335 $8,269,079 $8,547,285 $7,324,390 $49,407,190
Nevada $9,448,659 $9,975,108 $8,927,588 $10,312,883 $10,740,080 $9,340,451 $58,744,769
New 
Hampshire $7,751,193 $7,986,786 $6,465,014 $7,340,273 $7,609,049 $6,447,504 $43,599,819
New Jersey $23,732,611 $25,185,572 $21,047,364 $24,554,977 $25,095,585 $22,337,726 $141,953,835
New Mexico $9,049,687 $9,342,376 $8,803,295 $9,767,256 $10,112,893 $8,690,645 $55,766,152
New York $29,418,122 $31,675,790 $28,493,781 $31,499,224 $32,201,357 $28,874,622 $182,162,896
New York  
City $22,828,585 $23,586,023 $25,864,757 $28,535,849 $28,742,088 $28,822,589 $158,379,891
North 
Carolina $22,919,940 $24,462,186 $20,433,395 $23,094,942 $24,056,483 $21,306,097 $136,273,043




$314,371 $585,043 $450,446 $584,096 $671,401 $593,312 $3,198,669
Ohio $30,275,149 $32,012,830 $27,626,951 $31,183,708 $32,187,334 $28,837,726 $182,123,698
Oklahoma $12,682,086 $13,228,697 $10,899,049 $12,193,074 $12,552,423 $11,101,950 $72,657,279
Oregon $12,616,956 $13,237,862 $10,906,827 $12,521,422 $13,132,689 $11,468,821 $73,884,577
Palau $192,061 $521,761 $406,583 $515,482 $536,951 $471,804 $2,644,642
Pennsylvania $32,340,936 $34,178,922 $30,735,407 $34,485,058 $34,864,545 $31,306,870 $197,911,738
Puerto Rico $13,478,640 $14,103,331 $11,641,389 $13,016,943 $13,167,668 $11,445,404 $76,853,375
Rhode Island $7,333,840 $7,513,164 $6,048,030 $7,001,977 $7,185,100 $6,073,925 $41,156,036
South 
Carolina $13,931,820 $14,634,027 $12,091,813 $13,617,772 $14,135,585 $12,548,500 $80,959,517
South Dakota $6,680,506 $6,798,496 $5,441,461 $6,111,718 $6,347,032 $5,878,521 $37,257,734
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Jurisdiction FY 20021 FY 2003*1 FY 20042 FY 2005†2 FY 2006‡2 FY 2007§2
Total FY 
2002-2007
Tennessee $17,665,877 $18,635,684 $15,488,192 $17,380,881 $18,158,899 $16,418,187 $103,747,720
Texas $51,421,771 $55,684,954 $51,803,533 $59,464,754 $62,045,438 $56,222,601 $336,643,051
Utah $9,971,636 $10,404,357 $8,501,910 $9,632,487 $10,138,504 $8,878,797 $57,527,691
Vermont $6,355,413 $6,453,782 $5,198,685 $5,837,490 $6,052,340 $5,843,658 $35,741,368
Virgin Islands 
(US) $419,235 $639,297 $488,051 $623,850 $734,858 $650,661 $3,555,952
Virginia $20,758,682 $22,068,328 $19,924,893 $22,766,355 $23,915,622 $21,300,739 $130,734,619
Washington $18,121,902 $19,214,353 $16,978,969 $19,341,607 $19,965,603 $17,735,544 $111,357,978
West Virginia $9,025,861 $9,271,321 $7,540,254 $8,439,010 $8,683,141 $7,412,363 $50,371,950
Wisconsin $16,940,986 $17,821,131 $14,811,846 $16,806,704 $17,367,490 $15,868,646 $99,616,803
Wyoming $6,099,142 $6,171,022 $4,908,897 $5,528,786 $5,750,124 $5,748,448 $34,206,419
TOTAL $918,000,000 $970,000,000 $849,586,000 $962,777,000 $991,440,000 $896,736,525 $5,588,539,525 
* Includes $100 million Smallpox Supplement
† Includes $100 million Pandemic Influenza Supplement
‡ Includes $225 million Pandemic Influenza Supplement
§ Includes $175 million Pandemic Influenza Supplement
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DHS National Preparedness Guidelines and Priorities
Appendix 2
DHS established the National Preparedness 
Guidelines (formerly the National Preparedness Goal) 
in September 2007. The guidelines include a series of 
national priorities to guide preparedness efforts that 
meet the nation’s most urgent needs. The priorities 
reflect major themes and recurring issues identified 
in national strategies, presidential directives, State 
and Urban Area Homeland Security Strategies, the 
Hurricane Katrina Reports, and other lessons-learned 
reports. The priorities will be updated or refined 
over time as the nation implements the National 
Preparedness Guidelines or encounters changes 
in the homeland security strategic environment. 
These priorities are also applicable to public health 
preparedness. 
The Guidelines provide three planning tools to help 
government officials achieve these priorities: the 
National Planning Scenarios, the Target Capabilities 
List (TCL), and the Universal Task List (UTL). 
The National Planning Scenarios are designed to 
identify the broad spectrum of tasks and capabilities 
needed for all-hazards preparedness. The TCL is a 
comprehensive catalog of capabilities to perform 
homeland security missions, including performance 
measures and metrics for common tasks. The UTL is 
a library and hierarchy of tasks by homeland security 
mission area. For more information, see 
www.fema.gov/pdf/government/npg.pdf.
National Preparedness Priorities
• Expand Regional Collaboration
• Implement the National Incident 
Management System and National Response 
Plan
• Implement the National Infrastructure 
Protection Plan
• Strengthen Information Sharing and 
Collaboration Capabilities
• Strengthen Interoperable Communications 
Capabilities
• Strengthen Chemical, Biological, 
Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosive 
Detection, Response, and Decontamination 
Capabilities
• Strengthen Medical Surge and Mass 
Prophylaxis Capabilities
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The mission of CDC’s terrorism preparedness and emergency response activities is to prevent 
death, disability, disease, and injury associated with urgent health threats by improving 
preparedness of the public health system, the healthcare delivery system, and the public. 
CDC has made all-hazards preparedness and emergency response a priority and is building 
and enhancing systems at the local, state, and federal levels. For more information, see http://
emergency.cdc.gov/.
Coordinating Office for Terrorism Preparedness and 
Emergency Response (COTPER) 
COTPER coordinates terrorism preparedness and emergency response activities across CDC 
and strategically distributes funds to other CDC centers and offices. COTPER is comprised of 
the following divisions:
• The Division of State and Local Readiness (DSLR) administers the Public Health 
Emergency Preparedness cooperative agreement, which funds state and local efforts to 
build and strengthen their infrastructure and capabilities to respond to and recover from 
a public health emergency and provides consultation and technical assistance to promote 
these efforts. DSLR also manages the Centers for Public Health Preparedness program, 
located in 27 universities across the country, and supports eight Advanced Practice 
Centers, which are local public health departments that develop cutting-edge tools and 
resources that help other local public health departments prepare for, respond to, and 
recover from emergencies. 
• The Division of Strategic National Stockpile (DSNS) supports and maintains the 
Strategic National Stockpile (SNS), a national repository of antibiotics, antiviral drugs, 
chemical antidotes, antitoxins, life-support medications, intravenous administration 
equipment, airway maintenance supplies, and medical/surgical items. During a public 
health emergency, state and local public health systems and resources may become 
overwhelmed. The SNS is designed to supplement and re-supply state and local public 
health departments in the event of such an emergency. DSNS also provides technical 
assistance to local officials to help ensure that local, state, and federal agencies can work 
together to receive, stage, store, and distribute SNS assets.
• The Division of Emergency Operations (DEO) is CDC’s command center for the 
coordination of emergency response to domestic and international public health threats 
and is staffed 24/7/365. The Director’s Emergency Operations Center (DEOC) is 
equipped with state-of-the-art communications technologies to support information 
pipelines with state, federal, and international partners. The DEOC is the CDC contact 
for state public health departments for reporting potential public health threats.
• The Division of Select Agents and Toxins (DSAT) regulates the possession, use, and 
transfer of biological agents and toxins (select agents) that could pose a severe threat to 
public health and safety.
• The Office of the Director (OD) manages strategy, goals setting, budget formulation, 
communication, and science for terrorism preparedness and emergency response 
activities. In addition, OD manages the Career Epidemiology Field Officer program, 
which recruits and supports skilled epidemiologists in state and local public health 






























departments. Public health departments can choose to spend cooperative agreement 
funds to support a field officer in their public health department. 
Other centers within CDC also contribute to public health preparedness and are described 
below in alphabetical order.
Coordinating Center for Environmental Health and Injury 
Prevention (CCEHIP)
CCEHIP plans, directs, and coordinates public health research, programs, and laboratory 
sciences that improve health and eliminate illness, disability, and/or death caused by injuries or 
environmental exposures. The following highlights public health preparedness activities within 
national centers of CCEHIP:
• The National Center for Environmental Health/Agency for Toxic Substances and 
Disease Registry (NCEH/ATSDR) conducts ongoing projects to improve surveillance 
systems, laboratory capacity, and emergency response. NCEH/ATSDR is improving 
various surveillance systems for chemical exposures, hazardous substance spills, and 
morbidity following disasters. Upgrades of CDC laboratories enhance their capacity 
to respond to chemical and radiological terrorism and to analyze toxins via improved 
analytical methods. NCEH/ATSDR is also working with state and local public health 
departments to improve response to chemical, nuclear, and radiological terrorism.
• The National Center for Injury Prevention and Control (NCIPC) links to the 
injury care community to decrease morbidity and mortality from injuries caused by 
explosions. NCIPC is moving towards this goal through curriculum development for 
health care providers, the development of clinical guidelines in blast injury management, 
improvement of field triage for large-scale blast injuries, and translation of lessons learned 
from international and U.S. military experience. 
Coordinating Center for Health Information and Service 
(CCHIS)
CCHIS provides leadership and promotes innovation in public health informatics, health 
statistics, health marketing, and scientific communications. The following describe the many 
ways in which the national centers within CCHIS are enhancing communications to help 
detect and respond to emergencies.
• The National Center for Health Marketing (NCHM) strengthens health 
communications networks across federal, state, and local levels with such projects as Epi-
X, the Public Health Training Network, and the National Public Health Radio Network. 
NCHM’s Emergency Communication Branch provides leadership for cross-agency 
emergency risk communication during emergencies, and ensures that CDC coordinates 
with state and local public health departments in providing critical health protection 
information to the public, clinicians, emergency responders, and other stakeholders. The 
emergency response component of the CDC-INFO Contact Center and Translation 
Services for Emergency Information enhances dissemination of emergency information 
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• The National Center for Public Health Informatics (NCPHI) coordinates BioSense, 
the near real-time biosurveillance system that provides health situational awareness using 
existing data from healthcare organizations across the country. Through PHIN, NCPHI 
provides technical assistance and guidance to state and local partners to implement 
interoperable public health information systems allowing for the exchange of data 
across organizational and jurisdictional boundaries. The LRN Real Time Laboratory 
Information Exchange also equips LRN labs to securely share data in real time according 
to industry standards.
• The National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) develops and conducts data 
collection activities to monitor the nation’s health and provides expertise in data 
collection and analysis to state and local partners through collaborative efforts. Examples 
of such efforts include the California Health Interview Survey and New York City’s 
Community Health and Nutrition Examination Survey, work with state vital statistics 
offices to improve state data collection activities, and assisting states in data collection 
needs related to disasters such as Hurricane Katrina. NCHS also provides leadership 
in developing classification standards for reporting morbidity and mortality and in 
monitoring adoption of electronic health records by health providers.
Coordinating Center for Health Promotion (CoCHP)
CoCHP seeks to increase the potential for full, satisfying, and productive living across the 
lifespan for all people, in all communities. CoCHP preparedness activities include providing 
technical expertise in epidemiology, surveillance and communications for populations with 
physical and development disabilities and chronic diseases, pregnant and lactating women, 
reproductive-age women, infants, the elderly, and school-age children in emergencies. 
Additional activities include: 
• The National Center on Birth Defects and Developmental Disabilities (NCBDDD) 
is conducting ongoing projects to develop and strengthen intramural research and 
surveillance capacity related to emergency preparedness for at-risk populations. In 
particular, NCBDDD is investigating the states of pre-event and post-event readiness 
among at-risk populations affected by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
• The National Center for Chronic Disease Prevention and Health Promotion 
(NCCDPHP) has a number of publications addressing the burden and needs 
surrounding persons with chronic diseases following natural disasters. Activities include 
strengthening emergency response surveillance efforts through rapid telephone surveys 
administered through the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System; collaborating 
in the review of mental health response cards following Hurricane Katrina; examining 
agricultural issues to assist in achieving the goal of a safer, healthier, secure, and equitable 
food supply (e.g., food security, influences on economics and food production, food 
access); examining provisions for oral health following Hurricane Katrina; and developing 
conceptual models, analytic reports, guidance, and incident response plans for pregnant, 





























Coordinating Center for Infectious Diseases (CCID)
CCID strives to protect health related to infectious diseases. The following highlights CCID’s 
ongoing public health preparedness activities, including developing vaccines, enhancing 
diagnostic methods of select bioterrorism agents, and improving the LRN. 
• The Influenza Coordination Unit (ICU) is ensuring that the diverse activities related 
to pandemic or seasonal influenza preparedness and response activities are coordinated, 
effective, and efficient. ICU works with other CDC divisions and offices to continuously 
improve the CDC Pandemic Influenza Operations Plan, plan and participate in agency-
wide exercises, and manage portfolios of related pandemic influenza projects.
• The National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases (NCIRD), as part of 
the Anthrax Vaccine Research Program, is conducting a large-scale human clinical trial of 
the anthrax vaccine, as well as further immunological studies in animals. NCIRD is also 
developing an anthrax immune globulin for eventual storage in the SNS.
• The National Center for Zoonotic, Vector-Borne, and Enteric Diseases (NCZVED) 
is working to improve surveillance, diagnostic and molecular methods, and laboratory 
capacities for a number of select bioterrorism agents, including smallpox, botulism and 
plague. NCZVED also seeks to quicken the detection and response to bioterrorism 
agents in water and food.
• The National Center for Preparedness, Detection, and Control of Infectious 
Diseases (NCPDCID) manages the LRN, the global consortium of reference and 
national laboratories whose goal is to decrease the time needed to detect biological and 
chemical agents that can harm the public and respond to these events with detection 
and identification capacities and surveillance support. The Division of Bioterrorism 
Preparedness and Response (DBPR) is primarily responsible for managing the LRN and 
preparedness activities within CCID. In addition, NCPDCID tests for the continuing 
effectiveness of existing drugs against bioterrorism agents and prepares U.S. ports of entry 
to reduce the risk of natural or intentional introduction of infectious diseases into the 
country. 
Coordinating Office for Global Health (COGH)
COGH provides leadership and works with global partners to increase life expectancy and years 
of quality of life, and also to increase global preparedness to prevent and control natural and 
manmade threats to health. 
• The Global Terrorism Preparedness and Emergency Response program is developing and 
implementing a pre-event strategy for CDC’s external engagements with international 
public health partners in terrorism preparedness and emergency response. 
• COGH also coordinates international response with the Director’s Emergency 
Operations Center during international emergency response events and serves as 
the principal CDC point-of-contact for CDC programs, federal agencies, foreign 
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National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH)
NIOSH provides leadership to prevent work-related illness, injury and death through 
information gathering, scientific research, and translation of knowledge gained into products 
and services. The NIOSH Emergency Preparedness and Response Office takes primary 
responsibility to serve as the focal point of technical expertise; facilitate rapid and specific on-
site support; and advance research and collaboration to enhance preparedness and response 
efforts.
• NIOSH is a cooperating agency in the Worker Safety and Health Support Annex of the 
National Response Plan. In the aftermath of disasters, NIOSH provides assistance on 
occupational exposure assessments, provides guidance on personal protective equipment, 
and develops and disseminates guidelines to integrate worker safety and health into site 
operations. NIOSH works with multidisciplinary teams to develop procedures for follow-
up evaluations of worker injuries, conducts health hazards evaluations, and provides 
technical assistance to local, state, and federal governmental agencies to assess potential 
health effects from workers’ exposures in the recovery zone.
• In addition, NIOSH has developed an aggressive research portfolio to address a 
wide range of research needs in the emergency response community. For example, 
NIOSH conducts research to address the critical need for effective personal protective 
technologies, such as respirators, chemical-resistant clothing, hearing protectors, and 
safety goggles and glasses that provide a barrier between the worker and an occupational 
safety or health risk.
Office of the Director (OD)
OD manages and directs the activities of CDC and coordinates the CDC response to 
emergencies. Public health preparedness activities within the OD include security, legal 
preparedness, and workforce training. OD also coordinates the placement of Senior 
Management Officials (SMOs), who function as the chief CDC representatives within selected 
states. SMOs oversee CDC resources, provide technical assistance, and serve as a point of 
contact during emergencies. In 2007, 11 states and DC had permanent SMOs, and 5 states and 
2 territories had SMOs who provide support only during an emergency. The following offices 
participate in CDC preparedness activities:
• The Office of the Chief Operating Officer (OCOO) ensures that federal assets 
and critical infrastructure are safeguarded by providing security for CDC facilities 
and the SNS. OCOO also manages secure intelligence communication systems and 
HealthImpact.net (an internal CDC system) to support terrorism preparedness projects.
• The Office of Chief of Public Health Practice (OCPHP) develops the legal 
preparedness of CDC programs, front-line public health practitioners, policy makers, 
and partners in related sectors (e.g., emergency management, law enforcement, judiciary, 
and health care) to effectively address terrorism, other public health emergencies, and 
additional national public health priorities. OCPHP focuses on improving all four core 
elements of public health legal preparedness: laws and legal authorities; the competency 
of multi-sector practitioners to apply those laws effectively; coordinated implementation 
of laws across sectors and jurisdictions; and actionable information on best practices 
in legal preparedness. In addition, OCPHP is implementing the Social Distancing 
Law Project to assess 18 states’ capacity to implement quarantine and other non-





























• The Office of Enterprise Communication (OEC) promotes effective and efficient 
communication networks both within CDC and with external partners. During an 
emergency situation that requires a CDC response, OEC provides information and 
communication support within the Joint Information Center. OEC developed the CDC 
Employee Guide for Influenza Pandemic Preparedness and conducted pandemic influenza 
crisis and emergency risk communication training in collaboration with HHS. 
• The Office of Workforce and Career Development (OWCD) plans, directs and 
manages workforce training programs for public health preparedness. The Epidemic 
Intelligence Service (EIS) program trains high-level epidemiologists for placement in 
state and local public health departments. The management and staff of LRN reference 
laboratories are also trained in preparedness, implementation of the Select Agent 
Program, and testing protocols. In addition, OWCD provides targeted preparedness 
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CDC works under the strategic leadership of ASPR, the principal advisor to HHS on issues related to 
bioterrorism and other public health emergencies that affect the civilian population. ASPR coordinates 
and integrates public health emergency preparedness activities among federal, state, and local officials. 
ASPR has also been a lead partner in the development of a U.S. government-wide pandemic influenza 
strategic plan and coordinated subsidies for states to stockpile antiviral drugs to help respond in case of 
an influenza pandemic. The planning, coordination, and operational functions of ASPR are conducted 
by four offices:
Office of the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development 
Authority (BARDA)
BARDA is responsible for providing coordination and expert advice regarding the development and 
procurement of public health medical countermeasures, or pharmaceuticals (e.g., vaccines, antitoxins, 
and preventive and therapeutic drugs) that protect against health threats during emergencies. Through 
the Public Health Emergency Medical Countermeasures Enterprise—an interagency effort that also 
includes CDC, FDA, and the National Institutes of Health—BARDA coordinates efforts to define and 
prioritize requirements for public health emergency medical countermeasures, product development 
and procurement, and related research. BARDA is also responsible for setting strategies for the 
deployment and use of medical countermeasures stored in the SNS.
Office of Preparedness and Emergency Operations (OPEO)
OPEO is responsible for developing operational plans, analytical products, and training exercises to 
ensure the preparedness of ASPR, HHS, the federal government, and the public to respond to public 
health and medical threats and emergencies, both domestically and internationally. OPEO is also 
responsible for ensuring that ASPR has the systems, logistical support, and procedures necessary to 
coordinate HHS operational response to acts of terrorism and other public health and medical threats 
and emergencies. The following programs are administered within OPEO:
• The Hospital Preparedness Program (HPP) helps hospitals and health care systems to 
prepare for and respond to public health emergencies. Current program priority areas 
include interoperable communication systems, bed tracking, personnel management, fatality 
management planning and hospital evacuation planning. During the past 5 years, HPP 
funds have also improved bed and personnel surge capacity, decontamination capabilities, 
isolation capacity, pharmaceutical supplies, training, education, drills, and exercises. Hospitals, 
outpatient facilities, health centers, poison control centers, emergency medical services, and 
other healthcare partners work with the appropriate state or local health departments to 
acquire funding and develop healthcare system preparedness through this program. Funding is 
distributed directly to the health department of the state or political subdivision of a state (i.e., 
cities and counties).
• The National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) is a federally coordinated system that 
augments the nation’s medical response capability. The overall purpose of the NDMS is to 
establish a single integrated national medical response capability for assisting state and local 
authorities in dealing with the medical impacts of major peacetime disasters and to provide 






























support to the military and the Department of Veterans Affairs medical systems in caring 
for casualties evacuated back to the U.S. from overseas armed conventional conflicts.
• The Healthcare and Public Health Sector Critical Infrastructure Protection 
Program leads a unique public and private sector partnership in protecting the essential 
goods, services, and functions of healthcare and public health that, if destroyed or 
compromised, would negatively affect the nation’s ability to respond to emergencies and 
care for its citizens.
Office of Medicine, Science, and Public Health (OMSPH)
OMSPH is responsible for providing expert medical, scientific, and public health advice on 
domestic and international medical preparedness policies, programs, initiatives, and activities. 
OMSPH serves as the ASPR liaison to health and science professional organizations for 
domestic and international issues. 
Office of Policy and Strategic Planning (OPSP)
OPSP is responsible for policy formulation and coordination for preparedness and response 
strategic planning. In coordination with other ASPR and HHS offices, OPSP analyzes proposed 
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Data presented in Sections 1 and 2 of this report come from a variety of sources. Footnotes in 
the report provide information on the specific source and timeframe for each data point. The 
purpose of the information below is to provide additional details about data sources. Listed 
alphabetically below are the specific sources of data, the time frame in which the data were 
collected, and any additional information needed to understand the data. 
APHL 
APHL, Public Health Laboratory Issues in Brief: Bioterrorism Capacity; October 2002: 
APHL conducted the first survey in this series to establish a baseline status of state public 
health laboratories regarding bioterrorism preparedness as of December 31, 2001. Self-reported 
data were collected about personnel, facilities/biosecurity, clinical laboratory connectivity, 
equipment/supplies, transportation/courier service, integrated data management, and training 
from 46 states, 1 territory, and DC, for a 92% response rate.
APHL, Public Health Laboratory Issues in Brief: Bioterrorism Capacity; May 2007: APHL 
conducted the fifth survey in this series to assess the effects of preparedness funding on state 
public health laboratory readiness for bioterrorism. Self-reported data were collected about 
funding, workforce, laboratory connectivity and integration, sample intake and laboratory 
testing, and reporting capabilities during the period from August 31, 2005 to August 30, 
2006. All 50 states, DC, and Puerto Rico responded, for a total sample size of 52 with a 100% 
response rate. Puerto Rico’s responses were not included in the data presented.
APHL, Chemical Terrorism Preparedness: In the Nation’s State Public Health Laboratories; 
May 2007: APHL conducted its third annual Chemical Terrorism Laboratory Preparedness 
Survey of public health laboratories to assess their capacity and capability to respond to 
chemical terrorism from August 31, 2005 to August 30, 2006. Self-reported data were collected 
on funding, testing capability and capacity, workforce, coordination and response planning, and 
all-hazards receipt and testing. Responses were received from 46 states and DC, for a response 
rate of 90%.
APHL, unpublished data provided for 2006 and 2002: APHL provided unpublished survey 
data for the number of clinical laboratorians that participated in state-sponsored training to 
perform rule-out testing for biological agents. The training covered rule-out testing, packing 
and shipping, and biosafety guidelines.
CDC
CDC, DBPR EARS data; 2007: Data about EARS consist of program information from 
DBPR in CCID. 
CDC, DBPR LRN data; 2007: Data about the LRN consist of program information from 
DBPR in CCID. More details about LRN data follow.






























• Percentage of population within 100 miles of a LRN laboratory: DBPR used census data for 
the year 2000 to determine the proportion of the U.S. population within 100 miles of 
a laboratory participating in the LRN. Analysis for this report was conducted in August 
2007.
• Number of laboratories within the LRN: This report represents the number of LRN 
laboratories as of November 2007.
• Laboratory testing for biological and chemical agents: State and local laboratories in the 
LRN are subject to routine proficiency testing to confirm accuracy of testing for a range 
of biological and chemical agents. These proficiency tests are conducted throughout the 
year, and the data were updated as of September 2007.
CDC, DEO data; 2007: DEO tracks major events that may have public health consequences. 
CDC monitors and often responds to these major events.
CDC, DEO Epi-Aid data; 2007: These data consist of program information from Epi-Aid, 
a program of CDC assistance in epidemiologic field investigations on request from states, 
localities, and abroad. DEO coordinates these regular deployments of field teams throughout 
the year and records the number, type, length, and locations of field investigations.
CDC, Division of Integrated Surveillance Systems and Services BioSense data; 2007: Data 
about BioSense consist of program information from the Division of Integrated Surveillance 
Systems and Services in NCPHI.
CDC, DSLR data; 1999-2005: DSLR requested information from states regarding the 
progress made in preparedness from 1999 through August 30, 2005, at the end of the first five 
budget periods of the cooperative agreement.
CDC, DSLR data; 2003-2006: States were required to submit information annually on their 
preparedness activities during the reporting period from August 31 through August 30.
CDC, DSLR data; 2007: DSLR collected performance measure data from states, territories, 
and localities for budget period 7 of the cooperative agreement. Data presented in this report 
reflect the partial year period from September 1, 2006 through February 28, 2007. States will 
submit additional data for the latter half of the year.
CDC, DSLR Mid-Year Progress Report Review data; 2007: DSLR reviewed state public 
health departments’ status in various areas of preparedness through narrative information 
reported as part of the cooperative agreement. DSLR uses the reviews to develop consultation 
plans and regional workshops to work on areas identified as needing improvement.
CDC, DSNS data; 2001-2007: CDC annually reviews state plans to receive, stage, store, and 
distribute pharmaceutical and medical supplies during an emergency. The review tool is based 
on a 100-point scale and covers 13 functional areas. Program consultants rate the plans based 
on the evidence provided and their professional judgment and experience. CDC uses review 
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presented for states with completed reviews from September 2006 through December 2007. 
One state did not have a complete review as of January 2007. DSNS also tracks the number of 
joint state and CDC SNS exercises, and data are presented for 2001-2006.
CDC, DSNS Cities Readiness Initiative (CRI) data; 2007: These data consist of program 
information from the CRI.
CDC, Epi-X data; 2007: These data consist of program information from Epi-X, a CDC 
communications system that helps track disease outbreaks. CDC’s CCHIS maintains an active 
registry of qualified and trained users of the Epi-X system. The report presents figures based on 
end-of-calendar-year numbers of registered Epi-X users.
CDC, HAN data; 2003-2007: CDC’s CCHIS tests states and localities’ ability to respond to a 
test message within 30 minutes or less. The report presents data from 2003 through 2007.
CDC, NCEH data; 2007: Data consist of NCEH program information. NCEH works 
with state and local public health departments to improve response to chemical, nuclear, and 
radiological terrorism.
CDC, Pandemic Influenza State Self-Assessments data; 2006: As part of the cooperative 
agreement pandemic influenza supplemental funding, states and localities completed a 
pandemic influenza self-assessment in April 2006. Progress was reported in a number of key 
activities as “completed,” “in progress,” or “not started.” Data were reported for 49 states.
CSTE
CSTE, Epidemiological Capacity Assessment (ECA); 2006: CSTE surveyed state and 
territorial public health departments in 2006 to determine the current status of core 
epidemiologic capacity, competence-specific training needs, and barriers to recruitment and 
retention of epidemiologists. The 50 states, DC, American Samoa, the Northern Mariana 
Islands, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands responded, for a 93% response rate. The 2006 
ECA summarized 2006 data and changes in epidemiologic and surveillance capacity since 2001 
and 2004 for the 39 public health departments that participated in assessments all 3 years. 
HHS
HHS Press Releases; 2002-2007: HHS publishes press releases on the amount of funding 
allocated to state, local, and territorial public health departments through the cooperative 
agreement.
HHS OIG, Status of State 24/7 Urgent Disease and Public Health Emergency Reporting 
Systems; February 2005: OIG reviewed public health departments’ 24/7 urgent disease and 
public health emergency reporting systems and reported that 12 states and Los Angeles County 





























HHS OIG, Memorandum Report—Laboratory Preparedness for Pandemic Influenza; 
October 2007: OIG surveyed public health laboratory officials in the states and DC concerning 
their ability to conduct year-round influenza surveillance, among other critical tasks related to 
pandemic influenza.
Methods for Developing Section 2 Snapshots
State and local public health preparedness officials reviewed data presented in their respective 
snapshots. Corrections to the data during the specific time frames were accepted.
To develop text boxes on why public health departments value the cooperative agreement, CDC 
reviewed narrative submitted by grantees summarizing progress from 1999 – 2005. The text 
box was adapted from this information and reviewed by the relevant state or local public health 
department.  Their changes were incorporated.
To develop examples of public health department responses or exercises, CDC reviewed 
documentation from partner organizations and grantee progress reports to identify a topic. 
These topics were then confirmed with the appropriate officials, and supporting materials were 
requested from state and local public health departments. CDC staff developed the examples 
based on these materials and submitted the content to the relevant state or local public health 
department for review. Their changes and recommendations were incorporated. 
Most examples were developed using public health department documents. Sources for the 
examples outside of these documents are listed below.
Multiple States
ASTHO. State Public Health Successful Response Stories [online]. [cited 2007 Jul 30]. 
Available from URL: http://www.astho.org/pubs/SuccessStoriesMainPage.htm. Used to support 
examples for: Arkansas, Georgia, Missouri, Nebraska, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and 
Tennessee.
California
ASTHO. Public Health Preparedness: California – Heat Wave [online]. 2007. [cited 2007 Jul 
30]. Available from URL: http://www.astho.org/pubs/2007HillSuccessCA.pdf
Massachusetts 
Smith S. Outbreak stopped: Facing a potential measles epidemic, health workers employed 
high-tech alerts, old-fashioned quarantines [online]. The Boston Globe 2006 Jul 31 [cited 2007 
Jul 31]. 
New York City 
Chan S. New York City man has inhalation anthrax, officials say [online]. The New York Times 
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South Carolina
• Nieratko J. Train derailment highlights public health preparedness [online]. 
ASTHO Report 2005;13:1. Available from URL: http://www.astho.org/pubs/
FallASTHOReport2005.pdf
• Hinshaw D. At least 220 treated at area hospitals. The State 2005 Feb 7; Sect. A-1 (col. 
3)
• O’Connor J. Training, resources made response to leak smooth; much of S.C. ill-
equipped for such a crisis. The State 2005 Jan 9; Sect. A-1 (col. 1)
Utah 
Testimony of A. Richard Melton, DrPH, deputy director, Utah Department of Health: Hearing 
before the Subcomm. On Bioterrorism and Public Health Preparedness of the Senate Comm. 
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Category A Agents
The U.S. public health system and primary healthcare providers must be prepared to address various 
biological agents, including pathogens that are rarely seen in the United States. High-priority agents 
include organisms that pose a risk to national security because they can be easily disseminated or 
transmitted from person to person; result in high mortality rates and have the potential for major 
public health impact; might cause public panic and social disruption; and require special action for 
public health preparedness. Category A agents are listed below:
• Anthrax (Bacillus anthracis)
• Botulism (Clostridium botulinum toxin) 
• Plague (Yersinia pestis) 
• Smallpox (variola major) 
• Tularemia (Francisella tularensis) 
• Viral hemorrhagic fevers (filoviruses [e.g., Ebola, Marburg] and arenaviruses [e.g., Lassa, 
Machupo])
Category B Agents
The second-highest priority agents include those that are moderately easy to disseminate; result in 
moderate morbidity rates and low mortality rates; and require specific enhancements of CDC’s 
diagnostic capacity and enhanced disease surveillance. Category B agents are listed below:
• Brucellosis (Brucella species) 
• Epsilon toxin of Clostridium perfringens
• Food safety threats (e.g., Salmonella species, Escherichia coli O157:H7, Shigella)
• Glanders (Burkholderia mallei)
• Melioidosis (Burkholderia pseudomallei)
• Psittacosis (Chlamydia psittaci) 
• Q fever (Coxiella burnetii) 
• Ricin toxin from Ricinus communis (castor beans)
• Staphylococcal enterotoxin B
• Typhus fever (Rickettsia prowazekii)
• Viral encephalitis (alphaviruses [e.g., Venezuelan equine encephalitis, eastern equine encephalitis, 
western equine encephalitis])
• Water safety threats (e.g., Vibrio cholerae, Cryptosporidium parvum)
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